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GIVING THE AUDIENCE
Economics-minded critics of government intervention in the media realm
raise a constant refrain. Interventions are paternalistic. Interventions treat
viewers as "helpless or obstinate."' Interventions assume that viewers are
"incapable of wise choice." 2 In a free society, audiences must be treated as
perfectly able to know and choose what they want to read, watch, and listen to.
Market-based incentives will lead media producers to provide audiences with
what they want. In his classic article arguing for deregulation of broadcasting,
former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler explained that the government "should
rely on the broadcasters' ability to determine the wants of their audiences
through the normal mechanisms of the marketplace." 3 As with any other
product, "[i]n the fully deregulated marketplace, the highest bidder would make
the best and highest use of the resource." 4 Fowler's deregulatory perspective
has swept through policymaking circles and become the received wisdom in
executive, legislative, and judicial branch thinking about media policy. 5 This
Article argues that this approach is fundamentally wrong.
The Article's primary concern is with the market's effectiveness in creating
and providing media content. The pervasive antiregulatory refrain, however,
has recently been equally loud in the related context of the infrastructure for
delivering communication content. 6 It was overwhelmingly evident in passage
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, adopted as "[a]n Act to promote
competition and reduce regulation." 7 The virtually unquestioned market
orientation was conspicuous, for example, in the bill's initial Senate Report,
which described the bill's purpose as "to provide a pro-competitive,
I See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment
Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1725 (1995).
2 See id.
3 Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207,210 (1982).
4 Id. at211.
5 See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993), vacated and remanded to determine if moot, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996); U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, GLOBAIJAnON OF THE MASS MEDIA (1993).6 Cy BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXRsSSION 189 (1975)
(emphasizing the propriety of government regulation of the transmission system but not the
staucturally distinguishable editorial or content creation system). Although I have elsewhere
criticized some of the "deregulatory" tactics of the new Telecommunications Bill, see C.
Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and Cable, 17 HAs9MS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 97, 116-17
(1994), this Article challenges the more fundamental premises that underlie both that bill and,
possibly more importantly, the country's overall media policies.
7 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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deregulatory national policy framework." 8 Senator Hollings' additional views
emphasized that "competition is the best regulator of the marketplace," 9 while
the only two dissenting Senators argued that "[d]eregulation has a clear and
consistent track record" but complained that the deregulatory bill (as reported
out) did "not go far enough" and did "not guarantee free and open markets." 10
The promarket refrain within the media realm often repeats standard
conservative defenses of free markets. Yet, in the context of the media, this
view has added appeal, even to generally proregulatory liberals, because of
First Amendment values that reject government paternalism in respect to
speech. Despite the lure of this equation of freedom of the press with free
markets, I have argued the equation is not mandated by constitutional law. 11
Although the First Amendment ought to restrict purposeful suppression of
speech, it should not and has not restricted structural interventions designed to
improve the quality of the press.
Still, maybe the critics of intervention properly emphasize the strong
antipatemalism aspect of the First Amendment. If interventions are
paternalistic, if they attempt to displace people's own choices of what they
want, then maybe interventions are contrary to basic First Amendment values.
The critics argue that, in respect to media content, surely the government ought
to let the public get what it wants-and this, they assert, means leaving the issue
to the market. 12 This Article critiques the underlying assumption of this
argument, namely, the claim that the market gives people the media they want.
Economically-oriented critics of intervention typically rely on
oversimplified economics. Under certain purportedly typical circumstances,
markets produce a preference-maximizing amount of a "product." The market
provides firms with an incentive to produce the product as long as the product's
cost (e.g., its cost of production, distribution) is less than the purchaser will
8 COMMITEE ON COMMERCE, ScIENcE, & TRANsP., 104TH CONG., REPORT ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CoMPrIToN AND DEREGuLATION Acr OF 1995, S. REP. No. 104-
23, at 1 (1995).
9 Id. at 67.
10 Id. at70.
11 Elsewhere I have discussed interpretations of the Press Clause as well as some of the
history of government intervention and will not explore those issues in this Article. See, e.g.,
C. EDWiN BAKER, ADvERTISING AND A DEMOcRATic PREss ch. 5 (1994) [hereinafter BAKER,
ADVERTSG]; C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST.
COMMENTARY 421 (1993) [hereinafter Baker, Private Power]; C. Edwin Baker, Turner
Broadcasting: Content Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 57
[hereinafter Baker, Turner Broadcasting]; see also CAss R. SuNSTEiN, DEMOCRACY AND Tim
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECm (1993).
12 See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 3.
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pay, that is, as long as marginal costs are less than marginal price. This I call
the "standard model."
Of course, no one ever claims that the market works perfectly. And the
standard model is subject to a host of general critiques. 13 Still, many find the
standard model relatively adequate, at least enough so that it seems persuasive
as a presumptive reason to rely on "free" markets. For present purposes, I will
assume that the market generally works relatively well-for example, it
effectively and efficiently leads to the right production and distribution of cars
or can openers. My claim is that, whatever the validity of general critiques of
the market, the standard model applies especially badly to media products.
The persuasiveness of the standard model depends on the following
assumptions: (1) the products are sold in competitive markets and they are sold
at a price (i.e., marginal revenue) where average cost equals marginal cost (and
thus, implicitly, where marginal cost is rising); (2) the product's production and
normal use creates relatively few serious externalities (i.e., relatively few major
benefits not captured by or costs not imposed on the seller/producer); and
(3) the most significant policy concern is satisfying market-expressed
preferences. Even if these assumptions are true enough in respect to cars or can
openers, my claim is that they do not apply so well to the media.
I begin in Part I by noting several special qualities of most media products,
which complicate the economic analysis. Then, the argument proceeds in three
parts. Parts I and III survey reasons why media markets are especially unlikely
13 For example, (1) reliance on market allocation accepts the existing distribution of
wealth as a given when it should be changed or is contested; (2) the market stimulates
undesirable desires precisely because they can be profitably fulfilled; (3) the market
encourages (rewards) undesirable interpersonal behavior and undesirable personality traits; (4)
market competition creates an incentive for a market enterprise (e.g., capital holders) to have
power in relation to other resource owners (e.g., labor or other competitors) as much as it
creates an incentive to produce good products efficiently although the power struggles
between stake-holders both waste resources and often generate unjust distributions, see, e.g.,
PCHAw C. EDWARDS, CONTEsrm TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMAnON OF THE WoRKnACE
IN THE TWENMnH CENTURY (1979); and (5) the market promotes optimal preference
satisfaction only if, contrary to reality, most goods are made available at their marginal cost-
since this is not the case, we live in a world of the "second best" where making any particular
item available at its actual marginal cost could amount to too low or too high a price and
could generate too much or too little production, depending on whether the item substitutes
for (or otherwise affects the demand for) items that are made and sold at less than or more
than their "real cost."
Acceptance of these general arguments encourages a much more modest policymaking
role for traditional economic analysis and especially for the standard model described above.
Micro-economic reasoning will often be relevant to various entities' or individuals' profit
concerns, but much less relevant to societal well-being.
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to lead to the "highest and best" uses of resources as defined by the economic
criteria of value: "willingness and ability to pay." More pointedly, media
markets can be expected not to provide audiences with "what they want" in any
economically relevant sense of that notion. Staying within the framework of
economic analysis, Part H explores problems inherent in media markets related
to the fact that, unlike cars and can openers, once media content is created, the
content can be "consumed" by anyone without reducing its availability to
others. Still accepting the economic framework, Part I takes into account so-
called externalities-media's positive and negative effects on "third parties,"
people other than the media's immediate audience-that undermine the normal
expectation that markets will be value maximizing. Then, Part IV moves away
from traditional economic analyses by questioning the propriety of subjecting
all social value to market analysis; it argues that the market's identification of
preferences and its reliance on the existing distribution of wealth are often
inappropriate for determining the production and distribution of media content.
Each section provides reasons to reject sole reliance on the market in the media
context. Finally, Part V summarizes the policy lessons suggested by the earlier
sections.
I. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF MEDIA PRODUCTS
Media products are unlike the hypothesized "typical" product, such as a
car or can opener, in four ways that are relevant here. Each difference
complicates any economic claim concerning the wisdom of reliance on markets.
As background for further exploration, this Part will outline these
characteristics of media products.
First, media products have significant "public good" aspects. A public
good is an item for which one person's use of the product or gain from the
product does not affect its use by or benefit to another person.14 National
14 Economic definitions of "public good" usually emphasize two aspects: "nonrivalrous
use," which is the quality I emphasize above and is a major factor in the analysis offered in
Part II, and "nonexcludibility." Although my discussion makes little direct use of the concept
of nonexcludibility, in a sense it is applicable to the (positive) externalities that are taken up in
Part I. In common usage, however, nonexcludibility as an aspect of a public good is usually
thought of as referring to situations where any purchaser and each nonexcluded beneficiary
get roughly the same type of benefit from the good, while the concept of externalities is most
commonly used where the benefit or burden on nonexcluded third parties is of a different sort
than that which enticed an individual purchase. I thank Jason Johnson for pointing out these
different elements.
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defense or public parks15 are goods that many can use once the good is
provided. Typically, utilities or other "natural" monopolies exhibit this public
good quality in their infrastructure, which multiple consumers can use with no
or very small extra expense. To the extent that this infrastructure-gas lines,
water mains, or telephone lines-is a major part of the delivered product's cost,
and to the extent that adding an additional customer does not increase the cost
of this infrastructure, which is usually true until crowding requires larger lines
or mains, the marginal cost of serving that additional consumer will be
substantially less than the average cost. That is, the marginal cost of supplying
the new user could approach zero while the average cost of the infrastructure to
each user, that is, its total cost divided by the number of users, stays much
higher.
This situation leads to a problem. If the product is priced at its average cost
(or higher if a seller exercises monopoly power), some consumers will not be
willing (or able) to pay that price even though they want the products and
would be willing to pay the added cost created by their usage. Thus, charging
the average cost results in underproduction of goods and under-utilization of
goods that are produced. On the other hand, the product cannot be priced at the
marginal cost, as efficiency considerations normally recommend, because the
revenue that it produces (selling price times the number of purchasers) would
not cover the product's cost. The market will not produce the product if all
specimens are sold at the marginal cost of the last specimen because the seller
would not recover the cost of the required infrastructure.
The media spend huge amounts to gather, write, and edit news or to create
and produce video entertainment-costs known as "first copy costs." This
economically significant element of media products' cost is like the utility's
infrastructure or better, like national defense, because there is no limit to how
many can benefit from the producer's expenditure. 16 Adding a marginal
15 Although these are typical examples, the point is somewhat overstated. Many goods
seem like public goods only within limits. For example, more users eventually interfere with
the quality of the park-the crowd begins detracting from others' enjoyment or otherwise
imposes marginal costs, like extra clean-up or wear-and-tear costs. Still, once goods like
defense of national borders or media content are produced, they can be consumed by multiple
people without significant increased costs.
16 Economists often identify this factor as the cause of the current dominance of one-
newspaper towns. A monopoly newspaper pays only one set of first copy costs (and requires
a single infrastructure) in serving the whole city. By adding customers, it constantly reduces
its average cost. See JAMEs N. RosSE & JAMES N. DERTouzos, ECONOMIC IssUmS IN MASS
COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES 55-78 (1978). Competition can be expected only as an unstable
equilibrium, usually between two papers roughly equal in circulation. See Randolph E.
Bucklin et al., Games of Survival in the US Newspaper Induawy, 21 APPLIED ECON. 631, 636
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consumer does not affect first copy costs or analogous costs such as the expense
of broadcasting. Writing the story or sending out the broadcast signal costs the
same no matter how many people "tune-in." As long as these public good costs
are a large enough part of the media's total cost,17 charging potential
purchasers the average cost leads to inefficient exclusions. Charging the
average cost excludes people even though they would pay more for the story or
broadcast than it costs to add them to the group that receives it. Alternatively,
setting the price of a good at the marginal cost, that is, the cost of supplying it
to the last purchaser, creates insufficient incentives to produce the good. Of
course, firms sometimes avoid these consequences by engaging in "price
discrimination"-charging different purchasers different prices and thereby
tapping the "consumer surplus" that some consumers would receive if charged
only the marginal costs. Whether opportunities for price discrimination are
sufficiently available to produce what the standard model would describe as a
value-maximizing level of production (hopefully without producing monopoly
(1989) (stating that newspapers' reliance on advertising increases the instability of any
equilibrium).
Of course, until a long-term decline began just before the end of the nineteenth century,
local daily newspapers were very competitive. Thus, Rosse more precisely suggests that the
"fundamental long-run cause of newspaper failure is loss of effective market segmentation."
James E. Rosse, The Decline of Direct Newspaper Competition, 30 J. oF CoMM., Spring
1980, at 65, 67. Although Rosse does not explain this loss, the decline in effective
segmentation could result from the changed incentives that occur when advertisers become the
primary purchaser of newspapers' efforts. To the extent that newspapers' primary product
becomes readers sold to advertisers rather than product sold to readers, the primary
predictable product differentiation for daily newspapers selling to local advertisers will be
geographical rather than content based. See BAKER, ADVERTSING, supra note 11, ch. 1.17 The claim here is that this public good element in media products is sufficiently large
and, importantly, sufficiently variable among media products that economic and policy
analyses ought to take it explicitly into account. The difference here between media prodcts
and other goods is at most a matter of degree. Virtually all mass-produced products include
what I here call a "public good" element-most obviously, the design cost. This always
creates some tension in the standard competitive market model I described. The market
encourages enough (or too much) research on practices or product design only to the extent
that the research is aimed at creating products over which the researcher will have something
approaching monopoly power-for example, if it obtains a patent or trade secret. This helps
explain, for example, why the market encourages research expenditures on drug therapies
even ifthe marginal improvement of health, say the marginal reduction of death from cancer
or heart disease, would be much greater from research dollars spent on nonpatentable "public
health" or environmental health methods (although this is only one of the causes of the
skewing of research expenditures).
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profits) is an empirical matter that will vary with the product and market in
question.18
Second, the type and size of both positive and negative externalities are
extraordinarily significant in respect to media products. People care whether
their reputation is mined or advanced, whether people they meet are boring or
cultured, and whether the person they pass on the street decides to rape or
murder them-and these are .among the phenomenon that can be significantly
affected by other people's media consumption. Likewise, many people value a
well-functioning democracy and hence are greatly benefited by other people's
consumption of quality media or harmed by the ignorance or apathy produced
by inadequate consumption or consumption of misleading, distortive, and
demobilizing media. Furthermore, the corruption that an effective investigative
press deters is a benefit that the media cannot capture to sell to consumers.
Later I will suggest that many media policies, ranging from libel laws to
reporters' privileges to postal subsidies given to newspapers or direct grants for
public broadcasting-and much, much more-can be understood as at least in
part designed to increase positive or to reduce negative externalities.
Third, media products are unusual in that often two very different
purchasers pay for the transfer of media content to its audience. The media
enterprise commonly sells media products to audiences and sells audiences to
advertisers. By paying for audiences, advertisers in effect pay the media firm to
provide the audience with something the audience wants-although not
necessarily what the audience most wants. Of course, multiple parties affected
by a transaction, each thus being a potential payee or purchaser, are not an
unusual economic phenomenon-that is basically the definition of an
externality. Externalities typically refer to the value of some item to someone
who does not participate in the transaction. If one or more persons, often
numerous unorganized people, would potentially pay to have the transaction
occur, then the externality is positive; it is negative if they would pay to have it
not occur. However, in the media context some of this multiple set of
purchasers are not merely potential purchasers, and their mutual involvement
plays an unusually large and more routinized role. The combination of
audiences and advertisers as purchasers have especially significant
consequences and adds special complexities. For example, what is the right
level of production of television programming? The value of production of a
television broadcast is its combined value for the audience and the advertiser.
To the extent that the broadcaster only collects from the advertiser, the
18 Even where the answer is "yes," reliance on price discrimination introduces an
inherently policy-based issue of which consumers ought to have their "consumer surplus"
reduced in order to achieve a proper level of production, a central issue in many rate-setting
disputes.
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broadcaster will apparently have an inadequate incentive to spend money on
programming for the public. From this observation, some economists conclude
that our society drastically under-invests in television broadcasting. 19
Multiple purchasers create other issues. For example, there is a potential
conflict between advertisers' and audiences' interests in the media content.2 In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century many papers routinely accepted
"reading matter," material prepared by advertisers that promoted their products
(or sometimes their political goals) but that was not identified as advertising.
Advertisers wanted this material included as apparent editorial content, not
advertising, while (presumably) the public would have preferred identification
of the material's source. Typically the public wants and expects the editorial
portion of news media to represent the journalists' and editors' independent
professional judgment. The market brings this interest to bear on the journalistic
enterprise to the extent that the enterprise can better sell its publication if it
gains a reputation for independence, but in the reading matter case, the market
did not suffice to induce the source identification or journalistic independence
desired by the public. In response, Congress prohibited the practice for any
paper receiving second-class mail privileges. 21
A fourth aspect of the media relevant to media economics involves why or
how audiences value media products. In the standard economic model
presented above, people seek products that satisfy various existing preferences.
They value the products because they satisfy these prior preferences. When
people purchase media products-as when they seek education or advice from
psychological, legal, or spiritual advisors-they are often seeking information
or guidance for the very purpose of forming preferences. People often want a
media product for what I will call "edification," which includes education,
19 An early study concluded that the value to Americans of free over-the-air television
was at least $20 billion, which was roughly 10 times the advertising revenue produced. See
RoGER G. NOLL Er AL., ECONOMIC ASPECrs OF TELEvisiON REGULATION 23 (1973). The
authors concluded that "by traditional criteria of consumer welfare, not only another network
but a very large expansion of television is warranted." Id. at 30.2 0 See generally BAKER, ADVERnTSIG, sUpra note 11, ch. 2.
2 1 In addition to identifying advertising material, the law required papers to publish the
identity of its owners. The legislative intervention may have conformed to the competitive
economic interests of some, especially the quality, papers. Still, the law required some editors
to prnt what they would prefer not to print. See Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288,
296 (1913) (upholding the law against a First Amendment challenge); cf Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-55 (1974) (invalidating a Florida statute requiring
newspapers that attack a political candidate's character to give the candidate free space to
reply). The best account of the legislation and the practices leading up to it is LINDA LAWSON,
TRUTrH IN PUBLSHNG: FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PREss's BusiNEs PRAcICns, 1880-
1920 (1993).
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exposure to wisely selected information, or wise opinion and good argument.
This feature of media is difficult to understand in terms of standard economic
analysis. Even if a market can properly allocate resources to fulfill preferences
for preference formation activities, a market for this type of product will have
unusual features. When a person wants to develop "better" preferences, values,
or outlooks, she puts her present outlook or preferences into question without a
clearly formulated alternative to put in their place. Thus, her own preferences
do not give her a complete standard by which to measure whether her
purchases provide the right thing.
This dilemma is not entirely resolvable. How does a person know whether
the person she became after seeing the psychologist is the person she wanted to
be, or whether her changes would have been better with a different
psychologist? Furthermore, from what perspective does she evaluate this-from
the views she now has, those she had before, or the views she would have had
if she had chosen the other psychologist? Of course, even when people do not
know precisely what they want, they usually have rules of thumb for guessing
whether they are likely to be getting it. They may know the seller's or
producer's general reputation for expertise. In addition, they may have reasons
to presume the seller or producer exercises independent judgment and to
believe that this supplier uses this independence to try to serve the purchaser's
interests-reasons underlying the criteria of professionalism in education, law,
psychology, or the priesthood.22 These concerns provide a catalyst for efforts
of the press to portray itself as independent and an explanation for most
people's outrage at any evidence that advertisers influence media's editorial
content.
Of course, people value media products for various reasons. Audiences
want media products (sometimes the same media product) for entertainment or
for specific information, as well as for "edification." Attributes that make a
media product good for one purpose may not be those that make it good for
another. This diversity in functions introduces complications for the notion of
the audience getting what it wants,23 complications that are often exacerbated
due to the multiple purchasers-audiences and advertisers. Audience members'
knowledge about how well a media product serves differing purposes often
varies. Advertisers, on the other hand, may have greater interest in particular
functions. For example, an advertiser may be primarily interested in a movie's
or story's transformative and informative roles, especially its particular slant
and its capacity to persuade. In contrast, the audience may focus most on the
22 Some also use rule of thumb indices of the seller's sharing or, at least, familiarity with
and responsiveness to the purchaser's basic values or perspectives, as might be the case, for
example, with a partisan paper.
23 See infra Part IV.
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content's potential to entertain; in fact, this focus on entertainment might make
some sense if the audience is best situated to evaluate this characteristic. In
consequence, the advertiser may pay for, say, a pro-Pepsi informational slant,
about which the audience is unaware or unconcerned as long as the slant does
not affect the movie's entertainment value. Predictably, advertisers pay for
"product placements" where their products are presented within the apparently
nonadvertising content.
More generally, when content serves multiple functions but where
information about how well it serves each is not equally available to and
assessable by the audience, the market creates opportunities for manipulative or
ideologically distorted content. If the audience values both the entertainment
and edification roles strongly, but if information in respect to a program's
contribution to edification is harder to obtain, the audience may choose on the
basis of entertainment value in the hope that the different dimensions correlate.
This audience strategy reduces the cost to the advertiser in having its editorial
choices prevail. For example, tobacco companies could "pay" (i.e., threaten to
withdraw advertising) for the editorial slant they want in popular women's
magazines. Such payment is, in effect, censorship. It leaves the magazines to
report on those health problems of aging, especially those "cured" with
cosmetics, that are not related to, or identified as being related to, smoking.
The point is merely that the combination of multiple purchasers (audience plus
advertiser), multiple ways in which the product is valued, and a disparity of
information concerning how well the product serves differing values, can lead
to systematic market failures. These factors can combine to produce results
contrary to what the audience wants-what it would pay for if it had better
information.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE MAR
The four features described in Part I relate to ways in which the market
predictably fails to "give the audience what it wants," producing results that on
pure economic grounds are not the most efficient use of resources. Here I begin
a more careful examination of their consequences.
A. Content as a Public Good
Initially, consider the public good aspects of media content. Once
produced, media content is a public good. No one's consumption (e.g.,
reading, viewing, discussing) prevents anyone else from also consuming the
same content. Maximum value results from allowing consumption without
charge for the content-although a consumer should pay for any marginal cost
[Vol. 58:311
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of access. But zero pricing does not compensate the creator and, therefore, the
economic expectation is that zero pricing will lead to dramatic underproduction
of content.
If content were freely appropriatable by any consumer (or distributor), the
pricing (that is, the price of zero) would not exclude audience members who
value the content, but this pricing, it is feared, would fail to encourage
production. Enter the regime of intellectual property-probably the most overt
legal response to the public good aspect of media content. Copyright law
creates private property rights in content so that authors and creators will
receive a reward adequate to induce production.24 Complexities of copyright
law are (or, at least, are supposed to be) a response to its utilitarian aim of
influencing both production and distribution in a manner that maximizes the
availability and valued use of intellectual content. Thus, copyright aims to
recognize private property rights only to the extent that they "contribute" more
to production of valuable content than they "cost" in terms of restricting access
to and further use of that content.25 This goal explains (at least in part) doctrines
such as "fair use." Fair use benefits audiences by allowing free use whenever
free use adds more value than it "costs" in terms of reduced incentives to
produce. 26 Arguably, its maximizing policy is relatively nonideological in
merely aiming to efficiently promote "science and the useful arts,"27 that is, to
24 The need to compensate the creator provides the standard economic argument for
intellectual property rights, but arguments in favor of zero pricing are imaginable.
Commercially produced content, that is, production intended to be profitable, competes to a
degree with noneommercially produced content (for example, ideological speech that people
spread for political reasons or amateur productions where the joy or pride of expression
provides a primary motive for production). Possibly, a culture in which these types of
noncommercial communications were more prevalent, that is, where they had less
competition from market-oriented, commercially produced content, would be by some
measures richer than the commercial culture provided by the mass media.
25 This last point suggests that content creators can line up on either side of a debate
about extending or contracting copyright protection. Moreover, characteristically, different
types of creators will line up differently (e.g., noncommercial creative "borrowers" favor less
restrictions on the availability of earlier creations while commercial producers are more
interested in maximizing their own return than in being unrestricted in their appropriations).
See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SoFiwARE AND SPLEEs: TowARD THE CONSmUcioN OF
THE INFORMAiON SoCIEY 51-60 (1996). However, to the extent that a prime value of
copyright is creating avenues of distribution, audience-oriented, non-profit-seeking creators
may equally have an interest in commercially effective copyright.
26 Similar economic balancing of gains and losses due to propertizing intellectual content
can explain why copyright only attempts to protect the "unique expression" of the idea and
not the idea (or fAct) itself.27 U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8.
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make more content more widely available. 28 But on closer examination,
copyright law turns out to favor production of some content over other and
influences who has access to it. More generally, it can be seen as an aspect of
media policy, embodying particular policy choices designed to affect what
audiences receive.
Propertization, say of the traditional commons where sheep or cattle
grazed, is supposed to solve the problem of underproduction of some goods.
Copyright, however, cannot be expected to be such a perfect solution precisely
because of the public goods aspect of media content. Here, at least without
adequate price discrimination, which I will discuss shortly, market-based firms
predictably provide inadequate amounts of the good. Private firms will fail to
provide some media content that the audience wants-content whose value as
measured by willingness to pay is greater than its cost. Some products will not
be produced because there is no price at which the media product can be
profitably sold even though its value to all potential consumers is greater than
the cost of supplying them. Likewise, another routine feature of goods for
which marginal cost is declining is that such goods are often sold at a price that
prevents some people from purchasing them even though they would be willing
to pay at least the marginal cost necessary to provide them with the good.
A simple example based on a hypothetical two person society, summarized
in Table 1, can illustrate these problems.
TABLE 1
Cost Demand
#1 #2 #3
Copy I/Person 1 10 9* 12* 9
Copy 2/Person 2 1 6* 5 5
Profitable Selling Price* 5 1/2 to 6 10 to 12 -
Surplus (Value-Cost) 15-11=4 12-10=2 -
Potential Surplus 15-11=4 17-11=6 14-11=3
*Potential purchasers assume seller's inability (or inadequate ability) to
price discriminate.
Hypo #1 shows a declining marginal cost product.
Hypo #2 shows that markets may underproduce this type of product.
Hypo #3 shows that markets may fail to produce a valued product.
28 But see stpra note 24.
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In this example, the cost of producing the first copy is assumed to be 10,
while reproducing and distributing to the second person is assumed to cost only
1. In the first hypothetical, the product could be properly produced and sold to
each person for 6. However, even here, if a third person was added who valued
the good at 2, that seller could not afford to sell to each person for 2; thus, that
third person would not be supplied even though she values the product at more
than the 1 cost of supplying her.
In the second hypothetical, the good could be sold to Person 1 at a price
between 10 and 12. Production at this level produces a societal gain, a surplus
of 2, with the surplus going either to the seller or buyer or divided between
them. This surplus represents the amount that the good is valued by the buyer
over the cost to the seller. However, the good cannot be sold at a price of 5
because then the seller's revenue of 10 does not cover the cost of selling two
copies (10+1=11). The result is underproduction since the value to the
unserved Person 2 is much greater than the cost of producing the good for her
(5-1 =4).
Likewise, in the third hypothetical, the good cannot be sold without a loss
to Person 1, who would pay 9 for a good that cost 10, or to both parties at a
price of 5 because the revenue of 10 would not cover the cost of 11 it takes to
produce the original and the copy. The result is that production that could
produce social gain, that is, that could produce what people want-a value of
14 at a cost of 11-does not occur. Thus, in typical cases, represented by the
second and third hypotheticals, underproduction and inadequate availability of
content that is produced are inevitable.
Underproduction and inadequate distribution of media content caused by its
public good aspects might be avoided if property owners could perfectly price
discriminate in the sale of their goods. Price discrimination is where the seller
sells to different purchasers at different prices reflecting the amount that the
specific purchaser is willing to pay. For example, in the third hypothetical, if
the seller could sell Copy 1 to Person 1 for 9 and Copy 2 to Person 2 for 5, the
seller would have an incentive to produce the good-it would be able to
generate a profit of 3. This solution is sometimes available. Price discrimination
is common in the media realm. Consider, for example, media firms' ability to
sell both hard and paperback books, often made available at different times; to
distribute video content through different "windows," first in theaters, then pay-
television, then video cassette rental, then free-television; or to divide the
audience into groups who will pay different subscription rates for the same
magazine. Still, often inability to price discriminate is good. For example, in
the standard model of market competition discussed earlier, price discrimination
is not necessary to achieve efficient results. Rather, it merely involves sellers'
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exploitation of circumstantially monopolistic positions to transfer wealth from
purchasers. More relevantly here, price discrimination inevitably is only
partially effective. The problems of underproduction and inadequate distribution
will inevitably continue even if at a somewhat muted level.
Thus, copyright and reliance on markets cannot be expected to be a perfect
solution to stimulating adequate production of media content. Moreover, an
additional problem is that privatization of content through copyright law tilts
market production toward particular types of content. In this sense, copyright
law can be characterized as a speech-related law that involves content
discrimination. 29 Existing copyright law allows privatization of only some
aspects of content. For example, copyright only covers the "unique
expression," not facts or ideas. If privatization serves its intended purpose of
creating production incentives, it should encourage investment in creating and
distributing "unique expressions" in contrast to finding, developing, or
communicating "facts or ideas. "30 By allowing producers to receive closer to
full value for the first but not the second, copyright law has potentially serious
consequences for what content is produced. The distinction, for example, could
encourage greater investment in unique entertainment content (expression) and
less investment in news content (facts).3 ' Within news production, these
copyright rules favor expenditures on unique or flashy presentation (maybe
high salaries for appealing "anchorpersons" who, like the copyrightable words,
are a "unique" element) as opposed to expenditures on news gathering,
especially on news that is expensive to obtain.32 These tilts, however, have no
29 The Supreme Court has treated facially Content-neutral laws as content-based if they
had any purpose to affect content. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-
43 (1994).30 Admittedly, patent and trade secret law covers some commercially relevant aspects of
the latter content.
31 In 1995, the newsroom budget of the Washington Post, the paper that brought us
Watergate, was reportedly about $70 million, while the 1995 movie, Watenvorld, reportedly
cost about $175 million, although this figure includes more than just content creation (for
example, an approximately $30 million marketing budget). See Dan Cox, Soaring Star
Salaries Induce Labor Pains, VARmTY, Sept. 11, 1995, at 1; Richard Harwood, E&tinct
Strained Wretches?, WASH. PoSr, Nov. 2, 1995, at A31.32 Forty percent of viewers refer to the anchorperson as their reason for viewing a
network news program. See Lno BOGART, COMMmCiAL CULTuRE: THE MaDiA SYsrI AND
Tmn Puruc INTERisr 186 (1995). Thus, it is not surprising that as newscasters' salaries
increased, the networks fired senior professionals and generally engaged in cutting the costs
of news production. See id. at 182.
James Fallows, whose main concern is the deleterious effect on democracy of the
media's constant cynical emphasis on the competitive, horse-race aspects of politics rather
than on its substantive aspects, argues that having a star personality "report" on the top
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necessary relation to audience preferences 33 -or their willingness to pay for
different content-but rather replicate the peculiarities of the legal order's
privatization rules.
Of course, privatizing facts or ideas in order to encourage their production
is hardly the appropriate solution. Although in special circumstances (e.g.,
trade secrets or patents) this seems acceptable and this move is sometimes seen
as a plausible way of promoting creation of computer databases, generally the
notion of ownership of ideas and facts is seen as offensive. Because a person
comes up with an idea or uncovers facts hardly suggests that the person should
be able to stop another from independently doing the same and then telling
others about it. Even when a person learns something from the originator, the
notion that the recipient cannot then repeat it, or reformulate it and then include
it in her own messages, is contrary to how thinking and discussion occur.
Privatization gives the originator a virtual property right in the recipient's mind
and speech. Economic arguments, ranging from costs of enforcement to costs
of trying to make efficient use of the information, likewise argue against routine
privatization of facts and ideas.
Various responses can reduce the negative consequences of a lack of
copyright protection for facts and ideas. For example, the media may
successfully nurture desires for speedy news, and, more importantly, for
reliable news, and they may be able to teach audiences to correlate these
attributes with news organizations that themselves engage in (some)
investigations. This would then give the media an incentive to spend money on
finding facts and developing ideas. Another response is the government's (and
others') heavily subsidized development of information and ideas that are then
communicated through the media. Government-supported research universities,
prestige-based reward systems within those universities, direct government
sponsorship of research, and non-copyrightability of governmentally produced
intellectual works serve as examples. Public officials' news conferences and
press releases, and similar techniques used by various private sources, create
current story twists the content of news in a way that contributes to this misdirected media
focus because, usually, this star figure will not have expertise or reportorial knowledge of the
specific issue but will have general expertise on issues such as how the issue will play
politically. See JAMEs FALLOws, BREAKING THE NEWs 157-59 (1996).
33 However, the tilt does relate to the preferences that the media have an incentive to
cultivate. A broadcaster or network's exclusive position in respect to a given anchorperson
gives broadcasters a reason to promote the merits or appeal of its anchor rather than its less
unique news as a reason to "tne in." Whether a self-conscious democratic society would
choose to promote this tilt, see infra Part IV, is at best doubtful.
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and make available considerable information without concern for the lack of
copyright protection-although with arguably questionable content tilts. 34
Still, the basic points remain. The public good quality of media content
makes for underproduction. The intellectual property regime both responds to
and reproduces this problem. It also encourages production of some content
more than other. Responses to this differential underproduction provide only
partial cures, and the cures contain their own tilts. The audience gets what the
law encourages, not some "uncontaminated" version of what it wants.
B. Monopolistic Competition35
The last subsection described how media firms sometimes will be unable to
profitably market goods even though the goods' value to consumers is greater
than their cost to the firm. The introduction of a competitively successful
product can exacerbate the problem. That is, sometimes goods that prevail
competitively can reduce social value as compared to the products that they
replace. Here, market competition can increase inefficiency, leading consumers
(the audience) to get less of what they want.
A simple example, which is summarized in Table 2 and which expands on
the illustration used earlier, illustrates this possibility.
34 See EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACrUJNG CONSENr 18-25
(1988).
35 The classic work on monopolistic competition is EDWARD H. CHAMBmEuN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPErrTON (1960). This section extends an analysis that I first
presented in BAKER, ADVERTSNG, supra note 11, at 9-13, 73-76. The general type of
phenomenon I describe here is explained in CLEMENT G. KROusE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMICS 190-218 (1990), and applied to a media context in BRUCE OWEN & STEvEN
WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 148 (1992).
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TABLE 2
Product A Product B
Cost Demand Cost Demand
Time I Time 2 Time 2
Copy I/Person i 10 9* 9 11 8*
Copy 2/Person 2 1 6* 5 2 7*
Profitable Selling Price 5 1/2 to 6 - 6 1/2 to 7
Surplus (Value-Cost) 15-11 =4 - 15-13=2
Potential Surplus 15-11=4 14-11=3 15-13=2
*Purchases under a profitable sales strategy; hypothetical assumes seller's
inability (or inadequate ability) to price discriminate.
Key asswnption: introduction of Product B has the effect of slightly
reducing the demand for Product A, reflected in the change in demand
from Time 1 to Time 2.
This hypothetical assumes the new product is somewhat bulky, explaining
its somewhat higher cost for Copy 2, and is valued somewhat more similarly by
the two people (i.e., has a flatter demand curve). The key feature of this
hypothetical, however, is that the availability of the new product is assumed to
reduce slightly the demand for Product A. This assumption is obviously quite
plausible. This change could, and in the hypothetical it does, change the
demand such that it is no longer profitable to produce and sell Product A even
though Product A is not only valued by its audience at an amount more than its
cost but also its production and distribution would create a greater social surplus
than does Product B, which replaces it.
Of course, this is merely a hypothetical. Obviously people are not always
worse off when a new media product drives out of existence another product or
a set of other products (e.g., a set of products like Product A in the
hypothetical). The general point is that there is no way of knowing in the
abstract when relying on the market will or will not be beneficial-when the
market will lead people to get closer to what they want as they see it. The
answer will depend on the specifics of the people's demand curves. Still,
although abstract analysis cannot tell which competitively successful content is
and which is not economically justified, some observations are possible about
when it is more likely that the product that prevails in the market will actually
cause a loss. For example, usually the successful but unjustified material will
have relatively weak but broad appeal-a comparatively flat demand curve. In
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contrast, the economically justified, audience-satisfying material that a free
market will fail to produce often will be material with relatively strong, unique
appeal.
Most often the effects of monopolistic competition described above will be
embodied in the nonexistence (or reduced distribution) of some media products
that the audience wants and possibly the existence of some whose net effect is to
reduce the extent to which the market satisfies the audience. Below I will
consider several possible examples.
1. International Trade
The recent GATT negotiations almost unraveled over America's initial
insistence on free trade provisions covering video products-movies and
television. The Europeans, particularly the French, thought something uniquely
important (something more than money) was at stake-a belief that seemed
almost incomprehensible to most American commentators. 36 Still, the
Europeans successfully resisted American demands. This GAIT controversy
replayed an earlier third world, leftist critique of Western and especially
American cultural imperialism. Under the general label of the New World
Information Order, during the 1970s and 1980s this critique reached its high
point in the UNESCO's MacBride Commission Report. 37 A central claim was
that market practices distort information flows and damage cultural and
developmental interests of poorer regions.38 Both the recent French and the
earlier third world claims defended their own cultural integrity. Both asserted
that the American media products not only swamp their culture but also cause
the economic shrinkage of their own cultural industries. The French and the
third world complaint could be about negative externalities caused by the
imported media products or it could be a claim that market standards of value
are inappropriate for evaluating media structures-issues I will discuss in Parts
I and IV. But their complaint also could refer to the type of problem discussed
above-market competition causing a product to prevail even though it
produces less value than the products it replaces.
3 6 See Daniel Singer, GAIT and the Shape of Our Dreams, Ti NATION, Jan. 17,
1994, at 54.
37 See MACBRIDE COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD (1980).
38 See id. passim; HERBERT I. SCHILLER, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL
DOMINATION (1976). In addition to the cultural point, the third world critique raised other
issues, especially the comparatively one-way flow of news and control over and content of
third world news. See id.
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The so-called cultural imperialism is easily explained. It occurs because,
once made, media products can be reproduced almost costlessly-the "public
good" element of media products. A media owner correspondingly gains from
any extension in audience, at least if able to maintain the product's price or to
price discriminate, for example, by selling the product for different prices in
different countries. As long as the costs of marketing are less than the potential
revenue, a media owner will find it very advantageous to extend its market
internationally. Unlike local media products, the international marketer does not
need to charge for the products' cost of creation (assuming that domestic sales
pay for this). The result is a huge competitive advantage for the imported
products that can put many local media products out of business.
Cross-border free trade in these media products does not so clearly increase
the range of what is available as change what is available in each country. Even
if there were some increase, the new mix is potentially subject to criticism. In
the United States, many people complain about the extent that soft sex and
action/violence motifs fill both television and Hollywood productions. A major
factor influencing Hollywood's content choices may be less what the American
audience wants and more the profits available in exports. 39 Those whose native
language is not English or whose culture provides dramatically different social
cues and thematic problems can be perplexed by complex verbal exchanges and
intricate drama that would appeal to the more "local" American audience. In
contrast, people require fewer special skills to appreciate whatever there is to
appreciate about Baywatch, apparently the world's most-watched television
show.4° Without an export market, if production costs for a drama and
Baywatch were the same, and if the producer could get X dollars selling
Baywatch to Americans but X+Y selling the nonexportable drama, the
producer would choose the drama. That choice changes, however, if exporting
occurs and if the added international sales for Baywatch are greater than Y. If
this is repeated over the category of action/violent and soft sex programming,
39 Reportedly, U.S. film, television, and home video industries had $18 billion in
revenue, 55% of which came from Europe-compared to our imports of $300 million of
video materials from Europe. See James 0. Goldsborough, Let's Allow Some Artistic License
in this Trade Deal, SAN DIGO UNiON-TRB., Dec. 13, 1993, at B5. In 1993, 45% of the
U.S. film industry's revenues or about $7.1 billion came from overseas. See Jessica Siegel,
Refocusing the Big Picture, CHICAGo TRiB., Mar. 6, 1994, § 13, at 16. The international
market as an incentive to produce American programming with action and violence goes back
at least to the early 1970s. See Stephen J. Kim, "Viewer Discretion Is Advised": A Sructural
Approach to the Issue of Televised Violence, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1424-25 (1994).
40 See Bill Carter, Stand Aside CNN. America's No. 1 TV Export Is-No Scoffing,
Please--"Baywatch," N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 1995, § 1, at 41. Baywatch was canceled after its
first season on NBC, but production was able to continue for syndication primarily on the
basis of a correct prediction of profitable foreign distribution. See id.
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Americans may be getting a lot more of these programs than they want, that is,
than they would purchase if the United States was the program's sole market.41
A mirror image of this process occurs in the countries now flooded with
American media products. Often they would have not paid for the American
productions if they had to pay the full cost of the item-they receive it only
because they are the "beneficiaries" of its public good aspect. As it is, often
their own cultural products, which would have survived except for the
competition with the American products, are driven out of business.
Still, international trade has the generally beneficial consequence that no
national audience has to pay the product's fll cost. Therefore, audiences of
both nations may be better off. Both may get more of what it wants given the
item's actual cost (that is, its reduced cost to them given the contributions of a
vast array of other customers spread over the world). However, this may not be
so beneficial, as suggested by the earlier discussion of monopolistic
competition. Equate the American export with Product B in Table 2. Its
introduction may drive out of existence local products even if the local audience
values the local product more, that is, even if the local product, like Product A
in Table 2, could produce a bigger surplus than the exportlimport. These
"international" products will cause many relatively culturally specific
products-both American and those of the import-receiving countries-to
become unprofitable even if the local audience continues to want them, that is,
even though the local audiences would still be willing to pay for the product if
the seller could perfectly price discriminate.
Of course, whether the net effect of the dominance of export products is
negative for either American audiences or those in the receiving country is an
empirical question. Only speculation is offered here. The question in each
country is whether the loss due to the failure of more culturally unique media
products is greater than gain due to the production and sale of the
internationally valued product-in the example above, the gain due to the
prevalence of Baywatch. In economic terminology, the question is whether the
lost surplus due to the nonproduction of the locally unique products is more or
less than the surplus generated by Baywatch. Although the answer will depend
on the precise shape of the demand (and cost) curves, some considerations
41 In a comparison of Nielsen ratings of violent and nonviolent network prime-time
dramatic programs during the 1988-93 period, each year the nonviolent programs got a
significantly higher rating. See George Gerbner, Marketing Global Mayhem, 2 TBE P BLiC
71, 74 (1995). A comparison of 250 U.S. programs exported during a given year with 111
programs only shown in the United States found violence to be the main theme in 40% of
those shown only locally but in 49% of the exported shows and "crime/action series
comprised 17 [%] of home-shown and 46 [%] of exported programs." Id. at 75; see also
Kim, supra note 39, at 1430-31 & n.214.
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suggest that restrictions on the American exported product would lead to more
audience-satisfying results. The demand for a successfully introduced
international product is likely to be comparatively flat, but quite broad. On the
other hand, the losing, culturally unique product is likely to have been more
intensely valued by its audience but failed to have a sufficiently broad audience,
that is, it is likely to have had a more steeply declining demand curve. The
international product probably sacrifices content intensely valuable for unique
local audiences in favor of material reasonably appealing to a huge audience. If
this is right, the result will likely correspond to the one illustrated in Table 2.
The international competition will not be value-maximizing, that is, the
products that prevail in the unrestricted international market will not be those
that audiences want. Only restraints on international trade in such media
products can produce value-maximizing or efficient results.
2. Advertising-Supported Media42
Like an international audience, introduction of advertisers adds a second set
of purchasers whose preferences for media content at least potentially diverges
from that of the media's audience. Most commentators, often even
economists, 43 assume that if the media is to serve content preferences, it is the
preferences of the public-the reading and viewing audience-that should
prevail, not those of the public plus the advertisers. However, even if the
relevant standard is maximizing value from the combined perspective of the
preferences of audiences and advertisers, the result produced by the market
may not be economically efficient or, more relevantly here, may not give the
audience what it wants. The basic claim, played out below, is that the
prevailing advertiser-supported media may be like Product B in Table 2 and
that it may drive out the more valued media content illustrated by Product A.
Of course, if advertisers merely contributed financial support to give
audiences what they want (plus ads), a divergence would not be so obvious-
but that scenario is implausible. Advertisers' concerns and audiences'
preferences will surely overlap since advertisers want to obtain audiences for
their advertising messages. That, however, is only one of the advertisers'
concerns, and their other concerns will sometimes override or at least modify
the first consideration. Advertisers influence media enterprises to give
audiences messages that advertisers want them to receive-sometimes, simply
42 This subsection is based on a more detailed account in BAKER, ADvERnsiNG, supra
note 11.
43 See, e.g., BRucE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEIA
STRu rURE AND Tnm Fi'r AmiemENw-r 1-202 (1975).
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messages that support the advertisers' products. Advertisers also influence
media (that is, they pay, either directly or indirectly) to provide audiences with
content that does not disparage the advertisers' products or political agenda, that
puts audiences into a "buying mood" or creates a receptiveness to ads, or that
avoids offending potential customers in a manner that could spill over into
offense at the advertiser. Although often proclaiming editorial or creative
independence, media executives recognize that people (or entities) who pay can
and will influence content. Clearly, the consequent influence of advertisers
corrupts the democratically defensible justification for the media and, more
relevantly here, undermines the media's orientation to give audiences the
informational and cultural content that the audiences want.
In response it might be argued that advertisers' interests are not inherently
illegitimate, that they ought to be taken into account, and, in any event, that
advertisers' participation makes the media product cheaper and thus more
accessible to the public. Thus, the issue parallels the discussion of international
media markets. It could be asked whether the goal is to provide (American)
audiences what they want without that content being influenced by "other"
purchasers-the advertiser (or the foreign consumer). Alternatively, should the
goal be to provide audiences with what they want among products, some of
which will cost less due to purchases by advertisers (or foreign audiences)?
Arguments can be made both ways. Accounts that emphasize unique or special
values of news, informational, cultural, or other media products routinely
characterize the influence of these other purchasers as corrupting. On the other
hand, pure market accounts often argue in favor of all potential purchasers
having the influence that their expenditures justify, and argue that, if people
want, they can buy ad-free (or locally produced) media products. This market
perspective notes that although people may prefer content that the advertiser did
not influence, if cost is ignored, in the real world these people may prefer
influenced content, given its cheaper cost. From this perspective, the question is
always: are people getting what they want, given the cost? Although I am
sympathetic with, and will later argue for, the first account, in this section I will
stick to the pure market approach and ask whether the market predictably
provides audiences what they want, given some products' reduced cost due to
advertisers' support.
Initially, an important difference between advertisers' and international
audiences' influence should be noted. Typically, neither the media nor the
advertiser wants the advertisers' influence on nonadvertising content explicitly
known. Advertiser influence on the media's nonadvertising content conflicts
with the media's claim to provide the public with professional judgment and
independence. This is a pivotal value. A physician would find it bad for
business if the public knew that a pharmaceutical company's payment
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influenced her choice of which medicine to prescribe. Likewise, a publisher
would find it damaging if the public knew that it routinely bowed to advertisers'
directives. The public, however, often finds it difficult to determine whether the
media is satisfying its preference for receiving a "noncorrupt" product. This
informational inequality between the public and the advertisers makes the
situation ripe for systematic market failures. Sometimes, an audience will not
receive what it wants (and would pay for) because its lack of information results
in it paying anyhow.
Other than their direct concern with editorial content, advertisers' main
concern, what they pay for, is "audience," usually a somewhat targeted
audience. The audience may be targeted geographically (local newspaper
advertisers want local audiences), economically (usually at least somewhat
upscale, since the advertiser only benefits from those who can pay for the
product), demographically (often the advertiser's product has a bigger potential
market among a particular age or gender group), or interest-based (sellers of
golf products want most to reach golfers). The impact of advertisers is to
increase the prevalence of media content relevant to their targeted audiences.
Although most easily observable in magazines and television, this targeting
effect can be found in all media receiving advertising support.
In terms of revenue, newspapers are selling readers to advertisers even
more than they are selling newspapers to readers. This makes their primary
incentive to provide a package that has the broadest, even if shallow, appeal
except for sometimes slighting material of special interest to relatively poor and
poor minority audiences who are not good markets for the advertisers'
products. This creates at least some disincentive to provide material for which a
comparatively small group would pay a higher price, but which would be
offensive or a turn-off to another audience segment.44 That is, the gain from
selling audience size to advertisers reduces any incentive a newspaper would
otherwise have for product differentiation that appeals to small segments.
This advertiser-rewarded orientation has supported development of
"objectivity" as newspapers' ruling norm. A purportedly objective approach
that offends few people will leave more people reasonably satisfied even if it
leaves them less politically engaged than would more partisan reporting.45 As
44 In contrast, since newspapers do not expect any reader to read all the paper, they
often add (generally) unoffensive content aimed at expanding their audience, in a trade-off
between the added expense of providing this material for everyone and the added value
(primarily to advertisers) of this added audience. Of course, this incentive applies to all
newspapers and thus is a quite weak incentive for product differentiation.
4 5 Despite advertising's effect of reducing the cost of newspapers to the public, its effect
of reducing partisanship could also reduce the total audience for newspapers (which even in a
nonpartisan form are a major stimulant for voting and political participation). See BAKER,
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product differentiation declines (which, given its primary local markets, should
occur for daily newspapers as the proportion of their revenue from advertising
increases), the declining average cost structure of local newspaper production
should lead to monopoly papers. This is precisely the historical pattern that
occurred in the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century as
advertisers' revenue contribution steadily increased. However, other
explanations of monopoly papers are available, and the actual phenomenon
probably reflects multiple causes.
More generally, the effect of advertising on diversity is complex.
Advertising helps pay for content especially appealing to audiences targeted by
advertisers, thereby potentially increasing an advertiser-specified diversity in
some media, such as magazines, while undermining diversity in other media,
such as newspapers. Since both effects involve reducing the price audiences are
charged for advertiser-supported content, the question remains: does this give
audiences what they want? In fact, does this give them even more of what they
want, since they do not have to pay all the costs?46
The answer is unclear. Media products that succeed due to advertising
support will often depress demand for others, sometimes causing these other
media products to fail. Within monopolistic competition, these failing products
typically have a declining average cost and often have, at best, limited ability to
engage in price discrimination. But audiences may still value many of these no
longer commercially viable media products-the audience may value the
products more than the products cost to produce. Descriptively, the success of
advertising-supported media will result in failure of more differentiated,
competitive daily newspapers, of some general audience magazines, and of
magazines that appeal to groups whose interests do not overlap with use of any
particular set of consumer products. Groups whose demographics are
comparatively diverse or whose members are comparatively poor and whose
unifying interests or activities do not implicate particular categories of consumer
products will be disadvantaged; often those disadvantaged will include those of
politically defined groups. For example, few advertisers find The Nation to be a
ADVERTISiNG, supra note 11, at 17-20. Newspapers' failure to target poor, often minority
audiences, is apparently one cause of comparatively less political participation of these
groups. See id.
46 A frequent criticism of advertising-that advertising rips off consumers by making
them pay higher prices for the advertised products, thereby making them pay for being
manipulated into making the purchase-is too simplistic. First, by increasing the market for
the advertised product, advertising sometimes leads to a reduced price to the consumer.
Second, if after the advertising, people value the product more than they would otherwise,
they may be getting something that they value more than they would without the advertising-
so the advertising arguably increases their satisfaction. Of course, neither point
unambiguously supports the merits of expenditures on advertising. See infra Part IV.
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particularly good advertising vehicle. A feminist journal, especially if it is
aimed at an age- and class-non-specific, multicultural audience might have a
large potential audience but would be hard pressed to find its advertising
"niche." 47
Parts III and IV will note other possible critiques of the influence of
advertising on content. The point here is that the consumer surplus produced by
the prevailing advertising-based media could be less than would have been
produced by the non-advertising-based media-media that do not exist because
of competition from these advertising-supported media. Whether this occurs in
any particular instance cannot be determined a priori. However, there are bases
for speculation. For example, in the competition that leads to only one daily
newspaper existing in an area, the prevailing paper is likely to be less product
differentiated than those it replaces. Its demand curve is likely to be flatter
(although broader) than the demand for competing papers that uniquely appeal
to a portion of the audience. This characteristic provides some reason to expect
that the competitive winner creates less consumer surplus-provides the
audience with less of what it wants-than would newspapers that would
otherwise exist. In other cases, ranging from advertisers' greater support for
magazines like Women's Golf to their minimal support for others like The
Nation, the complaint is not merely that the consumer surplus will be greater
for failed titles than those that exist; in addition, the advertising encourages,
allows cheaper satisfaction of, and thus increases the sway of some content
preferences while disadvantaging others, arguably "distorting" the market.48
3. Ruinous Competition: Too Many Products, Too Much Fake Diversity
Monopolistic competition can generate too many products as well as too
few.4 9 In the above examples, a firm had no incentive to internalize the value
lost due to the elimination of consumer surplus when its new product drives out
media products that would still produce more value than they cost but that
become unprofitable given the inability to price discriminate. This lack of
internalization potentially leads to inadequate diversity. But the opposite can
occur. Wasteful competition occurs because the producer of the new product
has no incentive to consider its impact on the demand for and hence revenues
produced by surviving competitors. If the decline in the surplus produced by
resources still used by the competitor is more than the surplus (profit plus
47 See Gloria Steinem, Sex, Lies & Advertising, Ms., July/Aug. 1990, at 18.
48 Strictly, this last point fits the argument made in Part IV and is not a complaint about
the "inefficiency" of the market process.
49 The argument in this section generally follows KRousE, supra note 35.
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consumer surplus) produced by the new product, the result can be wasted
resources.50 Competing media firms' expenditures on their respective products
may produce (roughly) the same benefit for the public as expenditures by a
single firm on a single product. For example, both NBC and ABC evening
news might cost roughly the same to produce, but the public might receive
virtually the same value, an evening news program, whether or not the second
50 Rather than dissipating monopoly profits among the competitors, some arrangements
allow one "winner" to gain all the reward. Markets so structured often attract numerous more
or less equivalent "competitors," each of whom "spends" resources on tying to win, with the
result being the same result discussed above-a dissipation or waste of resources. Michael
Madow identified this process as occurring in the context of "star creation," and proposed
that by denying a property right in one's image, that is, denying a "right of publicity," the law
could not only increase the availability of cultural resources to new creators and
entrepreneurs, but could reduce the incentive to engage in the economically wasteful effort to
become a star or sports hero. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 205-25 (1993). This is also a
primary mechanism producing waste identified in ROBERT H. FRANK & PILIP J. CooK, THE
WnqNER-TAKE-AIL Soclm 167-89 (1995). Winner-take-all markets create a heightened
incentive to spend resources on defending one's status as winner or tearing down efforts by
others-mechanisms that often include advertising-that do not produce value but only
determine who receives it. Frank and Cook argue that this type of market has become
increasingly common today. One of their most interesting policy observations is that, in order
to decrease the personal incentive to participate in this type of market-to be the top
executive, the movie star or model, the sports hero-much higher income taxes for very high
incomes, whether or not the 91% rate that existed when John F. Kennedy took office in 1961
would increase "efficiency" or social wealth. See id. at 58, 121-23,212-17.
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exists.51
If everyone receives (without requiring additional use of resources) the
benefit from the creation of "public good X," a competitor's expenditure on
providing a virtually identical good benefits no one-it merely wastes
resources. If the public can get from a single wire that passes in front of its
house the same content or services that it can get from a second wire (and if the
greater use of a single wire involves no, or minimal, added cost), the resources
51 This loss can be described by a Table similar to those used above:
TABLE 3
Product A Product B
Cost Demand/Value Cost Demand/Value
Time I Time 2 Time 2
Copy I/Person i 10 6* 6* 1 1
Copy 2/Person 2 1 5* 5* 1 1
Copy 3/Person 3 1 5* 5* 1 1
Copy 4/Person 4 1 4* 3 6 4*
Copy 5/Person 5 1 3* 2 1 3*
Copy 6/Person 6 1 3* 2 1 3*
Profitable Selling Price 3 5 3
Consumer Surplus
(Value-Revenue) 26-18=8 16-15=1 10-9=1
Profit (Revenue-Cost) 18-15=3 15-12=3 9-8=1
Total Surplus
(Value-Cost) 26-15=11 16-12=4 10-8=2
*Purchasers at profitable selling price; hypothetical assumes seller's inability (or
inadequate ability) to price discriminate.
Key asswnption: introduction of Product B has the effect of slightly reducing the demand
for Product A at Time 2. Although not illustrated here, often Product A will survive but
only with both a reduced audience and with cost cutting on Copy 1, creating a
degradation of the quality of product available to Persons 1, 2, and 3.
Goal: to maximize surplus, i.e., Profit plus Consumer Surplus. At Time 1, Total
Surplus= 11; at Time 2, Total Surplus =4 for Product A and 2 for Product B or a total of
7. Thus, introduction of Product B caused a net decline in value produced.
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devoted to providing the second wire presumably provide no benefits. 52
Likewise, the public good aspect of media content means that it can be shared
by many without added content production costs. However, without price
discrimination, an enterprise will charge a price at least sufficient to recover its
costs, and a monopolistic producer may charge even more. These monopoly
profits attract competitors. Assuming that the competitor's product is not
substantially different from the original monopolist's, its entry may not give the
audience any more of anything it wants. Rather, the entrant will merely take
customers from the original firm, thereby reducing its monopoly revenue (and
profits) by an amount sufficient to cover the entrant's costs plus any profits it
garners. The result is inefficient-almost twice as many resources spent on
producing roughly the same value. Still, as long as both firms obtain enough
customers to cover their costs, this competition could continue for a long period
of time.
From the consumer's point of view, the ideal would be a single, efficient
monopolist that does not pocket monopoly profits. Something close to this could
result either from regulatory pressure, firms' strategic pricing behavior aimed at
heading off competition, or firms' non-profit-maximizing decisions to favor
public service or professional standards. The media enterprise could either price
the product as low as possible or devote monopolistic profits to improving
quality. For example, a public-spirited, family-owned monopolistic newspaper
might give the newsroom a bigger budget, devoting potential profits to public
service elements of journalism. A regulated cable monopoly could equip and
support public access facilities or provide cable access even to nonprofitable
sections of the community. These expenditures may even be economically
justified by what people would potentially pay, even though they are not
justified for a profit-maximizing monopolist that is unable to fully price
discriminate. Under these scenarios, audiences could lose from the introduction
of competition. Competition would take the potential "monopoly profits" that
the monopolist "spent" on consumers and instead use them to cover the costs of
producing duplicative media content.
The FCC's now mostly repudiated Carroll doctrine53 recognized that
sometimes licensing a new broadcaster in a community could produce ruinous
competition harmful to the public. As the Carroll court noted, the FCC should
of course not deny a license merely to benefit existing licensees. Still,
sometimes a new licensee would add little valuable diversity or quality to the
52 Of course, sometimes monopolists will be so wasteful or so oriented to reaping
maximum monopoly profits that potentially wasteful competition-the second wire-will
benefit the public.
5 3 See Carroll Broad. Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 440-44 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This
doctrine has been largely abandoned. See 3 F.C.C.R. 638, 638 (1988).
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available programming. Given that the various broadcasters must share the
same advertising base, and especially if a new entrant's programming
categories largely duplicate those of the established licensees, the new entrant's
primary effect might be to reduce the established stations' revenue and hence
programming budgets. The resulting decline in service could produce a loss to
the public that is greater than any gain from the new, presumably low cost
programming that the new licensee presents. Of course, there is no market
mechanism to indicate when this occurs. Hence, existing licensees' self-
interested claim that granting the new license will have this effect cannot be
easily evaluated. Still, the criterion of giving the audience what it wants, or the
statutory charge to the FCC to engage in public interest regulation, 54 would
seem to require an attempt.
For roughly the same reasons, under certain conditions, monopolistic
ownership of local broadcast channels would produce more beneficial results
than competition.5 5 Assuming three competing stations and three programming
categories where 70% of the audience strongly prefer type A, 20% type B, and
10% type C, the three competitors are likely to each provide type A, with each
on average getting one-third of 70% (23 1/3%) of the audience. But if a
monopolist controlled all three channels, having no incentive to compete with
itself, it could introduce a different type of programming on each channel in
order to increase its total audience. It would gain those viewers who prefer B
and C but do not bother to watch A. Here, consumer welfare would be better
served-the audience would get more of what it wants-with monopolistic
ownership. Competition would produce a wasteful use of resources-too many
of virtually identical products.
An issue repeatedly litigated on First Amendment grounds was many
communities' policy of granting exclusive licenses to cable companies. 56 Here
54 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1991). Obviously, denial of a
license under this reasoning would result in the government preventing someone from
broadcasting for reasons other than physical scarcity of airwaves. The Supreme Court noted
but said nothing about this point in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 401
n.28 (1969).
55 This phenomenon has been often noted. See, e.g., OwEN & WDMAN, supra note
35; Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REv.
293, 304 (1991).
56 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 488-97
(1986). An alternative First Amendment view would be that the government could provide for
a monopoly cable franchise just as it has monopoly telephone service but, if it does so, it is
constitutionally required to impose public access or common carrier obligations in respect to
at least some portion of the system's carrying capacity. An ACLU suit challenging Kansas
City's elimination of a public access channel raised this claim among others. See generally
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again, competition could reduce consumer welfare and give the audience less of
what it wants. If cable hardware, such as the wires, is a large part of the
system's cost, and if stringing two sets of wires by each house significantly
increases that expense, adding a new competitor could significantly increase the
costs that the cable audience must cover.57 The same set of people must now
pay all the costs of two companies and two sets of wires rather than the costs of
one. If regulation forces the single operator to engage in efficient behavior and
to return its potential monopoly profits to the public, either in the form of lower
rates or public service programming (for example, local public access,
governmental, or educational channels), the monopolistic cable operator would
provide greater benefits to the public than could be obtained through
competition.
Again, the optimal arrangement cannot be determined in the abstract.
However, actual examples where, for short time periods, competition between
cable companies produces either better service, better program offerings, lower
prices, or all three do not speak to the long-run better scenario.58 The same is
true in respect to whether phone companies, if they are allowed to carry cable
programming over their wires,59 will eventually carry all cable programming,
MARc A. FRANKuN & DAvID A. ANDERsoN, MASS MEDiA LAw 759 (5th ed. 1995). I
participated in the discussions leading up to this litigation.57 This particular duplicative cost would not occur if all cable systems could use the
same wire (for example, a fiber optics line installed and owned by the phone company). Fair
usage of this line is more likely if operated on common carrier principles, which would be
easier to police if the phone company had no incentive to favor its own cable products. The
FCC and then Congress imposed this regulatory separation by forbidding phone companies
from providing their own cable content to the public. Nevertheless, industry convinced
several lower courts that this approach borders on irrationality. See Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 909-32 (E.D. Va. 1993), vacated and
remanded to detenmine if moot, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996). It has now convinced Congress that
deregulation and competition is served by eliminating this separation. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Bit see Baker,
supra note 6, at 97-136 (criticizing the First Amendment challenge and arguing that the then
existing law, which allowed phone companies to be only carriers, not sellers, of
programming, was most likely to result in competition and diversity in programming).
58 Thomas Hazlett points to cases where cable competition produces better service
and/or lower prices. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television:
Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 90-113 (1990). However, these may
be primarily short-term effects of a struggle to become the monopolist-most situations of
"overbuilding" have resulted in eventual sale of one system to the other.
59 Allowing phone companies to carry cable programming, as was to be allowed under
the "video dialtone" rules, does not speak to whether the phone company should be allowed
to be the owner and marketer of the programming. See Baker, supra note 6, at 100.
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including that of competing program packagers, or whether a two-wire world
will persist.
The same issue can arise in respect to local newspapers. Given the
unfortunate modem decline of differentiation between local dailies, a single
newspaper may serve a community better than competitive papers. Since a
significant portion of the newspaper's expense goes to producing the public
good element-the so-called "first copy costs" such as news gathering, editing,
and layout-and since the potential revenue base from audience and advertisers
stays the same whether there are one or more papers, the amount the paper can
devote to the first copy, which is crucial for product quality, should decline as
the available revenue is split between multiple papers. A single paper has a
(potentially) larger audience and advertising base from which to derive revenue,
which it could use either to keep its price down or to provide a larger editorial
budget or both. If the monopoly paper is more committed to journalism than to
maximizing profits, it should be able to produce a better product than it could if
faced with competition. Thus, the monopoly paper might serve the community
better than two similar, but weaker, competing papers. 60
The issue is complicated, however, in part because of the difficulty in
describing, much less measuring, what is meant by "serving a community
better." 61 Many media commentators have argued that competition itself
produces papers that are observably better, although in ways that are hard to
quantify, and that competition between papers, producing at least some degree
of choice, should be counted as inherently good. 62 Moreover, at least one
empirical investigation found that a typical competitive paper devoted more
resources to its editorial product and maintained lower per copy prices than did
the typical monopoly paper-a result that may reflect the incredibly profitable
60 Exploitation of a monopolistic position to increase profits may, however, be the more
common response. Still, although viewing the case as atypical, Leo Bogart notes that the
Philade4hia Inquirer expanded its editorial staff after the failure of the Bulleain. See BOGART,
supra note 32, at 200. Although William Blankenburg avoided endorsing monopolies, he
commented that "if news-editorial quality can be equated with expenditures, then it's better to
have a single large daily than two half its size." William B. Blankenburg, Newspaper Scale &
Newspaper Etpenditures, 10 NEWsPAPm REs. J., Winter 1989, at 97, 101. Robert Entnan
notes the deep-pocket argument favoring monopoly as well as various other hypotheses
concerning why competition or monopoly papers would be better, but finds the empirical
research to be inconclusive. See ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WrnHouTr CIsNs 91-
101 (1989).
61 See C. Edwin Baker, Ownership of Newspapers: The View from the Positivist Social
Science (1994) (unpublished research paper, Shorenstein-Barron Center).
62 See BEN H. BAGDnaAN, MEDIA MONOPOLY (4th ed. 1992); LEO BOGART, PRESS AND
PUC 352-53 (2d ed. 1989).
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monopoly newspapers' tendency to take money out as profits rather than to
lower prices or increase the newsroom budget.63
4. A Solution and New Problem: Price Discrimination
The inability to adequately price discriminate has been assumed in the
discussion so far. It is only this inability that leads to underproduction of media
content (or any other item with sufficient public good elements) and to the
possi'bility that monopolistic competition will drive out more valuable content
and replace it with content less valuable from the perspective of consumers.
This assumption should be relaxed. Media owners have always engaged in
some degree of price discrimination. They serialize a story in a newspaper or
magazine, then sell it as a hardback novel, and then as a cheaper paperback.
Newspapers effectively sell cheap, for example, when multiple, sometimes poor
readers share a single copy, but sell at a "higher" price (per person) where one
person or family is the only user. Magazines sell at different subscription rates
depending not merely on the reader's value to advertisers but on the
purchaser's willingness to search for a cheap rate. These are all examples of
price discrimination, and the list could go on and on. Technological change also
often increases opportunities to price discriminate. Movie producers always had
the ability to engage in some price discrimination. They could charge different
prices in different geographical areas, to different age groups, at different times
of the day or week, and at different times after release. But new marketing
"windows" have increased this capacity. The producer can show the film first
in theaters and then move through various additional distribution channels-
pay-television, video sales and rentals, free-television, and maybe "on-line."
Although price discrimination will never be perfect, its occurrence surely
reduces some of the problems described above.
Taking price discrimination into account, however, adds a new complexity.
Opportunities to price discriminate vary among communications products, a
variation both between mediums and, within a medium, between product
categories. This variation has two important consequences. First, there should
be less underproduction of media products that are best able to price
discriminate. Second, by introducing (or increasing) price discrimination,
63 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 62, at 201-02; John C. Busterna et al., Competition,
Ownership, Newsroom and Library Resources in Large Newspapers, 68 JouRNAm Q. 729,
729 (1991); Gerald L. Grotta, Consolidation of Newspapers: What Happens to the
Consumer?, 48 JouRNAusM Q. 245, 248 (1971). Lower prices or higher newsroom budgets
in competing papers may also reflect short-run strategies of deep-pocketed companies that
operate at a loss while seeking to become the surviving monopolist. See Michigan Citizens for
an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1285-1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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products that now succeed will take up more of the market than before. Their
success (or greater success) will often cause a downward shift in the demand
for other products, often leading those other products to be unprofitable. 64
Sometimes, production of these products is no longer economically justified-
the audience now values them less than they cost to produce. But at other times
this will not be so. The failed product will still be economically justified but no
longer commercially viable. Especially when the failed product is
comparatively unable to price discriminate, its failure may reflect the
destructive monopolistic competition described above. Even though it would
still produce a surplus of value over cost, there is now no price at which it can
be profitably sold. The net result is that many products that best provide the
audience with what it wants are driven out by their comparative inability to
price discriminate. In contrast, since price discrimination merely converts
consumer surplus (or lost low-priced sales) into revenue, the successful price-
discriminating product may produce comparatively little social surplus.
Media products' comparative capacity to price discriminate is an empirical
matter. The slant-what types of media content will be favored and what will
be disfavored-cannot be determined a priori. Still, hazardous as it may be,
some broad speculation is possible.
First, the persistent opening up of new delivery channels for video
products-basic and pay cable channels and VCR technology combined with
rental and sale of video tapes to consumers-is likely to have increased the
capacity to price discriminate in these media as compared to print.65 This would
cause audiences to receive an increasing (possibly inefficiently large) supply of
video products and a decreasing (possibly inefficiently small) supply of written
material.
Second, some types of content within a given medium may be more
susceptible to differential packaging and hence increased price discrimination
than others. Due to its limited time salience as well as its relative lack of
copyright protection, news and factual content may be less subject to price
discrimination than is fiction or fantasy material. Of course, news content can
be immediately sold by wire or on-line, quickly broadcast, then sold in a
newspaper and maybe a weekly magazine, and finally used in a documentary or
integrated into a book. Nevertheless, the original producer may have more
control, and thus more of these options, with "expressive" (copyrightable)
video presentations of news rather than with the news itself, creating too great
64 C supra Part II.B, Table 2.
65 Computer databases containing demographic information and allowing its
manipulation, as well as various other relatively new devices, may give owners of written
media products greater capacity to target discrete audiences and potentially to price
discriminate.
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an incentive to develop news susceptible of appealing video presentation and
too little an incentive for print-oriented investigative journalism. Thus, although
the consequence for news production of variations in the opportunities for price
discrimination is an empirical issue, unfortunate results seem probable.
Third, the activity of price discrimination-marketing the material through
different channels or windows-itself often requires large investments. Whether
creating a window is worth the cost largely depends on how much additional
revenue the window can produce. The obvious consequence is that
"blockbusters" will generally be better positioned to price discriminate than
products whose smaller audiences are less likely to pay the cost of using all
potentially available windows.66 The predicted result is that the most popular
media products are likely to become even more dominant-inefficiently
dominant. The result is that more diverse media content that audiences also
want-that audiences value more than it would cost to produce-is likely to be
underproduced.
Fourth, to the extent that price discrimination involves using different
"windows," increasing price discrimination is usually cheaper and more
convenient if the owner of the media product operates within all of the various
channels. One of various "synergies" in media mergers that only dubiously
relates to the public good is the merged firms' capacity to utilize more windows
in marketing a media product. The point here is that this is likely to contribute
to the undue dominance of the products of these merged firms-with "undue"
meaning contrary to the goal of maximizing what audiences want-as a result
of their superior ability to price discriminate. The same point applies with
respect to media products marketed internationally because these additional
markets typically allow sales at a different price than in the home market.
In sum, although the ability to price discriminate may reduce some of the
"inefficiencies" created by monopolistic competition among goods with
significant public good aspects, the variable ability to price discriminate is likely
to exacerbate other market distortions.
]I. SELLING AT FULL COST: INCLUDING EFFEC's ON THIRD PARTIES
The most commonly recognized reason for markets to produce
"inefficient" or non-wealth-maximizing results67 is "transaction costs" that
6 6 This effect is in addition to blockbusters' capacity to produce monopoly or "winner-
take-all" profits, which creates inefficient incentives to invest in producing blockbusters. See
FRANK & COOK, supra note 50.
67 The economic concept of "efficiency" is inherently indeterminate in the policy context
of choosing legal rules. A choice of a rule (or disposition of a case) both will affect the
parties' wealth and, often, will influence people's preferences. However, determining the
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prevent some costs and some benefits from being brought to bear on market
actors. The failure to bring these costs and benefits into the actor's economic
calculus is often described as an externality. Pollution is a standard example of
a negative externality; a beautiful view observable by the public is an example
of a positive externality. If negative impacts of an activity are not brought to
bear on the actor, the predictable result is too much of an activity; where
positive externalities exist, too little of the activity can be expected. Failure to
bring these effects to bear on the actor can also lead the actor to behave in a less
efficient choice depends on assuming some distribution of wealth and some set of preferences.
The purported solution of assuming the existing distribution of wealth is conceptually
unavailable when the content of the existing distribution is precisely what the choice of a legal
rule or outcome of a case places at issue. Likewise, unquestioning reliance on existing
preferences seems misguided when the decision in question will predictably change those
preferences. Thus, as a positivist efficiency analysis, typical versions of law and economic
methodologies are systematically incomplete and the efficiency criterion is oftenindeterminate. See C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHL.
& PuB. AFF. 3, 3-48 (1975) [hereinafter Baker, Ideology]; C. Edwin Baker, Posner's
Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law, 12 GA. L. REv. 475, 475-511
(1978) [hereinafter Baker, Posner]. In contrast to the overt inadequacy of this economic
analysis as positivist theory, a Marxist addition makes for potential descriptive
completeness-when alternative results would both be "efficient," the Marxist theory could
predict that the law will typically choose the solution that adds to the ruling economic class'
wealth or power. See id. Analytically, law and economic analysts adopt this ruling class
orientation when they assume for purposes of analysis that a value is a person's "willingness
to pay," an assumption using an allocation of wealth that advantages the wealthy, as opposed
to "price for which a person would sell," a standard that comparatively favors the poor.
None of the above denies, and this Article implicitly assumes, that welfare economics
can be extraordinarily useful in examining relevant aspects of the legal order. On the other
hand, this economic analysis can be equally dangerous to the extent it dominates consideration
of legal issues. The analysis's linguistic commodification of all valued elements of human
existence may contribute to making such commodification intellectually and socially
acceptable, while human flourishing requires that many elements of life not be commodified.
See generally MARGAREr JANE RADIN, CoNmi sr CoMMoDms (1996). The analysis's
reductionist orientation often causes it to assume precisely the issues most relevant in dispute.
More generally, the most important issues the legal order faces today are normative-they
relate to proper distributions of wealth and power and to what preferences or values should
prevail in various contexts. These issues are inevitably seriously contested and the
perspectives that different groups bring to bear on them differ, often profoundly. The
methodologies that are often most important-and hence methodologies that should be at the
core of legal education-are ones that aid in seeing different perspectives and that aid in self-
reflective development of different perspectives. If the reductive allure of economic problem
solving causes the neglect of these more difficult methodologies, we are all losers.
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than optimal manner (e.g., to fail to install a cheap and effective pollution
control device).
"Giving the audience what it wants" can only sensibly mean doing so
within some cost constraint. Usually the person who invokes the notion means
that the audience should get what it wants given its willingness to pay the cost.
Many people would like to see Broadway-quality productions for free at their
local theaters, but this observation is not thought to demonstrate that giving
audiences what they want requires making this opportunity available. "Giving
the audience what it wants" means giving it a Broadway-quality production
only if the audience is willing to pay its real or actual cost. The notion of
externalities, however, refers to a real cost or benefit that is not brought to bear
on the transaction. The seller either over- or under-calculates the product's cost
and, for this reason, charges the audience more or less than the product's cost.
The audience receives either more or less of the content that it would want if it
were required to pay the real costs. Thus, in trying to determine whether media
markets operate to give audiences what they want, it is crucial to come to grips
with the types of externalities prevalent in these markets.
For net externalities to be positive means that the media-product produces
value for which the media-firm does not receive payment. If the firm did
receive this payment, it could still be profitable, and could still succeed in the
market, even if it charged its audience less than it must now charge in order to
survive. Of course, standard economic theory claims that normally, if the price
goes down, more people will buy more of the product. That is, when
externalities are positive, the audience will get less of the media content than it
wants-less than they would buy if they were charged the lower, real cost of
their consumption. An audience's apparent unwillingness to buy does not
necessarily mean that the audience does not want the content in an economically
meaningful sense of "want." Rather, this unwillingness only means that the
audience does not want the content at the improperly high price at which the
profit-oriented or market-disciplined firm must price it. Likewise, negative
externalities permit artificially low prices. Purchases of content that have
negative externalities do not mean that the audience wants that content-only
that it wants the content given that the content is being sold at less than its real
cost. And if these externalities are significant, as I will suggest below, "good"
content may be priced way too high while "bad" content may be priced way
below its actual cost to society.
These are the purely economic observations. Two aspects of most
externalities in the media context merit special comment before proceeding.
First, these externalities often represent noneconomic values or activities; to
think of them as externalities at all seems awkward for those who do not adopt
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the pervasive market rhetoric of economic analysis. 68 In my analysis here, since
I am critiquing free market analysis on its own terms, I will use this rhetoric,
although later I will question its appropriateness. Second, media externalities
often involve the system of freedom of expression. Many, probably most, of
the media's effects on third parties occur through media content's effect on its
audiences' thinking, beliefs, preferences-or, as sometimes described, any
harms (or benefits) that result from a "mental intermediation." Liberal premises
arguably embodied in the First Amendment mean that people's admittedly real
and legitimate interest in what others read or hear does not give them authority
to force these others to read X or prohibit them from reading y.69 Prevention of
harm (or achievement of gain) is not always a permissible basis for prohibiting
(or mandating) behavior. 70 People may have a First Amendment right to
engage in certain forms of harm-causing behavior. Acceptance of this view of
the First Amendment, however, would still not stop the state from
implementing policies designed to increase positive and to decrease or
otherwise respond to negative externalities of media products.
This section considers media content's effect on third parties--costs or
benefits to people other than the immediate audience.71 Although I offer no
empirical evidence, I expect my attempt to catalog and describe these
externalities, both positive and negative, will provide convincing support for the
view that they are massive. If true, markets within an otherwise unchanged
legal order cannot be expected to operate efficiently, that is, cannot be expected
to provide the audience with what it wants. This discredits the claim that "the
fully deregulated marketplace [leads to] the best and highest use. "72
68 See RAD]N, supra note 67.
69 Government decisionmaking based on promoting some people's interest in what other
people read has sometimes been considered an improper reliance on external preferences. C.
RONALD DWORmN, TAKNG RiGrs SEuIousLY 275-76 (1977). Even if properly
characterized as an "external preference," reliance is proper for some purposes-in fact, it
can be central to individual and collective self-determination-but is not proper as a basis for
suppressing "others" liberty. See C. Edwin Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective Choice
Situations, 25 UCLA L. REv. 381, 381-416 (1978).
70 Cf. C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, S. CAL. L. Rnv. (forthcoming
1997) (arguing that prevention of harm or injury to others is virtually never a sufficient basis
for restricting people's liberty-although emphasizing that this claim is only plausible given
particular conceptions of liberty).
71 From a suitably abstract perspective, the discussion here resembles issues considered
in the last section. There, only disablingly high transaction costs blocked price discrimination
sufficient to achieve "efficient" outcomes. Still, externalities or third party effects are often
commonly recognized and treated separately.
72 Fowler & Brenner, supra note 3, at 211. Of course, regulation or other legal changes
can make things worse-dealing with one problem, one externality, often creates other
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Here I catalog major positive and negative externalities. In the following
subsection, I note illustrative actual or possible legal or policy responses. Most
existing and commonly proposed media-specific regulations or "interventions"
turn out to be attempts to respond to one or another of these externalities.
Therefore, these regulatory actions and related media policies cannot be
condemned wholesale on the ground that it would be better to allow the
audience to get what it wants. The market cannot be routinely expected to
accomplish that goal or to do better by the audience than intelligent regulatory
intervention. The question in most cases will be (partly) empirical-what are the
externalities, both positive and negative, how important are they, and do
particular regulations lead to their "distortive" effect being blunted? The
empirical analysis, however, usually cannot be expected to be conclusive.
These externalities are not only virtually impossible to measure but often their
significance, even their valence, will be disputable. Whether any particular
regime gives the audience what it wants will likewise be contestable. Therefore,
although empirical information will be helpful, the evaluation is inherently
political.
A. Catalog
This subsection describes ten generic types of externalities that greatly
affect whether a market production of media content will correspond to the
content that would be produced if the audience got what it wanted when
charged its real cost. Obviously, there is no natural classification scheme for
externalities. Like any classification, only its usefulness for some purpose gives
the scheme any value. Here, the constructed classification will be somewhat
arbitrary, with categories sometimes overlapping, and the overall scheme
inevitably incomplete. Still, it encompasses many, hopefully most, of the third
party effects that either do or arguably should impact media policy. In any
event, recognizing that the production and distribution of media content affects
people other than the immediate, paying audience, I consider ten categories:
1. Quality of Public Opinion and Political Participation
2. Audience Members' Interactions with Other People
3. Audience Members' Impact on Cultural Products Available to
Others
problems; moreover, sometimes regulatory rent-seeking only masks itself in the rubric of the
public interest. As long as even the theoretically ideal market can be seen to be inadequate at
providing socially desirable results, intellectual and political energy should be spent on
improving, not merely disparaging, political and governmental processes-the only realm in
which appropriate solutions are possible. That effort, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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4. Exposing and Deterring Abuses of Power
5. Other Behavioral Responses to the Possibility of Media Exposure
6. Nonpaying Recipients of Information and Media Output
7. Positive Benefits to People or Entities Wanting Their Message
Spread
8. Messages' Negative Effects on Those Who Do Not Want the
Attention
9. Gain or Loss to Sources
10. Costs Imposed or Benefits Created by Information Gathering
Techniques
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1. Quality of Public Opinion and Political Participation
Media consumption often leads people to become more (or sometimes
less)7 3 informed, as well as more or less active as voters or political
participants. 74 The quality and extent of a media consumer's voting and
political activity affects other people. Even a person's opinions as measured by
polls can influence others' behavior, including decisions of political elites.
These political consequences of media consumption constitute a major
externality. The symbolic and institutional resources society devotes to
maintaining a democracy and trying to make it more vibrant make it clear that
many people are committed to (and value) its successful functioning to an extent
way beyond their personal concern to have their own opinion or to vote
themselves. The extent and quality of people's media consumption greatly
affects all third parties who want to live in a well-governed democracy.
More generally, individuals are tremendously benefited or harmed if the
country makes wise or stupid decisions about welfare, warfare, provision of
medical care, the environment, and a myriad of other issues. Each individual
gets the advantage of good policies (and disadvantage of bad policies)
depending on the extent and quality of other people's political participation.
Thus, each person can be tremendously advantaged by other people's media
consumption. Collectively, people's media consumption produces huge
externalities.
Media can, of course, mislead as well as inform, can present venal as well
as wise argument, can encourage bad as well as good values, and can dampen
as well as incite political participation. Escapist literature or news that diverts
attention away from crucial structural issues and directs it toward trivial events
can undermine the quality of politics. Everything from negative political ads, to
false information, to demagogic partisanship, can pollute political discussion. In
other words, the externalities can be dramatically negative as well as positive.
Moreover, often their characterization will be contestable. Not everyone would
agree that reading The Nation produces good political externalities-just as I
have doubts about the benefits of Rush Limbaugh. This contestability does not,
7 3 See Justin Lewis, What Do WeLearnfrom the News?, ExTRA!, Sept. 1992, at 16, 17
(publication of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) (holding other factors constant, finding
heavy viewers of television news less well informed about news than other people); see also
BAKER, ADVERTISING, supra note 11, at 31-32 (reviewing literature and concluding
newspapers, not television, are main source of public's current events knowledge).
74 See RuY A. TEDEA, WHY AMmECANs DON'T VoTE: TuaNour DEC.NE IN TE
UNmD STATES, 1960-1984, at 88 (1987) (stating that decline in newspaper reading can
account for two-thirds of net voter decline in 1968 to 1980 and one-third of the socio-
economic status adjusted total).
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however, lessen the extraordinary importance of these externalities. Although
many social scientists and economists prefer looking at empirical situations
where the characterization of effects is seemingly unproblematic, even if only
by definitional fiat, and where the difficulty is only getting solid data, any
honest approach to policy must recognize that the contestability of
characterizations does not make the effects any less centrally important.
2. Audience Members' Interactions with Other People
The media's impact on political culture is only one of many spill-over
effects. It inevitably influences its audience's interactions with third parties,
frequently in ways that these others value or disvalue. I will leave until later
cases where a specific third party values or disvalues defamatory or laudatory
content that portrays her or, alternatively, her competitors.75 Third parties' self-
interested concern with the audience's media consumption extends much more
broadly. For example, social science evidence clearly indicates that, at least
under existing conditions, media portrayals of violence increase the likelihood
that some audience members will engage in violent behavior towards others. 76
Similarly, the image of the world presented by the media influences its
audience's behavior in situations ranging from its sexual and intimate
interactions to its purchasing behavior to its compassionate responsiveness to
other's difficulties. A heavy diet of watching television apparently corresponds
to increased fear of the world and reduced willingness to come to the aid of an
endangered stranger. 77 People's consumption of some religious, pornographic,
advertising, or other materials may contribute to their being more or less
appealing romantic or sexual partners-or influence their exercise of power in
hiring decisions or assigning jobs. Group defamation can harm those portrayed
by influencing audience members' attitudes and then their subsequent behavior
75 See inra Parts lI.A.7, ]T.A.8.
76 In a survey of research findings, John Murray observes: "Despite decades of
research, there is a perception that the research evidence on television violence is unclear or
contradictory. This perception is incorrect." John P. Murray, The Impact of Televised
Violence, 22 HoFsmA L. REv. 809, 810 (1992). Murray's conclusion is best summarized by
Leonard Eron's testimony to Congress: "There can no longer be any doubt that heavy
exposure to televised violence is one of the causes of aggressive behavior, crime, and violence
in society." Id. at 823; cf. L.A. Powe, Jr. & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Televised Violence:
First Amendment Princples and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1134-70
(1978).
77 For an early development of this point, see George Gerbner & Larry Gross, Living
with Television: The Violence Profile, 26 J. Comm. 173 (1976).
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toward members of the portrayed group78-although an additional concern is
obviously the direct injury experienced by members of the audience.79
Similarly, copy-cat crimes involve a major cost of media content not brought to
bear in the media producer's pricing policy; both the First Amendment and
difficulties of proof properly conspire to prevent liability and hence
internalization.
Media consumption also influences the knowledge and other resources that
a person brings to an interaction. A third party will find it is more difficult to
discuss the war in Bosnia with someone who has not heard of Bosnia. That is,
media consumption influences whether an interaction with another will be
experienced as interesting or boring, helpful or unproductive. Starkly put, no
one is an island. Among people's most important-dangerous, injurious,
fulfilling, challenging-experiences are those they have with others. It matters
whether the other is an interesting and insightful conversationalist, a skillful
associate, a caring person, or alternatively, a rapist or a bully and a bore-and
the other's media consumption influences these characteristics. Their media
consumption can have a major positive or negative value for people with whom
they interact-value for which these third parties often would, at least in theory
and in the absence of transaction costs, be willing to pay to obtain. It is this
theoretical willingness to pay that economic analysis must take into account.
More broadly, even when it is empirically impossible or normatively
inappropriate to attribute responsibility for specific behavior to specific media
content, media content undoubtedly contributes significantly to the culture that
makes different behavior more or less likely, more or less thinkable, as well as
affecting the meaning or significance of that behavior when it occurs. Other
than, maybe even more than, its direct value to its audience, this influence on
people's "construction of reality" and on the resulting behavior, which affects
other people, may be the media's most significant effect.
3. Audience Members' Impact on Cultural Products Available to Others
A has an interest in B's media consumption not only because B's
consumption affects B's interactions with A, but also because B's consumption
affects the media and other goods available to A. B's purchases of particular
78 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952).
79 See Charles R. Lawrence Mll, fHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Carmpus, 1990 DuicE L.J. 431, 457-66. This harm includes the injury to the people
disparaged and to those who accept the disparagement-although to the extent members of
this second group do not experience this influence as a harm, or at least do not at the time it
occurs, how the effect should be characterized by a nonpaternalistic analysis of giving people
what they want is ambiguous. See infra Part IV.
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cultural products-say, rock-and-roll music or opera compact discs or a quality
newspaper-increases the demand for media goods of that sort. This increased
demand can be beneficial or harmful to A. If A likes B's favored culture, A
could be benefited if the increased demand leads this favored culture to become
more widely and cheaply available, or harmed if too many Bs seek the limited
number of tickets for live performances.
Here, media content's public good aspect is especially relevant. More
demand usually allows spreading the cost of producing media content over
more people. Thus, others wanting a person's preferred media content
generally makes it more cheaply available. People's cultural preferences are in
this way "subsidized" by others having the same preferences. Of course, if a
person values not the cultural product itself but rather the cultural product's
"eliteness," she could be disadvantaged if her otherwise preferred content
becomes cheaper and more widely desired. In either case, however, other
people's media consumption has, as an externality, either beneficial or negative
effects on her opportunities to satisfy her cultural preferences.
Similarly, media content can affect, positively or negatively, its audience's
creativity, productivity, or group identity and diversity. These effects on
audience members likewise influence the availability of various options for
nonaudience members-cheaper "goods" if the audience becomes more
productive, useful or more interesting artifacts if audience members become
more creative, and more diverse life options if media nurtures diversity.
Alternatively, nonaudience members may have to pay higher taxes for an
expanded police-state apparatus if audiences become more dangerous. All these
effects occur even for third parties who do not personally interact with those
who consumed the influencing media products.
4. Exposing and Deterring Abuses of Power
Professor Vince Blasi highlighted the "checking" function of speech and
the press as a key rationale for constitutional protection.80 This function
involves both the media's power to expose governmental misdeeds and its
ability to deter those misdeeds by increasing the likelihood of exposure. The
focus on checking governmental abuse is surely no accident within the
constitutional arrangement. Constitutionalizing protection of the press plausibly
80 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521, 539. Blasi develops the checking function as central to interpreting both
the speech and the press clause, but arguably it makes most sense as a reason for and as
guidance in an independent interpretation of the Press Clause. See C. Edwin Baker, Press
Rights and Government Power to tucure the Press, 34 U. Mmm L. REv. 819, 819-89
(1980).
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follows from recognition of the value of a structure that checks abusive or
corrupt uses of governmental power combined with awareness that those to be
watched should not be trusted with the power to muzzle the watchdog. Still, the
general value of checking corrupt or abusive uses of power applies beyond a
concern with government. Wherever power exists, in business for example, the
potential of media exposure provides a valuable safeguard.
In one unusual but dramatic example, Amartya Sen argues that no matter
how bad the drought, no matter how poor the country, no major famine has
ever occurred in a democratically governed country that has a free press. 81
Apparently if there is a press to publicize the existence of the drought and
potential famine, the government in any country that subscribes to democratic
values and that tolerates competitive, oppositional political parties, which
potentially can take advantage of any failure of response, cannot resist the need
to respond. If necessary, the government moves food to the stricken region and,
more importantly, adopts income (or distribution) policies82 that assure
availability of food to the potentially "starving" groups.
A market cannot be expected to (fully or adequately) bring these
"checking" benefits to bear on media decisionmaking. If the press deters
misdeeds, everyone positively affected by the absence of the misdeeds benefits.
"Deterrence" means, however, that the media has no "expos6"-no product-
to sell to its audience and hence no opportunity to internalize the benefits it
produces. The deterrence is both a pure positive externality and a pure public
good. Similarly, when a press expos6 occurs, the public in general, not just the
audience that purchases the expose, benefits to the extent that the expos6
stimulates a corrective response by either the wrongdoers themselves or by
voters, prosecutors, and others with power. Even for the purchasers of media
content, the benefit is largely independent of their purchase. Of course, media
enterprises do benefit some from exposes. The long history of chasing the
"scoop" makes this clear. Still, even when the media can sell an expos6, 83 these
sales will dramatically under-internalize the benefits.
Sometimes journalism is pictured as producing exposes that stir political
behavior of readers or viewers or at least sufficiently enflame public opinion
81 See Amartya Sen, Freedom and Needs, THm NEw RmEPuc, Jan. 10 & 17, 1994, at
31; Amartya Sen, The Economics of Life and Death, Scaimar c AmuRICAN, May 1993, at
40.
82 Sen notes that often areas suffering the most devastating famines export food due to
starving groups' lack of income with which to purchase availahle food stocks. See AMiARIYA
SEN, PovERTYAND FAMm 161 (1981).
83 Given the non-copyrightability of facts, the media entity that uncovers the information
often will have to share with other media entities any revenue produced by selling the
"inews."
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that officials undertake corrective responses. This picture may be overly
simplistic. An empirical study of investigative journalism found the middle step,
the outraged public, to be missing. Investigative reports did produce responses
by officials but often the officials planned these responses before the story
became public and went forward even if the public largely ignored the story.84
The speculative possibility is that the press sometimes serves the American
political order not so much as the public's informer but rather as a substitute
public. 85 On this account, the benefits that the media's investigative work
produces may be great but not internalized. A relatively unconcerned public is
unlikely to pay much extra for those media reports that lead to correction of
corruption or to welfare-serving governmental responsibility. The economic
prediction must be that, to the significant detriment of the country, the market
will encourage the media to seriously underproduce these benefits. Certainly
when investigative reporting serves a deterring function and, as noted above,
probably even when it produces exposes that stimulate corrective political
responses, the investigative reporting will be undervalued by the market. The
public will predictably receive less than they would want if only charged its cost
minus the value of the positive externalities received by others.
Market dynamics not only cause an underproduction of these benefits, they
also distort their creation. Quality journalism and expensive investigative
journalism presumably perform the "checking function" better than slipshod,
under-funded, or nonexistent journalism. Nevertheless, the gain that the media
firm receives is directly related not to the quality or importance of the
"checking" effects but to the cost of its production and to its appeal to an
audience. The result is that the value of exposes to the media will not correlate
with their value to society. The corruption leading up to the savings and loan
scandal was just not as sexy as exposes about Gary Hart or Bill Clinton's actual
or alleged sex life. The country's comparative over-emphasis on street or
violent crime as compared to environmental or bureaucratic crime and
misbehavior reflects in part the comparative expense of producing the reports
and their comparative expected sale value. Predictably, those exposes most
tantalizing or narratively accessible to a broad audience and cheapest to
assemble will be comparatively overproduced. The much-praised 60 Minutes
overtly illustrates this dynamic, with segment combinations chosen in part to
84 See DAvID L. lNo=s Er AL., JouRNAusM OF OumrAGE 18 (1991).
85 Schudson argues that "[s]o long as information is publicly available, political actors
have to behave as if someone in the public is paying attention." MIcHAEL SCHUDSoN, THE
PowE1 OF NEws 25 (1995). He explains: "The news constrcts a symbolic world that has a
kind of priority, a certification of legitimate inportanee." Id. at 33. Maybe it should not be so
surprising if reporters "often act as if their real audience is made up of the other reporters or
government officials they consider their peers." FALLows, supra note 32, at 240.
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give a balance of audience-maximizing appeal, and individual stories chosen
(and distorted) depending on the show's ability to make them accessible without
too much of an expenditure of resources.86 Other recent magazine-style
television journalism profits by even more overt emphasis on sensationalist
exposes, thereby heightening the misallocation of journalistic resources. Of
course, this observation does not condemn those formats. Rather the point is
that media firms, which do not fully capture the positive benefits of
investigative journalism, will disproportionately underproduce the most
valuable investigative material.
5. Other Behavioral Responses to the Possibility of Media Exposure
The possibility of media coverage has consequences way beyond deterring
misdeeds. Potential subjects of media exposure often change their behavior in
light of the possible coverage. Demonstrators sometimes choose and time
expressive activities intended to stimulate media coverage or select behavior
because they believe the activity will play favorably under a media spotlight. 87
Some commentators argue that a primary incentive for terrorist activities is the
hope for media exposure. 88
Press coverage can change content and sometimes the outcome of debate
by legislators or other office holders. Apparently, at some point in the
nineteenth century, members of Congress stopped addressing each other in their
debates as much as they addressed their constituents.89 Of course, given that
media coverage has effects, the question remains whether the predictable
consequences will be good or bad. The possibility of being "on the record"
changes expressive forms and possibly substantive outcomes. The media,
however, has little incentive to take account of whether or when these various
behavioral consequences of media coverage are positive or negative (i.e., costs
or benefits) because these effects are "external" to their market-based decisions.
86 Fallows argues that among the ways distortion enters in is that the producers cannot
devote too much time of prominent screen journalists, people like Mike Wallace, to fully
understanding a story because of the overpayment of these media stars. See FALLows, supra
note 32, at 57-60.
87 See TODD GrrMN, THE WHOLE WoRLD Is WATCHNG 78-123 (1980).
88 But see infra note 151.
89 See THOMAS C. LEONARD, PoWER OF Tm PRESS 91-96 (1986).
[Vol. 58:311
GIVING THE AUDIENCE
6. Nonpaying Recipients of Information and Media Output
A profit-oriented enterprise's decisions to produce and sell some media
content will often depend on its ability to require those who receive and value
the content to pay. To the extent that the enterprise cannot force payment, the
result will be underproduction of what people want. However, people often
avoid paying. First, they effectively receive media content through their
interactions with audience members who have paid. For example, one may ask:
"Joe, what of interest was in the paper today?" 90 Secdnd, they gain access to
abandoned copies of the media content or, like library users, are free-riders on
shared provision of content.91 These possibilities further illustrate media
content's public good character. In any event, a major benefit produced by sale
of media content is access gained by many nonpurchasers. Depending on the
quality of the content (e.g., its accuracy or importance) as well as its value to
the nonpurchaser, this access can be a significant positive (or negative)
externality.
The dimensions of this phenomenon sometimes follow predictable patterns.
For example, the number of readers of an abandoned newspaper generally goes
up during hard times. It is often larger in comparatively poor communities. 92
To the extent that this context produces comparatively more positive
externalities, the market is likely to especially underproduce content valued by
the poor, even from the perspective of a standard that already disadvantages the
poor-willingness and ability to pay.
Another important category of nonpaying (or under-paying) users is content
creators themselves. Even if they pay for a "copy" of a work, they frequently
do not pay the full value of integrating it into their own subsequent works.
Almost any "valuable" communicative content (whether or not commercially
9 0 ff "Joe" values his conversation with nonaudience members, he may have
compensated the media producer for the value that he, but presumably not his interlocutor,
receives from the interaction-although the value he receives may also turn out to be an aspect
of the consumer surplus that played a central role in the reasons for underproduction discussed
in Part I.
91 Library users (and other cases of shared use), however, may represent a form of price
discrimination that is crucial for publication of many books.
92 The typical English national newspaper in the 1970s had two to three readers per
copy; in contrast, radical working-class papers in the 1830s are thought to have had roughly
20 readers per copy while at mid-century the more expensive stamped radical papers may
have been read by 50 to 80 persons per copy. See James Curran, Capitalism and Control of
the Press, 1800--1975, in MAss COMMUNICTION AND Socrim 195, 202 (James Curran et al.
eds., 1977). A major question, relevant especially for determining advertising rates, is the
typical readership of modem papers, with paid papers often asserting that they obtain a much
higher readership per copy than free weeklies. See BOGART, supra note 62, at 54-55.
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created) becomes subject to "appropriation" by later content creators-
appropriated in the sense of being the subject of comment, parody, or
integrative use. All cultural creations as well as conversation-think of how
intimates' private conventions grow out of their prior interactions-use prior
cultural inventions as their building materials. For this reason, legal devices like
copyright are always janus-faced-providing an incentive for creation by giving
creators some, but inevitably only a fraction, of the value of their creations but
also "inefficiently" restricting further creative uses by restricting the materials'
cultural availability. Standards like copyright's "fair use" permission are at best
rough compromises between these two conflicting goals, both of which must be
fully served in order to effectively encourage efficient media production.
7. Positive Benefits to People or Entities Wanting Their Message Spread
Publicity creates or blunts demand for objects, activities, or persons. It can
stimulate or discourage acceptance of values. The media help create celebrities
and pariahs. A media review can foster or hamper the economic success of a
restaurant, a movie, or virtually any other product. Individuals, advocacy
groups, governments, and businesses often desperately seek the media's
favorable attention, while disvaluing having their message ignored, distorted, or
critiqued. Here, I will consider cases where people value media attention,
leaving the converse to the next heading.
Frequently people or entities pay directly for favorable presentations about
themselves, their products, or the views they hold. Favorable content is
typically called "advertising" if direct payments are implicitly admitted, or
called "corruption" of the media if direct payments are made for content that
purports to be the media's own editorial content.93 Beneficiaries also often pay
the media indirectly, although overtly paying the public relations industry.
Here, their payment to the media enterprise can take the form of making it
cheaper for the media to gather and use (favorable) information. The person or
entity provides press facilities, news conferences, press releases, video news
releases, and other similar materials and services. 94
9 3 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (1994) (requiring announcement whenever payment is
made to secure broadcast); Lewis Publ'g v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 314-16 (1913)
(upholding requirement that newspapers receiving second class mail privileges identify as
advertising any material published for compensation); SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., 851 F.2d
365, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding law requiring disclosure of fact and amount of
consideration paid by issuer of security to a person for presenting a description of the
security).
94 The FCC has struggled with the question of whether rules regulating advertising apply
when a toy manufacturer "gives" a network cartoon programming that features characters that
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Often, however, the media bestows major positive benefits-favorable
reporting about a person, group, place, or product-without either direct or
indirect payment by the beneficiaries. These significant gratuitous benefits are a
major plus for these groups and individuals-a positive externality of media
content that is not internalized into the media's decisionmaking.
8. Messages' Negative Effects on Those Who Do Not Want the Attention
Media attention can also harm individuals, groups, or entities. Either
accurate or inaccurate information, either fair or unfair comment, can ruin a
restaurant or politician. The market does not routinely bring these harms to
bear on the media's editorial decisions. Of course, the situation is different if
the media has transactions with the negatively described (or potentially
described) person or entity. Implicit or explicit bargains are then much simpler.
The journalist can offer to keep the source confidential. It can soften or avoid
the negative portrayal of its important advertisers who make payments for ads,
or of government officials or agencies which regularly provide information and
access. Nevertheless, for the media to explicitly accept payment for not running
or for changing a story is typically characterized as corrupt. An "independent"
press is not supposed to engage in such transactions.
Theoretically, media companies could partially internalize costs imposed by
its unwelcome portrayals. A media entity could compare the value the injurious
content adds to its journalistic product with the amount the negatively portrayed
party would pay to exclude the content. Unless charging for not running the
content is illegal (for example as "blackmail"), the media entity could then
choose the most profitable course. Nevertheless, actual journalistic practices
(possibly because of high transaction costs or the value of the media entity's
reputation for independence) usually rule out these transactions. The predictable
failure of the market to lead the media to internalize these costs imposed on the
subjects of its news apparently makes the news "inefficiently" negative-more
negative than if the audience paid the full cost of the news.
Still, distinctions between different negative portrayals (for example,
between accurate and inaccurate portrayals or between accurate newsworthy
and accurate nonnewsworthy portrayals) are important. Media entities have
incentives to avoid inaccurate portrayals. Their audience may pay less for poor
quality information. This incentive, however, only internalizes one cost created
by the "bad" information-the cost borne by the audience, not the additional
the manufacturer markets. See In re Policies & Rules Concerning Children's Television
Programming, 6 F.C.C.R. 2111 (1991); NEwToN N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY,
ABANDoNED IN TBm WATELAND 21 (1995).
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harm to the person or entity described. This market failure might be partially
remedied by, for example, defamation and privacy tort law. Distributive or
fairness considerations, however, may argue that the media usually should not
be deterred from presenting accurate information. Negative effects of accurate
information are a real externality. However, not internalizing these effects may
help achieve the result that would occur if the media entity could internalize
various, uncaptured positive externalities, for example, checking function gains
created by the accurate information.
One particular response to potential noninternalized negative effects merits
particular attention. Many groups-both private and governmental-have an
interest in the public only receiving sanitized news concerning their activities.
They can advance this goal by collecting and writing their own sanitized
accounts and then distributing these accounts as press releases. The media
enterprises then sell this freely obtained content to audiences, possibly because
audiences do not know what they are getting or, equally relevant for the current
point, because audiences just do not value greater accuracy (as to these issues)
enough to pay the added cost of more investigative journalism. In other words,
public relations, discussed above as a means to obtain positive portrayals, can
also be a means to implicitly pay the media for avoiding negative portrayals.
Thus, "press release" journalism reduces a negative externality created by
negative portrayals. Nevertheless, the result can be "inefficient," as well as
otherwise objectionable. It is inefficient, for example, if the practice prevents
the production of positive externalities such as those associated with the
"checking function." 95 If the media entity were able to capture these positive
externalities, "real" journalism might be more profitable than press release
journalism. Not internalizing these negative externalities might be a second best
result-better than counting them when the positive externalities are not
counted.
9. Gain or Loss to Sources
Sources stand to gain from their interactions with reporters. They may
obtain desired publicity for their views or their disclosures, desired personal
recognition or status, a sense of empowerment, or a route to future media
access. There are also potential costs-the source may be injured through
retaliation or embarrassment if her identity is disclosed. The reporter and,
subsequently, the publisher or broadcaster generate these costs or benefits in
exchange for information that, depending on its quality, may benefit the media
entity by giving it a better product to sell-broadcast or publish-to a public.
95 See supra Part M.A.4.
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Even if no cash is involved (and sometimes it is), as with any voluntary
exchange, these mutual benefits should usually lead to efficient results. Thus,
here, reliance on the market is presumptively justified. 96 Still, this dyad merits
special attention.
Any failure to obtain "efficient" levels of disclosure might be expected to
result from legal blockages of opportunities to enter into binding agreements
between sources and reporters. Such a blockage might reduce the availability of
information from sources. But consider two examples, one where the
government forces the press to break its promise, and the other where it forces
the press to keep the promise.
Being able to promise anonymity helps a reporter "pay" for information-
the media internalizes one of the source's potential costs. The government's
claimed right to demand that a reporter testify and expose the source97 limits
the reporter's ability to give persuasive assurances, thereby reducing the
availability of information. 98 The blockage arguably leads to an inefficient
reduction in news production. Of course, a reporter's privilege could be seen as
subsidizing the press. It grants the reporter a right, a resource, not given to
other members of society. Thus, the question might be whether society wisely
grants this subsidy. However, the reporter possesses the information only
because of engaging in the reporting business. In that role, the reporter, unlike
most members of society, works to create a value in the ability to offer
anonymity. Moreover, to the extent that freedom of the press represents a
commitment to protect this business, a plausible view of the baseline is that the
information about the source's identity is created by and belongs to the
"press." 99 Recognizing a reporter's "special" testimonial privilege is not giving
the press something that otherwise was the government's; the privilege only
means that the government does not take something that the press itself
produces. The privilege makes it more likely that the press, without imposing
on anyone a cost related to gaining this information, is better able to produce
socially valued information.
96 Of course, sources will sometimes later regret the interchanges, but that is often true
after the fact for buyers or sellers. Still, the presumption might be that sources who willingly
make disclosures are adequately compensated, subject to typical "efficiency" doubts
surrounding contract behavior. For example, how should one party's woeful lack of
information or power affect the analysis of the transaction? This caveat suggests examining
the rationale for restrictions on free trade built into professional norms.
97 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972).
98 See Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Suady, 70 MxcH. L. REv.
229, 262 (1971).
99 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN Imm'Y AND FREEDOM OF SPEEcH 242-49 (1989).
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Likewise, a simplistic economic analysis might suggest that damages for a
breach of a promise of confidentiality should be available. 100 The argument is
that the availability of contract provides the news organization an ability to give
the source something valued by the source and thereby enables the press to
obtain information that it otherwise would not get. Forbidding such damages
because, for example, they involve liability for truthful publication of
information, 101 would inefficiently lead to reduced production of news. A more
textured account, however, must consider the effect of the damage remedy on
journalistic practices and on the quality of information produced.' 02 For
example, would potential liability lead media enterprises to centralize more
power in editors as opposed to reporters? If so, what effect would this
centralization have on the quality of news produced? Or does the unavailability
of liability disempower journalists as opposed to editors, for example, in the
decision about whether to publish the source's name?103
If, as seems probable, the circumstances in which the source is most likely
to demand a legally binding promise are those in which the media firm is most
likely to want to breach the promise, and if this happens mostly where the press
concludes that the identity of the source is itself important news (for example,
because it shows that the source attempted to manipulate the press into
publishing misleadingly negative information about a political opponent)104 the
analysis shifts. Non-enforceability may lead primarily to a decrease in the
publication of misleading or "corrupt" information, while enforceability may
discourage publication of politically relevant and true expos6s about sources
who unethically try to manipulate the media. If so, then non-enforceability
would improve the "quality" of information made available to the public. Once
the negative externalities of "bad" information are taken into account, the
economic analysis that merely looked at "quantity" is seen as unwisely
100 See Joseph H. Kaufman, Beyond Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: Confuentiality
Agreements and Effidency Within the "Marketplace of Ideas," 1993 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 255,
259-68; The Supreme Court, 1990 Tenn-Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REV. 177, 277-87
(1991).
101 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 673 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
102 The best treatment, suggestive on points made below, is Lil Levi, Dangerous
Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RurERs L.
REv. 609 (1991).
103 See Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and its Significance for First
Amendment Law and Journalism, 3 WM. & MARY BILRTS. J. 419,452-56 (1994). Note the
exercise of this power by the editor can hurt the journalist by limiting her future effectiveness
to the extent she then has a bad reputation among various potential sources.
104 Cf. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670, which is criticized in Baker, Turner Broadcasting,
supra note 11, at 119-22.
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simplistic. Audiences may be benefited by making these promises
unenforceable if the result is that "bad" information is less prominent. Merely
relying on the market cannot be said here to be clearly the best way of giving
the audience what it wants.
10. Costs Imposed or Benefits Created by Information Gathering
Techniques
The journalist's activity of gathering information itself sometimes creates
benefits or, more often, imposes costs. The "speeding" reporter may damage
property or injure people in a rush to obtain a story. Likewise, a reporter's
presence and her questioning may intrude into privacy or interfere with
personal, business, or political relationships. When a reporter barges in to be
the first to interview the crime victim, it can be painfully intrusive, 105 whether
or not later publication occurs, with the publication being a potentially
additional upsetting invasion.
People who know they are being recorded, especially if they know they are
being recorded on audio or video tape by the press, will often change their
behavior from that which they would otherwise prefer-a fact apparently
assumed, for example, by the many laws forbidding recording of conversations
without the consent of all participants.1 06 This change is presumably a cost to
those who did not wish to change and did not wish to be recorded, but can be
either a benefit or cost to others who may or may not prefer the changed
behavior. The mere presence of reporters can negatively affect the content and
openness of discussion at a board meeting or among a group of people trying to
decide how to respond to some issue. Televising a trial might affect a jury's
attention or attitude toward the case; certainly the received view is that
televising jury deliberations would be inappropriately intrusive and probably
distortive. Alternatively, the mere presence of reporters or news gatherers can
be beneficial. "On the record" discussions may be fairer or wiser in their
105 Consider a reporter who, after a mother kills her two young children and then
herself, goes next door with camera rolling and, knowing that the parents are not at home,
tells the murdered children's young playmates about what happened in order to get their
reaction on film. See KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 432-33 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995).
106 The federal government bars recording of conversations unless one party consents,
see 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994), but some states bar taping unless all parties consent. Some
constitutional challenges claiming interference with news gathering in particular contexts have
been upheld, but more often are rejected. See FbRANKN & ANDERSON, supra note 56, at
408-11, 581-82.
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output. More dramatically, a reporter's presence can provide an unpopular
group increased safety or an activist organizer increased status. 107
Sometimes on-going relationships between a reporter and her subjects,
rights of exclusion implicit in ownership of private property, or other unique
features of situations allow rough internalization of many effects of the activity
of news gathering. Still, the media typically will not pay the full costs or receive
the full benefits of news gathering, and this underpayment will have
consequences. Audiences will receive more content than they would if they
paid its real cost when the news gathering itself imposes costs for which the
media does not pay. However, they receive the reverse, less content than they
should, when the reporting creates benefits, for example, better conduct of
public affairs or safety for dissidents. Moreover, the distortion is biased in
particular ways, possibly towards sensationalism and away from public affairs
and dissent.
B. Policy Responses
The economic language of "externalities" is usually absent from popular
discourse about media policy. Yet it is uninformative to rely on a faith in
markets or to use economic analysis to argue for deregulation without including
consideration of these externalities. Once this consideration is included, it
becomes apparent that most existing media law, as well as most policy
advocacy about legal policy in the media context, can be understood as
attempting to reduce costs not otherwise borne by the media, to impose those
costs on the media, or to promote provision of content otherwise inadequately
produced because of the media's inability to internalize the benefits. That is, the
legal and policy realm can be understood as responsive, and should be even
more responsive, to the externalities cataloged here, thereby making the media
come closer to giving the audience what it wants. Here, I offer a sampling of
illustrations of this claim.
1. Responses to the Media's Effect on Political Culture
The content and quality of people's political participation 108 is a major
concern of media policy. The First Amendment strictly limits governmental
authority to restrict content because of its assertedly negative effects. Any
system that respects people's agency or the institutional integrity of the press
107 Safety was sometimes a reason for Black Panther groups to permit a reporter to be
present at times of expected police raids. Cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 672 (1972).
108 See supra Part III.A. 1.
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rules out most such governmental restrictions. Thus, the Supreme Court
unanimously struck down a prohibition on newspapers' election day
endorsements, a state law purportedly justified as preventing powerful
unanswerable distortions of the political process.1 9 However, laws sometimes
restrict politically relevant speech of entities whose "agency" or liberty has no
moral claim to respect. Participation of these entities within the political culture
can be seen as distortive rather than contributory." 0 Likewise, free speech
doctrine permits various restrictions on knowing falsehoods that reduce the
quality of political information. 11
Even if most restrictions on speech reasonably viewed as having negative
political externalities are considered unconstitutional, the government often
promotes content expected to have broadly positive political externalities.
Newspapers' predicted positive influence on political knowledge was invoked
as a primary justification for the huge mail subsidy newspapers have received
since colonial times-subsidies often paid for by postal charges imposed on
other "speakers," usually first class letter writers.'1 2 More modem examples
109See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966); see also Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (protecting publication of
truthful information regarding confidential Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission
proceedings). Before the development of modem First Amendment jurisprudence,
prohibitions that often served very partisan positions were constitutionally much less
problematic. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (upholding
contempt citation of newspaper for publishing political cartoons and denying the paper an
opportunity to defend by proving truth).
110 Laws restricting corporate political contributions were widely adopted during the
Progressive era in the early twentieth century, in large part because they were thought to
represent corrupting profit-oriented concerns rather than people's political sentiments or
principles. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-75 (1957) (discussing history of
restrictions on corporate political contributions); Louise OvERAcKER, MoNEY IN ELE ONS
177-88 (1932); EARL R. SIKS, STATE AND FEDERAL. CoRRurP-PRAcnCEs LEGImLATION
108-13 (1928). These laws are apparently constitutional. Compare Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (upholding statute prohibiting corporations
from making independent expenditures on behalf of political candidates from corporate
treasury), with First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (striking down statute
prohibiting corporations from making expenditures to influence the outcome of referendum
not affecting property, business, or assets of the corporation).
11 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964).
112 See RICHARD B. KmILBOWiCZ, NEws IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POSr OFFICE, AND
PUBUC INFORMATION, 1700-1860s, at 2-24 (1989). The political power of newspapers may
have led to subsidies, especially within postal policy-many early postmasters were
newspaper publishers. Originally, in addition to newspapers, the more common users of the
mail were apparently other businesses, not individuals engaged in noncommercial
communications. Hence, these other businesses probably paid most of the newspaper subsidy.
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abound. Government actions that help make media content more cheaply and
plentifully available to the public include provision of public libraries,
expenditures on public broadcasting, allocation of certain electromagnetic radio
frequencies to broadcasting as opposed to solely military uses, allocation of
some of these broadcast frequencies to public broadcasting rather than
commercial broadcasting, grants for producing art and cultural materials and
for making them publicly available, and government printing and free or below
cost distribution of information. The government also subsidizes information
development, for example, research within universities, within government
agencies, and by specific government contract, although often these
expenditures have aims unrelated to improving the political culture. The
government indirectly subsidizes the press and the development of political
information by issuing press releases and by providing press facilities for
accessing portions of the political sphere. The Freedom of Information Act
mandates that lots of expensive-to-create information be made available on
request.'1 3 Moreover, the charges for finding (as opposed to duplicating) the
information are dropped for the media and sometimes for various nonprofit
organizations, and even duplication charges are waived or reduced when
making the information available serves the public interest. n4
Content subsidies are only one possible policy for promoting positive
political externalities. A quite different approach involves influencing the
structure of the media industry and the distribution of ownership of, or
decisionmaling control within, media entities. Different structures and
distributions allow control by different sorts of people who may have
predictably different incentive structures. They may differ from current owners
and decisionmakers in the priority they place on the following: public service
ideals; professional norms; influencing political outcomes; serving particular
geographic, identity, or interest based communities; and maximizing profit.
These differences are especially important in an industry that constantly
struggles with a tension between profit maximization and creative, professional,
and public values-a tension that can be redescribed in part as a tension
between producing more negative or more positive externalities. A profit-
maximization focus is unconcerned with negative externalities-costs that do
not take money away from the enterprise. In contrast, public service ideals,
Providing socially valuable information also helped justify eventually extending mail
subsidies to magazines but not to "advertising papers," which policymakers perceived as
serving only private concerns. See Richard B. Kielbowicz, Oigins of the Second-Class Mail
Category and the Business of Policymaking, 1863-1879, 96 JoURNAUSM MONOGRAPHS 1, 4,
13, 20 (1986).
113 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
114 See id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(Il), (iii).
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professional norms, and various other non-profit-based incentives typically
amount to standards for, or goals of, reducing negative or producing certain
positive externalities. For these reasons, a public policy concerned with giving
the audience what it wants should aim at promoting structures and distributions
that give authority to the sorts of people less dominated by a profit focus and
more oriented toward maximizing social value.
A standard justification for antitrust rules is that monopolies inefficiently
reduce production. In the media context, the reduction to some extent denies
the audience what it wants. The political culture externality provides, however,
major additional "economic" reasons to engage in structural regulation that go
far beyond traditional antitrust concerns. For example, Sweden targeted its
newspaper subsidies to maintain or increase newspaper competition. Like many
other democracies, it believed this competition contributes to the quality and
vitality of a democratic political culture. 1 5 Similarly, this country's Newspaper
Preservation Act,116 however inept at achieving its ends, was presumably
oriented in part towards this end.
Implicit in the assumed tension between maximizing profits and maintaining
journalistic standards is that the second contributes more to a desirable social
and political order. The increasing dominance of a bottom-line orientation
purportedly damages the informing as opposed to the entertaining role of the
media, especially of the news.117 A plausible hypothesis, subject to
investigation, is that different ownership structures lead to differing trade-offs
between these two demands. Some research indicates, and many editors and
media professionals believe, that profit considerations are less dominant in
independent than in chain-owned newspapers.118 Possibly people closer to
actual journalistic practice will have the greatest commitment to journalistic
standards, largely out of personal and professional pride. Local owners may
115 See KARL ERIK GUSrAFSSON & STIG HADENIUS, SWEDISH PRESS POUCY 78 (1976);
Goran Hedebro, Communication Policy in Sweden: An Etperiment in State Intervention, in
COMMUNICATION POUCY IN DEVELOPED COUNTIES 137 (Patricia Edgar & Syed A. Rahim
eds., 1983); Lennart Weibull & Magnus Anshelm, Indications of Change: Developments in
Swedish Media 1980-1990, 49 GAzEa 41 (1992).
116 Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, 91 Stat. 353 (1970).
117 See, e.g., BOGART, supra note 32, at 174-75; DOUG UNDERWOOD, WHEN MBAs
RULE THE NEwsRooM 59--66 (1993).
118 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 61, at 9-12 (review of literature); William B.
Blankenberg & Gary W. Ozanich, The Effects of Public Ownership on the Financial
Performance of Newspaper Corporations, 70 JOURNALUSM Q. 68, 70-71, 74 (1993); John
Busterna, How Managerial Ownership Affects Profit Maximization in Newspaper Firms, 66
JOURNAUSM Q. 302, 302, 307, 358 (1989); David Pearce Demers, Corporate Structure and
Emphasis on Profit and Product Quality at U.S. Daily Newspapers, 68 JOURNAUSM Q. 15,
23(1991).
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have commitments to their community as well as to profits. In contrast, those
farther removed (and those not coming out of journalistic culture) will take a
more single-minded interest and possibly even an entrepreneurial pride in
bottom-line success. 119 If so, positive externalities should increase (holding
other factors constant) as ownership (or control)120 moves from conglomerates
(especially conglomerates not headed by journalistic professionals) 121 to
independent, often family, ownership, or possibly better, to journalists
themselves. 122
Many media-specific legal rules attempt to discourage concentration and
increase control at the local level. Going beyond antitrust rules, the FCC long
restricted a single enterprise's total ownership of broadcast stations as well as
restricting cross-ownership of various types of media outlets within a single
community. 123 The FCC's chain broadcasting rules attempted to keep ultimate
119 See, e.g., Cereal Killing, Tim NEw YORKER, July 24, 1995, at 4 (discussing the
closing of New York Newsday by the former General Mills executive put in charge of Tlies
Mirror).
120 Both legal and customary factors could cause control to diverge from ownership and
even to devolve lower down the corporate structure, moving from central management to
editors or journalists. The extent and nature of employee associations, of unionism (and hence
of labor law), and the content of contract and corporate law will significantly affect the locus
of actual control. Sensitive attention to this is crucial for intelligent media policy. For
example, Jerome Barron based his analysis of Cowles Media in part on how the decision
would affect decisionmaking control within media organizations. See Barron, supra note 103;
see also Gail L. Barwis, Contractual Newsroom Democracy, 57 JouRNAusM MONOGRAPHS
1(1978).
12 1 Warren Phillips, former editor and CEO of the Wall Street Journal, spoke with pride
about the importance his organization placed on having the publisher and CEO traditionally
coming from the journalist rather than the business side of the company. Interview with
Warren Phillips, CEO, Wall Street Journal (Fall 1992); see also Bill Kovach, Big Deals, with
Journalism Thrown in, N.Y. TMnS, Aug. 3, 1995, at A25. C.K. McClatchy, a respected
former editor and head of a newspaper chain argued that "good newspapers are almost always
run by good newspaper people; they are almost never run by good bankers or good
accountants." C.K. McClatchy, How Newspapers Are Owned-and Does It Matter?, at 8
(Press Enterprise Lecture Series No. 23, 1988).
122 See Werner J. Severin, The Milwaukee Journal: Employee-Owned Puizewinner, 56
JOURNAUSM Q. 783 (1979).
123 These media-specific concentration rules have been routinely upheld when
challenged in court even though some place restrictions on constitutionally favored media
entities, such as newspapers, that are not imposed on nonmedia businesses. The Supreme
Court also allowed the FCC to distinguish among newspapers, requiring divestiture of their
local broadcast licenses in 16 "egregious" cases, but not in others. See FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793 (1978); see also United States v. Storer
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decisionmaking power over as well as responsibility for broadcast content in the
hands of the local broadcaster rather than the networks. 124
Unfortunately, many of these restrictions have been either abandoned or
eased due to deregulatory attack. Possibly because of policy lapses, other rules
(e.g., inheritance tax laws and corporate tax rules in relation to newspaper
ownership) have in the past encouraged concentration. 125 In the early 1930s,
corporate lobbying power prevailed over popular expressions of policy
sentiments, with the result that government policy favored corporate
commercial interests in their battle with existing and potential noncommercial
users for control over broadcasting. 126 The United States, like virtually all
democratic countries, has long been concerned with media concentration. 127
Many policies, including FCC ownership rules, have restricted ownership
concentration. Still, corporate interests continually push to have these limits
lifted. In a lengthy report initiated during the Bush Administration, the
Department of Commerce argued in 1993 in favor of legal changes that would
stimulate greater concentration of media ownership. 128 Likewise, although
President Clinton and others resisted more dramatic cuts, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 substantially reduced limits on media
combinations. 129
Still, the ubiquitousness of industry's ability to misdirect governmental
policy should not lead to forswearing governmental involvement. As a rule,
governmental structural intervention, when it occurs, has been beneficial. From
a historical perspective, industry victories typically occur in the following
situations: where, like the initial governmental structuring of broadcasting,
some type of governmental intervention is universally seen as necessary and,
therefore, the struggle must be over the content of regulation; where the victory
involves defeating attempts at useful intervention; or where it eliminates
Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956) (upholding national concentration limits on broadcast
licenses).
124 See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-27 (1943) (upholding
rules against statutory and constitutional challenge).
125 See JAMES N. DERouzOs & KNNETm E. THORPE, NEWSPAPER GROUPs:
ECONOMIES OF SCALE, TAX LAWS AND MERGER INCEmVES 55-87 (1982). One policy
justification for recent changes in inheritance laws was to reduce the pressure on families to
sell their media properties. See id. at 72-75.
126 See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEy, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADcAsNG, 1928-1935, at 121-
50(1993).
127. See, e.g., THE COMMIssION ON FREEDOM OF THE PREss, A FRE AND RESPONSIBLE
PREsS 79-80 (1947).
128 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 124.
129 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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beneficial current regulation.' 30 Beyond the examples of media-specific
interventions noted above, more dramatic policies aimed at beneficial structural
changes in media control are possible. Ben Bagdikdan is one among many who
argue for the benefits of journalistic employees electing (or having some role in
choosing or dismissing) their editors. 131 Law could either require or provide
incentives for this arrangement. Legislation could forbid the purchase of
existing media entities except by individuals or by legal entities for whom the
purchased media entity would be its primary business. 132 This would end the
century's long trend toward greater media concentration and would encourage
ownership by the people who work in the enterprise. James Curran
persuasively argues that effective performance of the media's multiple political
and cultural roles requires a mixed system, with public policies designed to
encourage different forms of ownership and control. 133
The list of possible subsidy and structural policies responsive to the political
culture externality could go on and on, and each will be subject to numerous
(but only sometimes persuasive) objections. Nevertheless, past and current
examples of such legally implemented policies show that this country, in accord
with all other western democracies, has never thought that reliance on the
market alone is adequate. Rejection of a pure market process implicitly reflects
an understanding that media potentially create significant positive political
externalities.
2. Responses to Other Externalities
Media consumption influences its audience's behavior. Other people
positively or negatively value that behavior. This situation is the focus of the
second and third externalities cataloged above-audience members' interaction
with other people and audience members' impact on the cultural products
available to others. 134 If the content of a person's media consumption results in
her becoming a stimulating conversationalist or a murderer, her friends or
victims are affected. Actual and possible policy responses are abundant. Most
130 This explains why the fact that corporate special interest groups usually have
sufficient political power to obtain policies that sacrifice the public interest should not
motivate an interpretation of the First Amendment that keeps government out of the arena of
press policy. See Baker, Private Power, supra note 11, at 432 (arguing that courts have
properly rejected this approach to the Press Clause).
13 1 See BEN H. BAGDIAN, DouBLE VIKON 239 (1995).
132 See C. Edwin Baker, Mergerphobia, 257 THE NATON 520, 521 (Nov. 8, 1993).
133 See James Curran, Mass Media and Democracy Revisited, in MASS MEDIA AND
SocmTy 81 (James Curran & Michael Gurevitch eds., 2d ed. 1996).
134 See supra Parts III.A.2, ImI.A.3.
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of the subsidy and other strategies discussed in relation to political culture apply
here. Given the reasonable belief that mass media's emphasis on gratuitous
violence and sex reflects bottom line judgments of corporate executives more
than autonomous or creative choices of writers and producers, and given that
these emphases, or at least the emphasis on violence, 135 interact with other
aspects of culture and personality to increase the likelihood that a viewer will
engage in violence, a shift in ownership or decisionmaking control to the media
professionals could lead to better media products with fewer negative
externalities. Media subsidy programs can benefit nonaudience members by
supporting media that have positive cultural and educational effects on
audiences. Although there is not enough data to resolve the issue, it is unclear
whether expenditures to increase the availability of good media content or
expenditures for hiring more police or building more prisons would be more
effective at reducing crime. Of course, other justifications often support the
same subsidy (or an overlapping set of subsidies). For example, a society might
believe that, like education, access to significant cultural material is a basic part
of membership in the society.
In contrast to promoting positive externalities, one response to negative
externalities is almost instinctual. The policymaker or the public often wish to
ban or restrict expression that it believes encourages antisocial conduct. Even if
apparently justified on efficiency grounds, this response directly contradicts
most interpretations of the First Amendment. 136 Respect for people as moral
agents is consistent with encouraging their exposure to collectively considered
"good" speech, but not with paternalistically denying them access to speech
considered bad. Such respect requires attributing legal or moral responsibility to
the person who engages in the offensive act. Attributing the responsibility to the
media that the person consumes treats the reader or viewer as a mere puppet
whose strings the media pulls. 137 Respect for agency recognizes that media
content itself never has uniformly good or bad effects. Rather, different viewers
(in differing contexts) take different things from their exposure to the same
135 See Murray, supra note 76.
136 In marketplace of ideas theories, the response is more speech or to accept the
negative consequences. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes
& Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that even proletarian dictatorship should be accepted if
speech persuades); see also American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that harm caused by pornography does not justify suppression), t'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986). Likewise, a liberty theory asserts that harm does not itself justify
suppressing speech. See Baker, supra note 70.
137 See C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1181,
1205-06 (1994) (critiquing Catherine MacKinnon in part for not taking women and men's
agency seriously).
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cultural artifact. Even if suppression seems to be a quick fix, it is usually
ineffective in its goals, can reinforce negative and restrictive images of its
supposed beneficiaries as well as of its overbroad set of targets, often generates
additional problems, and can divert attention from more useful responses. 138
Although particular responses or effects of media content are clearly
objectionable, the content itself will always be multivocal and its meaning and
use contested. 139 Attempts at suppression on the basis of characterization of
content as bad, for example, because of its portrayal of violence or sex or
impropriety, will often mask ideological attempts to reify majoritarian or status
quo views. 140 Each point provides a pragmatic reason to believe that a free
speech ideology committed to protection of dissent and to a process of change
should not permit suppression. 141
Zoning sometimes either reduces negative or enhances positive
externalities. Children are assertedly especially vulnerable to injury by media
content. Out of either paternalism (for their own good) or a desire to reduce
negative externalities (effect on children leads to bad consequences for others),
policymakers often propose to restrict children's access to various media
products. The issue merits more attention. Often, restriction will amount to a
centrist attempt to mold people according to the most conventional popular
standards. Arguably, such a policy contravenes basic First Amendment
principles.142 Parental control of children is, however, widely accepted.
Practices that reduce parents' capacity to exercise control can be considered
negative externalities, and practices that increase this capacity can be
considered positive. Mandates for rating systems or devices like the V-chip
technology might usefully increase this capacity. "Channeling" of indecency on
television could give parents a time period, for instance daytime hours, when
they could be assured that, even if unsupervised, their children would not have
such easy access to the restricted programming.
138 See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72
TEx. L. REv. 1097, 1100-01 (1994). For a rare, thoughtful attempt to consider serious
structural responses to media portrayals of violence, see Kim, supra note 39.
139 See Amy Adler, What's Left? Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for
Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996); see also Lili Levi, The Hard Case
of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 49 (1992-93).
140 See Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Erpression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. iL. L. REv. 95, 95-99.
141 See BAKR, supra note 99, Ch. 5.
142 Cf Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868-69 (1982) (holding the First
Amendment imposes limitations on a school board's discretion to remove books from junior
and senior high school libraries).
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Still, any robust system of expression must accept the principle that the
adult population not be reduced to the level of children. 143 For example,
channeling must at least leave ample time periods during which the adult
audience can view any programming it wants (within the notable constraint of
what the broadcasters choose to offer). Channeling that satisfies this basic
principle regulates speech, but arguably does not "abridge" the relevant
freedom of either the media or the public. 144 The issues then become
empirical-and political. Will the proposed practice-V-chips or channeling-
really enhance parental authority? Do parents actually want that enhancement?
What will the practice cost? Will this response to the evils of unrestricted
commercial broadcasting divert attention from more meaningful responses, and
so on?145
Various private and governmental policies encourage the media's
performance of the "checking" function, the fourth externality listed above. 146
Journalism is a prize-ridden profession. Both individual journalists and some
owners of media entities devote resources to winning privately provided
"Pulitzers" and various less prominent prizes. Likewise, although investigative
journalism is always expensive, some legal rules decrease the costs borne by
the media and thereby increase its production. Examples include restrictions on
liability for defamation, especially for discussion of public affairs, the Freedom
of Information Act's (FOIA) subsidized provision of information, and reporters'
privileges. Even if these measures are grossly inadequate to correct for the
market's failure to create appropriate incentives, they do externalize some costs
as a rough response to the fact that media entities only receive payment for a
fraction of the benefits from performance of the checking function.
The specifics of these "subsidies" can be criticized, however. Their content
can bias the choice of which abuses to expose.' 47 FOIA's grant of cheap access
143 See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
144 See FCC v. Pacific Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978); see also Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (print media); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989) (telephone). Likewise, the same point about not decreasing availability was
emphasized where the physical zoning was justified on the basis of decreasing negative
externalities unrelated to any interest in restricting access to communicative content. See
Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976).
145 See C. Edwin Baker, The Evening Hours During Pacifica Standard Tune, 3 VAL.
SP. & ENTER. L.J. 45, 55-60 (1996). Pacifica is consistent with a constitutionally permissible
attempt to enhance parental anthority. However, prohibiting indecency between 6 a.m. and 12
p.m., upheld in Action for C0ildren's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), improperly accepted a majoritarian purpose of molding people.
146 See supra Part Ill.A.4.
147 See William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment,
and Bad Journalism, 1994 Sup. Cr. REv. 169, 207-08.
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to (some) government information as compared to, for example, the
unavailability of corporate information on demand, and common law as well as
the constitutional protection from liability when media (or nonmedia) speakers
libel government as opposed to the private actors, could encourage the media to
focus on exposing governmental as compared to private (corporate)
wrongdoing. This bias is also evident in defamation law's neutral report and
fair report privileges. 148 These rules arguably "subsidize"-make easier,
cheaper, or less likely to create liability-damaging reports concerning
government or government officials rather than those concerning corporate
misbehavior. To the extent this bias is reflected in reporting, it could encourage
greater distrust of government as compared to corporate power, a bias that
could tilt against people's motivation as well as ability to promote the public
good (i.e., these rules create a negative political externality).
The fifth externality concerns the effects of actual or potential media
exposure on the behavior of third parties (people other than the media's primary
audience). 149 Particular instances will have differing, sometimes contested,
valences. Sometimes people will respond to the possibility of media coverage
with behavior that benefits others, sometimes with behavior that inflicts harm.
Possible legal responses are various, and often their wisdom (and
constitutionality) is disputable. Whether trials or governmental meetings should
be closed, whether nonconsensual video or audio taping by the media should be
allowed or restricted, depend in part on assessments of whether these practices
will have good or bad (or minimal) effects on the participants' behavior-their
frankness and honesty, their attention and thoughtfulness, their willingness to
bargain. Likewise, either law or media self-restraint could limit media coverage
of terrorist acts in the hope of discouraging such behavior.150 Alternatively,
successful efforts to make the media order more open might better reduce
incentives to engage in terrorist behavior as a means to stimulate coverage of
suppressed messages.151
148 A fair report privilege applies to publications concerning official proceedings or
reports. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1981). The neutral report
privilege applies to publication of charges made by responsible prominent speakers about a
public figure. See, e.g., Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.
1977).149 See supra Part IlI.A.5.
150 A major aspect of the controversy surrounding the New York 2-ones and Washington
Post's joint decision to publish the "Unabomber's" tract was whether publication would
encourage similar terrorist behavior in support of similar demands in the future. See Wrflliam
Glaberson, Publication of a Unabomber's Tract Draws Mixed Response, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1995, at A16.
151 Some radical media critics assert that the argument that media coverage stimulates
terrorism, and thus the media should deny coverage, basically blames the victim. In contrast,
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The benefit of receiving media content without paying, the sixth
externality, 152 could justify subsidies for creators and distributors. However,
the political will to respond with an efficient level of subsidies is likely always
to be lacking, and the subsidy approach creates serious problems for wisely and
efficiently selecting beneficiaries. Alternatively, the legal regime sometimes
creates nonmarket means to collect payments for the benefit (for example, by
imposing a surcharge on equipment and blank tapes153 or on musical
performances and distributing the proceeds to copyright owners). A common
practice in Europe is to impose an annual fee on radios and televisions or a tax
on their sale to raise money to support public broadcasting, which is then
distributed without charge. These nonmarket structural interventions, as well as
copyright protection-which is possibly the single most important legal device
aimed at helping content creators collect for access to their creation-will be
grossly inadequate to fully internalize the benefits gained by nonpaying
audience members and, on the other hand, will restrict the availability of a
public good, creating a serious inefficiency.
The seventh externality cataloged above, benefits to individuals or groups
from favorable media attention, 154 generates complexly ambivalent legal
responses. First, being a positive externality implies both inadequate media
expenditures on producing such content and media prices for that content that
are too high, thereby preventing the public from getting content that they want.
These features implicitly justify subsidies, mostly of the sort already
recommended above. In contrast, direct internalization of these benefits-
payment for favorable coverage-is often viewed as corruption and is legally
discouraged. For instance, laws require media entities to identify as advertising
any content that someone or some entity has paid them to present. 155
they suggest that terrorist activities themselves are a (sometimes rational) response to an
inadequate media order that screens out views of dissident groups or facts of which the public
should be aware. Rather than suppress coverage of terrorists, a more legitimate response
would be to open up access to the means of effective expression. See, e.g., ALEX P. SCHIMD
& JANwY DE GRAAF, VioLENCE As CoM, uNicToN 33-42 (1982).152 See siqra Part IIm.A.6.
153 Some countries, for example, Germany, use this procedure although it has not been
adopted in this country. See Gary S. Lutker, Dat's All Folks: Calm v. Sony and the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1991-Merry Melodes or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDozo ARmS &
ENT. L.J. 145, 183 (1992); cf Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,
456 (1984).
154 See supra Part M.A.7.155 See 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)Ci) (1994) (imposing on broadcasters a duty to identify payee
as advertiser); Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 313-14 (1913) (upholding against
First Amendment challenge a statute that imposed this requirement on newspapers receiving
second class mail privileges).
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However, inadequate production is probably not the most serious issue
here. More important may be a distributive issue-some individuals and groups
get this benefit, some do not. Worse, markets do not distribute this inequality
randomly. Media critics continually observe that organizations with large public
relations or advertising budgets-usually corporate or other elite interests-and
individuals holding high political position have much greater access to the
media than others. 156 This greater access does not necessarily nor consistently
reflect greater public interest in their views, greater reliability of their
pronouncements, or greater intrinsic importance of their insights or
information. It does not even necessarily reflect reporters' or editors' own
greater interest or confidence in these sources-although media professionals'
ideological bias concerning the relation of class, gender, race, and role position
to knowledge or insight is observable. Rather, their access reflects in significant
part their ability to make themselves easier and cheaper to rely upon.157
Organizations that routinely put out information-most obviously government
but also to some extent large corporate entities-not only pay a large portion of
the expense of gathering and composing information but also are often
conveniently and cheaply integrated into reporters' beats.
Various policy measures can be understood to respond to this tendency to
distributionaly skew the underproduction of favorable media attention. Most
obvious are governments' usually marginal attempts to empower those
otherwise least able to indirectly "pay" for the presentation of their perspective.
Examples include tax exemptions or postal subsidies for nonprofits, especially
for their public relations activities, media access schemes ranging from public
access cable channels to right of reply laws or the FCC's Fairness Doctrine,
and policies designed to encourage "alternative" media. 158 These efforts are,
however, frequently attacked. The FCC has now abandoned, based both on a
deregulatory ideology and a constitutional analysis, the Fairness Doctrine; 159
access cable channels are under constitutional attack; 160 postal subsidies are
156 See HERMAN & CHOMSKy, supra note 34, at 51.
157 Sometimes the law directly supports this bias. Privileges in the libel area permit
easier reliance on or reportage of statements by a public official or charges made by "a
responsible, prominent organization... regardless of the reporter's private views regarding
their validity." Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977).
158 The Court suggested that the content-based, discriminatory tax scheme invalidated in
Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragkmd, 481 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1987), might have been
constitutional if it could plausibly have been understood as designed to help "fledgling"
publications.
159 See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
160 See Time Warner v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (1996).
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declining; 161 tax exemptions are limited and sometimes operate to restrict
important speech;162 alternative media are often suppressed. 163
The appropriate goal is more complex than equalizing access. Equalization
of media attention or favorable comment is, of course, impossible. It is also
misguided. Both media and audience attention are appropriately selective.
Although at one point 47 U.S.C. § 315's provision of equal opportunities for
political candidates was thought to require that all candidates, no matter how
minor the party, be invited to participate in any televised debate, 164 it is
questionable whether equal opportunities serve the public well.165 More
generally, favorable content should depend on the merits. Distributive issues,
however, reappear in that groups and individuals inevitably contest the
importance of differing foci.
Still, fairness (or wisdom) lies less in quantitative equality than in
thoughtful, intelligent, non-monetary-based choices of where and how to focus
media attention. A partial response would be independent, professional
journalists (or media-content-creators) with budgets adequate to avoid rank
manipulation by business and government and with sufficient pluralism of
161 See Richard B. Kielowicz & Linda Lawson, Reduced-Rate Postage for Nonprofit
Organizations: A Policy History, Citique, and Proposal, 11 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 347,
348-49 (1988).
162 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549-50
(1983).
16 3 See In re Review of Stephen Paul Dunifer, 11 F.C.C.R. 718 (1995) (upholding ban
on low power radio station); Rebels Hoist Challenge to Radio Rules, Cm. TRm., Aug. 5,
1996, at Bus. 7; Luis J. Rodriquez, Rappin' in the 'Hood; Rebel Radio, THE NATRON, Aug.
12, 1991, at 192; Michael Wines, An Internet Service Is Denied Access to the Capitol, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at D7 (relating story about Vigdor Schreibman, a leftist nonprofit
internet news service publisher who was denied access to Congressional press galleries
because his venture was not commercial); SENa]NG TIE OPPOSmON: GOvERNMENT
STRATEGIES OF SUPPRESSION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (Craig R. Smith ed., 1996).
164 In 1975, the FCC changed its interpretation of "use" of a broadcast station, where a
use required that all other candidates get equal access, and this change permitted the League
of Women Voter's to sponsor debates. See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 366 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The earlier Kennedy-Nixon debates had only been allowed because of special
Congressional legislation. Id. at 360.
165 In 1996, the major networks sought exemption from the equal opportunities
requirement so that it could provide free time for "major presidential candidates, as
determined by the Commission on Presidential Debates." Public Notice, FCC Seeks
Comment on Issues Relating to Broadcaster Proposals to Provide Time to Presidential
Candidates; Will Hold En Bane Hearing (May 13, 1996) (for information, contact the Federal
Communications Commission, 1919 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554 or
< http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMda/PubicNotices/pnmm6004.txt>) (emphasis
added).
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backgrounds among the journalists (and those with power to make content
decisions) that individual journalist's or owner's inevitable adoption of
particular perspectives will not silence alternative approaches to society. 166
Rather than equality, the response to the distributive concern is probably best
seen as providing for media independence combined with adequate pluralism.
Some people will experience media attention as harmful, the eighth
externality noted. 167 If media offer this "harmful" attention, audiences must be
assumed to value it to some, roughly market-indicated, extent; or, in relation to
false information, audiences presumably would prefer accurate coverage but
are unwilling to pay for (or are unable to identify) greater investigative care.
Even if the audience gets the level of accuracy it pays for, the audience's
calculations, and therefore, according to economic logic, the media's decisions
will not include as a cost the injury to people harmed by the content. At least,
the media will not if, as I assume for the moment, the people harmed have no
effective opportunity to pay to suppress publication.
Tort law "remedies" provide the most obvious policy response. Libel law
partially internalizes some harms caused by inaccurate information about people
and products, but is usually inapplicable if the harm results from accurate
information 168 or from negative opinion.' 69 Tort law seldom covers even
harmfully inaccurate information if the information is not about the harmed
person or product 70 (for example, a misguided weather report that causes
people not to go and spend money at the resort, inaccurate information about
the economy that helps defeat an incumbent, or inaccurate praise of one's
opponent or competitor). Although the tort of invasion of privacy may properly
have little if any actual bite, 171 like defamation law it potentially could impose
liability on media enterprises for harm to the person described. Here is not the
place to explore either the economic coherence or constitutional acceptability of
166 Cf. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) (upholding FCC minority
preference policies against an equal protection challenge because they are related to the
achievement of broadcast diversity).167 See supra Part III.A.8.
168 Although the Supreme Court consistently protects the media from liability for
publication of truthful information, it refuses to accept the media's suggestion that it "hold
broadly that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First
Amendment." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989).
169 C Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1990) (holding that liability
depends on plaintiff being able to prove that statements concerning public matter are false).
170 But cf Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983)
(allowing recovery for plane crash due to inaccurate flight chart, analogizing chart to product
and using products liability doctrine).
171 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Puivacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 362 (1983).
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these doctrines. The point is merely that they represent legal attempts to reduce
negative externalities by forcing the media entity to internalize the cost.
Truthful exposds (and sometimes even false information) that harm some
third parties are often considered valuable by other third parties. Candidate Y or
the seller of product Y wants it known, truthfully or not, that candidate X is
corrupt or product X is defective.172 If true, negative and positive externalities
may roughly balance out. However, with certain categories of content-true but
salacious gossip or other purported invasions of privacy173-identifying the
positive third party externalities to balance against the negative externalities is
difficult and controversial. 174 A purported lack of positive externalities in these
172 Since both the positive and negative third party benefits can easily exist whether or
not the information is true, the different treatment of true and false information may reflect
distributional or fairness concerns rather than mere efficiency matters. But this turns out to be
more complex. For instance, there may be inefficiencies in a system that promotes the
creation and spread of false information. This instance provides an efficiency reason to make
the distinction.
173 Even where recognized, the tort requires that the information not only be "highly
offensive" but also be of "no legitimate public concern." See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993); see also RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
(1981).
174 To say "difficult or controversial" does not rule out positive externalities of
"salacious" gossip. See Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Co., 712 P.2d 803, 809 (Or. 1986)
(noting that some editors may believe that "community should see or hear facts or ideas that
the majority finds uninteresting or offensive" in protecting presentation of video of accident
victim while bleeding and in obvious pain). Creation of categories of truthful but punishable
speech is dangerous. It tends to reinforce conventional views and power relations, thereby
being directly inconsistent with First Amendment premises.
People's capacity to gossip may help equalize the distribution of social power. (More
problematic is the tendency for law to specially protect "gossip" when engaged in and valued
by the powerful-like in hiring contexts.) Karst's argument that the First Amendment most
crucially protects "unreason" is suggestive of the notion that gossip is both a means of
resisting dominant power and the capacity for popular participation in creation and
maintenance of norms. See Karst, supra note 140. See generally Max Gluckman, Gossip and
Scandal, 4 CURENT ArmO'OLOGY 307 (1963). "Outing" may change general attitudes as
well as affect behavior. See LARRY P. GRoss, CONTrsrm C sr: Tum Poics AND
Eincs OF OuriNG (1993).
Still, the harms caused by truthful information can be serious and sometimes unfair.
Rather than the largely ineffectual attempts at suppression through imposition of liability,
arguably, the policy response should be to search for ways to decrease the likelihood that
speakers (and the press) will impose these harms unwisely (for example, merely for
commercial gain). Unjustified imposition of harms might decline if journalistic (or societal)
norms improved or if media professionals gained greater power to resist market pressures.
Changed interests of a better educated or more mature public could reduce market incentives
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cases may help explain legal distinctions between truthful communications
characterized as invasions of privacy, especially of private figures, from
truthful exposes of publicly relevant information-which are almost always
exempt from liability.
Superficially, a rough balance between positive and negative externalities
might also exist for discrediting false information. The person misdescribed is
harmed while some other candidate or competitor benefits.1 75 Nevertheless, the
seeming balance may be misleading. The costs to the person misdescribed,
including the resources spent on trying to correct the record, may routinely
outweigh benefits to her competitors. And the inaccurate information harms
members of the public who are misled in their choices. Moreover, the benefit
that the competitor receives is analogous to the benefit from a theft. In each
case, practices aiming at knowingly creating the benefit not only distribute
benefits unfairly and inefficiently but also induce potentially escalating,
wasteful, self-protective activities.
Costs created by the practice of news gathering, the tenth externality, 176 are
usually internalized by the same legal rules that apply to similar costs created by
similar activities by people other than journalists. Application of trespass law is
illustrative. 177 Often, however, the regulatory goal is to stop only forms of
news gathering that impose costs that are predictably greater than the gains the
news gathering would achieve. For example, state law might give reporters
permission to trespass on some sort of "implied consent" theory, especially
when the reporter trespasses openly and without violating any explicit demands
to keep out, in places where newsworthy events are occurring or have recently
to publish or broadcast personally harmful content. Or the policy response could be to reduee
harm the exposs will cause (for example, by teaching people to have more tolerance). Surely
no negative consequences should result from knowledge that a person is gay or has been
raped. Policies directed at stimulating these changes are arguably more liberating than
attempts at suppression-and the two types of responses sometimes work at cross purposes.
Prohibiting identification of rape victims or exposure of a gay or lesbian's sexual orientation,
for example, reinforces the view that these facts are somehow discrediting.
175 Distributive or fairness considerations, however, may require that these benefits not
count at all for policy purposes. I should emphasize that my description of possible economic
logic of some of these legal polices does not mean that this is either their actual or the
appropriate rationale.
176 See supra Part III.A. 10.
177 Externalities imposed by the news gathering itself and the externalities created by
media content can be treated differently. For instance, both the trespass and the subsequent
story written by a trespassing journalist can impose costs on third parties. The law, however,
might impose liability only for the first. See, e.g., Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92,
97(1970).
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occurred. 178 This rule sometimes leaves individual property owners to bear the
"cost," and since this cost is not brought to bear on the media, the rule
"subsidizes" production of particular types of media content.
Many jurisdictions restrict nonconsensual use of tape recorders. The
interest protected is sometimes difficult to describe since the law imposes no
restriction on nonconsensual publication or broadcast of the content that the
reporter hears but does not record. Presumably, the ban protects some aspect of
privacy or deniability, thereby reducing some costs otherwise created by the
news gathering process. The ban, however, also reduces the accuracy of
content made available to the public. 17 9 Likewise, the government sometimes
regulates the manner of coverage of legislative, administrative, and judicial
proceedings in order to prevent the news gathering techniques from having
negative effects on the proceedings (or, more troublingly, regulates with an eye
to how coverage advantages or disadvantages the people with the power to
choose the rules).
C. Policy Summary
The catalog of externalities displays huge and vitally important media
effects that are not internalized in the decisions of paying audiences or media
enterprises. Some policy responses have been described. But, more generally,
what are the implications of these observations? What follows?
First, given the immense scale of potential positive externalities, the
expectation must be that the market itself would produce and deliver drastically
inadequate amounts of "quality" media content (with "quality" meaning here
content that has significant positive externalities). Audiences would want much
more quality content if they were charged its "real" cost. They could be
17 8 See Note, And Forgive Them Their Trespasses: Applying the Defense of Necessity to
the Criminal Conduct of the Newsgatherer, 103 HARv. L. REV. 890, 893-903 (1990).
Compare Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1976), iith Stahl v.
State, 665 P.2d 839, 841 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Allowing the trespass may reflect the
prediction that, if not for insurmountable transaction costs, permissions would be obtained,
sometimes with and sometimes without a charge-such that the rule reaches a Kaldor-Hicks
result. However, sometimes a permissive approach to trespassing may reflect a view of the
value of news gathering that should outweigh the interest in a private property owner in
suppressing information even when the owner would deny permission or charge an amount
larger than the media would be willing to pay.179 A law making it criminal to record without the consent of all parties was upheld
against the claim that the recording aided the accuracy of reporting and provided
corroboration in a suit for defamation. See Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d
723, 727 (Fla. 1977).
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charged much less if the media seller did not have to recover all of its costs
from its audience but instead received some payment from third parties (or
from the state acting in behalf of third party beneficiaries). Of course, these
observations do not demonstrate the merit of trying to supply the audience
"what it wants" as economically defined; that is an independent normative
issue. What these observations do demonstrate is that the goal of giving the
public what it wants (in market terms) requires governmental policies directed
toward greatly increasing the resources devoted to creating and supplying
quality media content.
Second, audiences also now get too much "junk" (with "junk" meaning
here content that has significant negative externalities). The audience would get
much less of this content if they were required to pay its "real" cost (i.e., its
cost after the media had internalized the content's negative externalities).
Third, although the general nature of externalities can be described-but
even as to this, surely the broad categories listed above are incomplete-the
most careful investigation will provide no precision about their extent. Social
science's inability to precisely identify the extent of media "effects" makes this
inevitable. Likewise, disputes will exist even about the characterization of
various externalities as positive or negative. Any attempt to attribute media
content to particular legal regimes will also be wildly inexact. Even thinking of
these issues in terms of "externalities" may itself qualitatively mislead
discussion. As I will discuss in Part IV, this commodified formulation of issues
of value and choice may be inconsistent with the way people ought to conceive
and treat themselves and their cultural environment. These observations counsel
great caution about policy analysis. However, the view that these imprecisions
discredit intervention hardly follows.
Useful policy analysis may require some efforts to make judgments about
the extent and value of externalities and the difference that various legal orders
make. The market's overt and apparently massive inadequacy at providing the
audience what it wants suggests the importance of policy responses. Despite the
inadequacies of the political process and its manipulability by corporate,
incumbent political, or other special interests, most past political interventions
have (arguably) been improvements over the result of an unregulated market,
even if the improvements have been systematically less than what should be
politically feasible if backed by progressive political forces and thoughtful
analysis. 180 Inadequacies in the political order should not provoke abandonment
180 Elsewhere, I have suggested that the symbolic power of the First Amendment may
have discouraged sustained attention to media policy in this country, see BAKER,
ADVERTISING, supra note 11, except by the industry entities which often seem willing to
ignore their potential First Amendment rights when it is in their interest, but which quickly
invoke them whenever regulation shows the potential to interfere with profitability or power.
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of efforts but, instead, consideration of how to improve the only arena that
offers hope of a better media environment. Surely any democratic faith requires
this.
IV. MARKET EXPREsSIONS OF WANTS: A MISGUIDED STANDARD
In a perfectly working marketplace, people engage in exchanges so as to
best fulfill their existing preferences as expressed in the market, given their
willingness and ability to pay. Assuming a perfectly working marketplace, this
formulation still leaves three obvious points for a critique of reliance on the
marketplace to determine the content and the distribution of media content.
Objection could be raised to (a) reliance on exchange relations as the basis for
allocation, (b) reliance on people's ability to pay, or (c) reliance on people's
existing preferences as expressed in the market.181
A. Commodification
Market exchange commodifies the good exchanged. 182 For purposes of the
exchange, each party treats the item she gives up solely instrumentally. She
uses the item as a means to exercise power over the other. That is, she uses it
and values it solely as a means to get a performance from the other that the
other gives only because of the receipt of "payment." 183 The social role or
value of some goods may be perverted or undermined merely by being
See MCCHESNY, supra note 126, at 252-70 (stating that broadcasters ignored the First
Amendment while advocating government intervention during the period when they used
government to help consolidate their control and rid themselves of competition from nonprofit
and educational users, but once they had control, invoked it in an attempt to rid themselves of
public interest oriented, governmental intervention).
181 The objections here differ from the earlier critique of "law and economics"
methodology as a means to choose or justify legal rules. See supra note 67. There I noted the
conceptual impossibility of relying on an existing distribution of wealth or set of constant
preferences for choosing rules because these are at least part of the issue in dispute. That
impossibility existed because the baseline on which the economic analysis depends was what
was at issue (a point that many law and economics practitioners continue to ignore). Some
economists, however, might grant the theoretical correctness of that critique but question its
practical significance. In contrast to that critique, here a context in which the baseline exists
can be assumed. Thus, here the objection is not to the impossibility of such reliance but to its
appropriateness.
182 See generally RADIN, supra note 67, at 1-15.
183 See C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 751-53 (1986).
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distributed through commercial exchange, as something owned or even
ownable, rather than being subject only to being earned or bestowed. 184
Although people often spend large sums of money on preparation for a
competition-a sports or intellectual competition-the very point (and value) of
winning the first place award is that, in the final instance, it is "earned," not
purchased. The trophy customarily has a unique and usually higher value to the
person who won it and, maybe, to her family than to a stranger. Certainly its
value is as a historically or narratively identified object rather than as an
"anonymous" object available for use-market exchange inevitably changes
and often defaces or erases that history or narrative.185 Similar things are often
said of love. Some people's primary objection to commercialized sex is a fear
that commercialization will pervert or undermine the social salience of a
noncommodified conception of love. For somewhat different reasons, society
resists the commodification of the vote, elected office, or life preserving body
parts.
Many people also resist commodification of some aspects of
communications. Calling teaching an act of love expresses the more general
thought that in at least some social interactions (in conversation, for example)
people ought to give others the benefit of their insight. 186 Doing so shows
respect or care for the recipient. Commercializing conversation is sometimes,
not always, resisted. Restating this at a societal level, the claim would be that
184 Slightly different is the belief that certain activities of creating and certain created
goods are perverted if produced merely on the basis of market demand, whether or not those
goods are then thought appropriately distributed by the market. This observation relates to one
rationale for treating many occupations that sell "speech," such as psychiatry, law, teaching,
or the priesthood-and journalism-as professions. It also spawns professionals to complain
about their audience "killing the messenger."
185 See Mark Kelman, Consiraption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 686-87 (1979).
186 A perverse case of commodification are the students who do not talk in class out of
fear of giving away their "good ideas." This can be contrasted with the activist who seeks to
give away "good," public interest oriented ideas. Academics are used to people being charged
tuition for the receipt of speech. Nevertheless, there was a strange unease in the late 1960s
about students who complained that they were not getting what they paid for when professors
canceled a class as part of a political protest. Likewise, many, not all, think for a student to
bring a nonpaying friend to class to be unobjectionable unless the friend's presence is
disruptive or there is inadequate physical space. Many instructors would not even object to a
nonpaying person sitting in all semester. When I realized this as an undergraduate, I became
quite despondent at the thought that I (that is, my parents) were paying for credits or degrees,
not for an education, which was apparently available for free. The economic perversity of my
reaction reminds me now of the standard movie story line of the guy paying the hooker and
only wanting conversation, with this eventually leading to sex (love?) without payment. See
LEAVING LAS VEGAS (ME'RO-GOLDWYN-MAYER/UNTED ARTISTS 1995).
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various cultural resources ought to be available to people not based on their
willingness and ability to pay its market price, maybe not even through market
transactions, but through social interactions defined by solidarity, honesty, and
willingness to search for answers. Although trade secrets, patents, and other
legal devices help commodify commercial uses of facts and ideas, a sense of the
unseemliness of copyrighting facts and ideas illustrates cultural resistance to
commodification-a characteristic also present in the invocation of "fair use" to
resist liability for many noncommercial uses of copyrighted materials. The
widespread existence of and support for free public libraries and public theater
can also be seen as fighting the commodification of a common culture.
A common belief is that the best cultural content will be an expression of
talent, at its best, and genius, and that production following these dictates often
will be inconsistent with production of commodities for the market. Similarly,
the claim is that journalism should express integrity and craft unperverted by
the market. I will not defend these views or discuss their implications for media
policy. However, if accepted, these assertions change the focus from a concern
for fulfilling audiences' market-expressed preferences for media commodities to
a concem with the opportunities for and conditions of intelligent and valuable
content creation and cultural development. These assertions suggest that maybe
a good society would provide space or opportunities, presumably meaning a
subsidy, for the creative expression of either all people or, at least, of specially
identified professionally committed people or specially identified "talented"
people.
Despite these observations, for the most part, I am inclined to see
objections to commodification of the media as either limited or derivative. For
example, concerns over opportunities for artistic creation raise distributional
issues. Should all or at least specially talented people receive, as a matter of
right, certain opportunities for creative expression rather than have those
opportunities limited to those who can sell their product or who are
independently wealthy? In this account, the objection is not so much to sales,
but to the limit of creative opportunities to those who can sell. Or the complaint
is about the audience's market expressed desires controlling what content is
created, not the fact that the content is sold. Similarly, many of the points about
libraries and copyright can be restated in terms of the distribution and
preference measurement issues. Certainly, the way authorship and media
consumption works in many people's life is contrary to market logic and can be
cheapened by participation in or focus on market processes. However, as with
many goods, noncommodified ways of relating to cultural content should be
able to coexist with unrestricted markets-people remaining free to opt out of
the commodity frame to the extent they choose.
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This coexistence, however, is not necessarily available. Professor Margaret
Jane Radin asks whether a "domino" effect applies-whether some
commodification will lead to the activity or good being progressively seen more
and more as a commodity, with the result that the noncommodified relation
eventually becoming unsustainable.1 7 This question is vital. I suspect that
usually, and certainly in the realm of media content, the domino effect will not
apply. Opportunities for noncommodified relations to creation, distribution, and
consumption of content can coexist with commodification. Rather than prohibit
commodification, people should be left to create a more or less commodified
world that reflects an aggregate of many individual choices. In fact, rather than
being undermined primarily by the social availability of commodity form, I
suspect that noncommodity relations are improperly undermined more by
distributional injustices, some of which unfairly coerce participation in the
market. For example, the problem is not that writers can sell their stories but
that poverty forces the creative writer to sell by the word or to add sex scenes.
On the other hand, political and legal structural choices will certainly push
toward or away from treating particular goods or relations in a commodified
form. For reasons implicit in Part IV.C, I would argue that society should
choose to generate greater space for noncommodified practices around media-
type content.
B. Distribution
The existing distribution of wealth in the United States seems to me
unquestionably unjust. Given this injustice, then those outcomes that result from
reliance on the existing distribution of wealth as the starting point (as do market
practices) are also presumptively unjust-or, in the language I have been using,
are not what people would want under an acceptable distribution of wealth.
These views' distributional objections arguably discredit the results of reliance
on markets for determining the production and distribution of media products-
but no more than they do for any other product. In this section, I will consider
distributional concerns that may have special relevance in the media context.
1. Principles of Distribtion
No society believes that all goods are properly distributed on the basis of
willingness and ability to pay. Apparently democratic societies always treat
187 See RAnxN, supra note 67, at 95-101; cf Baker, supra note 69, at 405-09 (stating
that practices that "determine" the availability of opportunities rather than merely having an
"additive" influence on their availability should be subject to regulation).
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some goods as properly distributed on a basis of equality or need (or merit of
some sort).188 The vote, citizenship, life sustaining organs, and various negative
liberties are possible examples. Many democracies guarantee at least minimal
levels of public education, food, shelter, and health care to all members.
Receipt of police and fire protection is usually distributed free on a somewhat
egalitarian basis. 189
Law also restricts market alienability of some goods. Society might
conclude, for example, that alienability would undermine the role of a good as
a component of a valued process (e.g., the vote, elected political office); or that
commodifying the good is contrary to how that society values that good (e.g.,
citizenship access to public services); or that market alienability would generate
temptations that conflict with society's paternalistic judgments concerning the
way or degree people should value the good (e.g., food stamps, sex, or free
public education). Inalienability of some goods (for example, basic human
rights), especially if constitutionalized, is somewhat more complex. The
doctrine that the government cannot impose unconstitutional conditions on the
receipt of benefits protects these rights from certain induced alienations. Still,
people can alienate these rights in other circumstances. For example, it is
permitted if alienation directly advances the purpose of some acceptable
practice-a job or a plea bargain-in which the person wants to participate.
Markets in publicly provided goods are often discouraged or prohibited even if
markets in closely related products-private parks, security services, or
education-are common.
Distributional principles vary depending on context and type of good
considered. What principles should apply to media products? The different
functions served by various media products complicate the answer. The media
educates; it informs political participation; it foments and energizes political and
civic activity; it provides a forum for public debate and dialogue; its content
188 According to Michael Walzer, "[t]he social contract is an agreement to reach
decisions together about what goods are necessary to our common life, and then to provide
those goods for one another." MICHAEL WALZER, SPHEE OF JusICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLuRASM AND EQUAlrrY 65 (1983). He goes on to claim that "[tbhere has never been a
political community that did not provide, or try to provide, or claim to provide, for the needs
of its members as its members understood those needs." Id. at 68. This account emphasizes
that the goods considered essential to membership and that are distributed on a nonmarket
basis vary with the culture of the particular democracy. See generally C. Edwin Baker,
Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131
U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1983).
189 In Sapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), in response to an argument that
"would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to past tax
contributions of its Citizens," the Supreme Court asserted that "the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits such an apportionment of state services." Id. at 632-33 (footnote omitted).
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influences public officials directly, but also indirectly through influencing the
views or opinions of citizens; and it helps create the culture in which people
live. But the media also serves a whole second set of functions. It amuses,
entertains, and diverts. It promotes private consumption of commercial products
and provides information relevant for people's private consumptive activities-
and the list could continue. Appropriate distribution principles may partly
depend on which of these functions is in play.
When the media serves the first set of functions listed above, various
normative considerations favor egalitarian distributions of media content or,
possibly more plausibly, distributions that make some minimum levels
universally available. Since media content provides for continuing education
and makes indispensable contributions to informed or reasoned political
participation; many of the arguments for free and equal basic educational
opportunities and for equal political participation rights apply to the distribution
and availability of this media content. Long-standing policies favoring free
public libraries move in this direction. These arguments of right assert that
universal distribution of some level and type of media content ought to be
foundational. This distribution is a base on which market considerations, with
their references to the willingness to pay and the consideration of externalities,
must build. Thus, this argument for universal availability of at least a minimum
level of politically or culturally valuable media content is independent of, but
often overlaps with, the efficiency argument 90 that emphasized the welfare
gains resulting from zero cost pricing of public goods such as media content. 191
On the other hand, to the extent that the media content serves to entertain and
amuse, these foundational arguments give no obvious reason why distribution
should differ from that of most consumer goods sold in the market.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,192 the Supreme Court
apparently rejected a concern with content as an appropriate basis for structural
regulation of the media. 193 Nevertheless, content concerns have been central to
governmental media regulation since at least the late eighteenth century. For
example, the government gave out mail subsidies to print media as well as,
more recently, licenses to broadcasters in a manner designed to produce types
of dialogue or content that the government considered valuable. 94 Both
newspapers and broadcasters exist under media-specific rules regulating
190 See sgpra Parts I, II.
191 Cf. C. Edwin Baker, Utility and Rights: Two Justafications for State Action
Increasing Equality, 84 YALE L.J. 39 (1974).
192 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
193 See id. at 637-41.
194 See Baker, Turner Broadcasting, supra note 11, at 93-114.
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ownership designed to benefit the communications environment. 195 The Court's
episodic impulse to treat content-oriented regulation by the government as
contrary to basic First Amendment principle largely reflects the ubiquitous use
of content-based regulations to suppress or censor speech. Suppression
contradicts both egalitarian and liberty-based democratic premises. Since the
government seldom wants to suppress all speech but rather wants to suppress
speech of a particular content, forbidding content discrimination would largely
eliminate suppression and censorship. The question, however, is whether
content discrimination, when not involving suppression, can be desirable.
The equality and liberty premises that are foundational to democracy
arguably call for different distributional principles for media content that serve
different functions. Political equality and individual self-determination arguably
require or, more plausibly, are greatly supported by egalitarian access to a
broad range of the day's knowledge and culture. The difference between media
materials that serve these functions and those that primarily provide
entertainment or have mostly commercial uses is significantly a matter of
content. Democratic principles recommend that egalitarian, as opposed to
market considerations, dominate in the distribution of media content that is
especially relevant to political participation and, maybe, culture-building.
However, they are consistent with market distribution for content primarily
serving the amusement function. Thus, these democratic principles suggest the
propriety of some content discriminations in policy-based interventions.
Of course, categorization of content is not simple. The same material can
serve multiple functions; since the function served is largely a matter of
audience reception, an item that primarily serves one function for one person
can serve a very different function for someone else or for even the first person
at a different time. Moreover, the distinction between politics and
entertainment, between politically salient and politically irrelevant
communications, is notoriously slippery. 196 Still, for many legitimate and
practical purposes, this and related content distinctions are continually made by
individuals and governments. Content discrimination seemed implicit in the law
granting cheap postal rates for publications that are "published for the
195 See id.
196 Sometimes it is argued that the First Amendment only protects political speech from
suppression. Not only should this claim be rejected on straight normative premises, but also
the distinction between the categories is too problematic and too political to allow censorship
or suppression of "merely" entertaining speech. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62
HARv. L. REv. 891, 895-901 (1949). Criticisms such as Chafee's apparently led Alexander
Meilejohn to modify his early views that limited the First Amendment to political speech.
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245,
255.
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dissemination of information of a public character, or devoted to literature, the
sciences, arts, or some special industry." 197 The Supreme Court, however,
concluded that the Post Office was severely limited in its authority to deny that
material fit the category. The necessity for choice does not permit this escape,
however, in selecting books to assign in class or to purchase for the public
library. Content concerns are equally central in selecting artistic or cultural
projects that will receive governmental support. Thus, the legal order
occasionally is forced to confront the tension between these maxims.
Even if egalitarian availability of certain media content could be
theoretically defended, practical considerations would lead to modifications in
its policy implementation. Media's inevitable multi-functionality means that
categorization of material for egalitarian distribution will always be inexact and
somewhat arbitrary. Free distribution (and completely subsidized production) of
all media content is obviously impractical. The choice, however, as to what
materials receive egalitarian distribution is hazardous. Choice will likely favor
established power-political and economic incumbents-and dominant
ideologies. Equally important, audiences will not want or value lots of potential
offerings. A more plausible goal would be to expand the availability of material
of cultural or political value to the recipient. Thus, equally distributed audience-
subsidies, something like a tax credit or "media stamps" for purchases of
edifying material, might make theoretical sense. However, producer-subsidies
for both creation and distribution will often be more practical.
Nevertheless, markets provide for material that serve other functions (for
example, the purely entertainment function). They guarantee that materials
unwisely or inappropriately excluded from subsidization will not be suppressed,
even if they are not specially supported. Markets also provide relevant
information for decisions concerning subsidies. Finally, they allow individuals
to purchase "quality" content beyond any minimal provision provided by
government. Thus, no acceptable policy justifies suppressing media markets.
Rather, the goal can only be to enrich, supplement, or sometimes restructure
these markets.
197 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148 (1946) (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 226
(1946)). The statute also denied second class mailing rates to "publications designed primarily
for advertising purposes." The Court's original "utterly without redeeming social
importance" obscenity test was apparently intended to identify material that had no relevance
for the marketplace of ideas, but was produced and consumed solely to serve an entertainment
function. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Compare Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (adopting the "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value" test) with Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (abandoning the "utterly without redeeming social importance" test is "nothing
less than a rejection of the fundamental First Amendment premises and rationale of the Roth
opinion').
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2. Meaning of Equality
If egalitarian considerations are to orient distribution policy in respect to
some media content, what "equality" means in this context needs clarification.
One common-sense egalitarian principle would be that each person gets to
spend the same amount to fulfill her desires. Equality in respect to some types
of goods sometimes means getting roughly the same dollars' worth of the good.
Thus, equality in school finance might be understood as each school district
having the same amount of money to spend per student. 198 But even in public
education, equal per student expenditures is only one possible meaning of
equality. Maybe equality is achieved if each school district has the capacity to
raise the same per student revenue by adopting the same tax rates-"district
power equalization." Or maybe equality requires that each student (or each
group of students), no matter how much it costs, gets equally educated (as
measured by their potential, by some absolute standard, or some other
measure). The proper notion of equality depends on the "right" or value at
stake in education finance. Similar, possibly even greater, complexities exist in
the media context.
As a minimum, when a poor person and a rich person spend the same
amount, fairness would seem to require that the poor get at least as valuable a
media product as do the rich. Often that is not the case. For example,
advertisers dramatically skew distribution. 199 They "subsidize" media intended
for the comparatively affluent to a much greater extent than media designed for
the poor. Often, an affluent person will be charged $.40 for a media product
that costs $1 because advertisers will pay the extra $.60. Since poor people
have less to spend on advertised products, they are worth less to advertisers.
Thus, media enterprises must charge much closer to the full cost for media
products directed at the poor-maybe $.95 for a $1 product. When price
discrimination is possible, the poor are sometimes charged more than more
affluent purchasers for the same content. Magazines and newspapers, which
benefit by being able to present advertisers with high-profile demographics of
their readers, promote their publications by offering low price or free "sample"
subscriptions in wealthy neighborhoods while charging a much higher
"regular" price in poor neighborhoods. Newspapers sometimes purposely
design their content to discourage purchases by poor people. Television drops
shows that attract huge audiences if their demographics are wrong-too old, too
rural, or too poor. The net result is that even beyond their greater wealth with
198 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that
unequal expenditures per student does not violate Equal Protection Clause).
199 This paragraph is based on BAmm, ADvERTISING, supra note 11, at 66-69.
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which to buy media products, wealthy people have their preferred media
partially paid for by advertisers.
This subsidy of the wealthy is a strikingly unfair inequality, especially if
media content relates to a person's role as a citizen and not merely as a
consumer. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,2°° the Supreme Court
struck down a poll tax. 20 1 Charging the rich and poor the same in order to enter
the voting booth was thought to deny equality given that the same "price"
placed a greater burden on the poor. But access to media content may be a
prerequisite to meaningful exercise of the franchise.202 Thus, the arguable
implication of Harper is that media content oriented toward and available to the
poor should be subsidized. The reality is the reverse. Media for the affluent
receives a significant advertiser-paid subsidy.
Putting advertising aside, equality takes on added complexity because of the
"public good" aspect of media content. One conception of equality is that each
person should control the same amount of resources devoted to the creation of
media content. This conception seems reasonable in many contexts. Equality
seems satisfied if each person has the same amount to spend on a car or on
food. Even here, however, one might be concerned about this conception of
equality. Consider, for example, two people's need for a car-the Los Angeles
resident as compared to the New York resident-or two people's need for
food-the very large person or the diabetic person with special needs as
compared to the physically small person. The needs may be very different.
Even more problematically, the more an item has public good aspects, the more
equality in individual expenditures advantages people in the mainstream. They
get more benefits than others since the combined media expenditures of all
members of a group that wants roughly the same type of media content rebound
to the benefit of each group member (to the extent of the media content's public
good aspect). If ten thousand people are willing to pay $5 a year for reporting
on school board affairs, for $5, each person gets the benefit of a $50,000 news
program. But the 100 people who will pay $5 a year for information on Haiti or
welfare policy can only expect the benefit of $500 spent on reporting on these
subjects. So for their $5, people in the two groups get products that cost
drastically different amounts to produce. Does this treat them equally?203
The lack of equivalence of what people obtain from equal personal
expenditures suggests a second conception of equality. Equality could mean that
200 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
201 See id. at 670.
202 Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 (1973) (noting that a right to a minimum amount of
education may be implicit in the right to vote).
2 03 Note that this question is not rhetorical. Different, plausible conceptions of equality
are available and an emphasis on one or another in a particular context requires defense.
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each person gets to have the same amount spent on producing media content
which she desires. If the earlier conception is labeled "equality in individual
expenditures," this second conception might be called "equality in individual
receipts."2 04 From one plausible perspective, this second conception of equality
is fair. It means that society serves each person's desire for relevant and
meaningful enlightenment to the same extent as anyone else's. In contrast, the
first, equal individual expenditures, conception could be critiqued as
mainstream domination. It dramatically rewards people for being in the
mainstream. Thus, if equality means equal respect for cultural alternatives or
equal fulfillment (as measured by expenditures) of needs for media content, the
second conception is required. On the other hand, more practically, the second
conception may seem dramatically unfair-equality in receipts means that
members of small groups get to control much more of society's resources per
person than do members of large groups.
These contending conceptions of equality have parallels in other areas. The
bargaining justified by "democratic interest group pluralism" assumes that the
degree that a group prevails should depend largely on its size. The conception
of equality suggested by this conception of democracy is "equality in individual
expenditures." Similarly, an assinilationist or melting pot perspective is very
consistent with each person controlling the same resources spent on media
content, because the result, given the public good quality of media
expenditures, is a push toward the mainstream. From the democratic pluralism
perspective, it is just tough that people with relatively unique tastes have them
satisfied less. It would be unfair, possibly elitist, for members of small groups
to get more resources per person devoted to their preferred conceptions than do
members of large groups.
In contrast, a "republican" or "dialogic" conception of democracy
emphasizes the adequate development of each seriously advanced (reasonable?)
view.205 The analogous conception of media equality is "equality in individual
receipts." Moreover, something like equal expenditures supporting each
perspective (i.e., equality in receipts) best keeps alive a cultural pluralism. Both
the dialogic conception of democracy and the positive valuation of cultural
pluralism would suggest that a person should not be disadvantaged merely
because she is different. Society ought to be concerned that people's basic
participatory needs for media content be equally satisfied.
My sense is that the demands that "equality of receipts" makes on the
community are too great. It would be somewhat unfair as well as unworkable to
204 These two conceptions would be equivalent except for the "public good" aspect of
media products.
205 See Jitrgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS
1(1994).
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stringently follow this conception of equality. Still, this second conception has
enough justification, in terms of keeping diverse views on the table and in
recognizing the value of difference, that it should be given some policy play. It
may justify, for example, some special subsidies for media responding to the
interests of small minorities.
3. Policy Summary
Markets have no natural or logical priority as a method of giving audiences
what they want or, more generally, of identifying and satisfying people's
desires. 2o6 Rather they are one device appropriately used to distribute resources
when a group concludes that reliance on a market best serves its values. Often
markets are very effective and useful devices. If not constrained by some
identifiable resource constraint, most audiences would have many wants beyond
those that can be realistically satisfied. Reliance on a market represents a policy
choice of a particular resource constraint-a conclusion that satisfying an
audience on the basis of its individual members' willingness and current ability
to pay is desirable. The possibility remains that using a different resource
constraint, which would result in satisfying different preferences, would be
preferable. The premise of satisfying people's preferences cannot justify a
choice to rely on a market rather than some alternative. This choice can only be
.made politically. The political choice ought to be made on the basis of
normative values and of a society's preferred self-conception. Neither a
libertarian nor an egalitarian democrat can accept pure reliance on the
market.207
Democratic theory supports at least some egalitarian tilt in the distribution
of media content. This recommendation applies more strongly the more the
media content in question serves political, educational, or culturally
constructive roles. The precise content of egalitarianism within this
recommendation is partly a matter of societal self-definition. I am presently
unconvinced that the choice between conceptions of equality described above
has a philosophically correct conclusion. The question is one of situational
political ethics, not universalistic political morality. Nevertheless, the coherence
of political debate, the capacity of groups and individuals to fully participate, as
206 See generally Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Properly and Contract
Efficient?, 8 HonSmA L. REV. 711 (1980) (arguing that any actually efficient regime, though
it may contain private property and free contract rules, must contain these rules in
combination with rules drawn from sources opposite to private property/free contract).
207 See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89
YALE L.J. 472 (1980) (rejecting the nondistributive conception of contract law and the
standard liberal preference for taxation as unjustified methods of redistribution).
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well as the progressive need for a society to learn to be adaptable and
progressive, requires that reasonable scope be given to desires of everyone,
even members of small groups, for satisfactory amounts of media content that
responds to their needs or preferences.
Some reliance on markets will surely make sense. Pragmatic arguments for
maximal reliance on markets cannot be ruled out abstractly. Nevertheless, even
putting aside the critiques of the market in Parts I and M, the discussion here
of various egalitarian considerations pushes toward several conclusions
concerning media policy.
First, market responses cannot be expected, even if the market worked
perfectly, to appropriately create and distribute media content. A claim that a
welfare maximization or an anti-elitist or a nonpaternalistic principle supports
maximum reliance on markets cannot be justified even if the market works
perfectly. These ideological claims are simply wrong. Welfare maximization
has no necessary relation to maximization on the basis of an existing
distribution of wealth, which is what the market relies on. And to argue against
reliance on that distribution does not equate to being elitist or paternalistic.
Second, a more appropriate measure of what the audience wants would rely
on a more egalitarian distribution of wealth or of receipts, especially more
egalitarian in respect to media content that serves political, educational, and
cultural aims. Given inequality and relative material poverty, a democratic
society needs significantly greater expenditures on and more equal distribution
of these types of media content than the market will produce.
Third, the market will be especially inadequate at providing media content
that serves the needs or preferences of smaller groups, and in particular smaller
marginalized or disempowered groups. Democratic and egalitarian theory
supports extra funding of media enterprises serving these groups.
Fourth, neither abstract theory nor market processes can provide precise
criteria for the appropriate degree of support for media content, just as no
abstract normative theory can show the precise form of equality or form of
society that law should promote. Rather, these are political questions that ought
to be resolved by the most legitimate available political processes.
Finally, all these arguments only favor promoting media content not
produced or not adequately distributed by the market. Nothing said
recommends suppressing any media content.208
208 parts II and mU argued that market dynamics and negative externalities result in
unjustified amounts of some content being produced and distributed-in some cases, content
that contributes to various harms. The economic arguments, however, did not show what
response was appropriate, and no response recommended in the policy discussion there
suggested "suppression" as I use that term here.
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C. Fulfilling Preferences
The standard claim on behalf of the market is that it provides the audience
with what it wants. Even if the distribution of wealth were a fully appropriate
criterion for determining whose wants are to be satisfied and even ignoring the
problems considered in Parts II and IIl, a critic of the market could argue either
that the market does not properly identify people's preferences or that satisfying
these market-identified wants is for some other reasons (for example,
paternalistic reasons) inappropriate. This section will explore the first claim.
1. Which Expression of Preferences?
The answer to the question of whether a market works well in satisfying
wants or preferences depends in part on how the questioner identifies
preferences. It is tautological that a perfectly functioning market responds
properly to market-expressed preferences. 209 However, people identify and
reveal preferences in many different ways and at many different times and in
many different contexts. People sometimes identify preferences impulsively,
sometimes after self-reflection, sometimes only after discussion. There is no
reason to expect these expressions to be consistent. Cass Sunstein emphasizes
that influences on the expression include factors such as social norms, social
meanings, and social role.210 As these factors change, either due to changed
context or temporal change, a person's expression of preferences is likely to
change.211 Lee Bollinger observes that "[w]e will make different choices and
209A prominent economist once told me that the market provides the only reliable
source of information about preferences-about demand. Consider, however, an ugly shirt in
the back of my closet that I never wear and that I bought in a drunken stupor-I paid $25 for
it at the store, which apparently means that I, at least then, viewed it as worth at least $25!
That is what this economist must say. A noneconomist might have said that I made a mistake
about my preference.
2 10 See Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 928-31
(1996).211 Emphasizing how social roles, norms, and meanings affect preferences, Cass
Sunstein generates a major critique of law and economics methodology. His primary point is
that preferences are not autonomous and are often effectively changed by government action.
See id. at 947-52. Sunstein generalizes a long standing criticism of standard law and
economics methodology-namely, that one reason the methodology is inherently
indeterminate in identifying "efficient" rules is that its analysis must take a set of preferences
as given, but often part of the issue in the choice of rules is to decide which preferences
should count, which are desirable, and which should be promoted. Moreover, since the
choice of rule will affect the preferences people have, reliance on any particular set for choice
of the rule seems arbitrary. See, e.g., Baker, Posner, supra note 67, at 487-93 (1978).
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behave differently depending on the context in which the choices are made." 2 12
His primary argument for media regulation is his implicit answer to the "critical
issue," namely, "that people may reasonably want to guard against, or to
moderate, certain inclinations they know they have by altering the context in
which they will exercise choice. "213
After reflection or discussion, a person may conclude that savings and
investment are vital both individually and for the country. She may vote for
greater taxes and expenditures as a form of social investment and she may
personally open a savings account. Notwithstanding the above, the day before,
like many decent people in her social group, she may have joined the
demonstration against higher taxes-her participation showing in part her
selflessness, her civic orientation. And the day after, in behavior that may not
demonstrate addiction, she may impulsively use her credit card to buy an
expensive rug, creating a debt quite inconsistent with her dedication to saving.
She might even maintain the credit card debt that charges a higher interest rate
than her savings account pays. An observer might say that there is no
inconsistency-that her preferences merely changed. However, it is equally
likely that each expression would reoccur now in its appropriate context. For
example, a person may express (and may know that she expresses) different
types of preferences when engaged politically or when voting than when she is
engaged in her market purchases. Alternatively, the observer might say that her
preferences are just more complex than one might have first guessed. But this
argument quickly devolves into the correct point that preferences depend on
contextual factors. This means that any reliance on market expression can only
identify "what she wants when acting in the market," not "what she wants."
A possible claim is that behavior or, more precisely, a certain type of
behavior-market purchases-shows a person's true preferences. In contrast,
verbal expressions reflect other factors-self-deception, conformity to a
superego, politeness, or conformity to social and role norms.214 However, this
claim seems arbitrary. Why should one particular expression be privileged over
the other? Why should the behavioral expression that tends to be the most
Therefore, as a positive analysis, the economics analysis will necessarily be inadequate since
either rule that could have been chosen may, if chosen, create the preferences that in
retrospect make it appear efficient. See C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis
ofLaw, 8 HOFTRA L. REv. 939, 966-68 (1980).
2 12 Lee C. Bollinger, The Rationale of Public Regulation of the Media, in DE OcRAcY
AND THE MASS MEDIA 355, 366 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990).
213 Id. at 366-67; see also id. at 363-64.
2 14 Verbal expressions (as well as market behavior) sometimes amount to strategic
behavior, but I do not list this possibility because of the difficulty of crediting it as behavior
that the person might believe to represent her "true" preferences.
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impulsive or the most self-centered be privileged over more deliberative, self-
reflective or other behavior? Some argument is needed before accepting an
emphasis on any expressive form. The issue of identifying the "real" preference
probably cannot be disentangled from why the question of identifying which is
"real" was asked. That is, "real" may properly mean different things in
different contexts. Then the question is: Is one or another context more basic?
Surely people believe that various, different contexts should be part of life.
Again, the point is that privileging one over another, without argument or
reason, is arbitrary.
Still, argument concerning which expressions of preference are most basic
can be made. An advocate's identification of a particular type may reflect her
conception of what it means to be a person-but people may vary in their
conception. Some people consider capacities for reflection and deliberation as
among the most defining and distinctive attributes of being human-and, if so,
they would presumably give these qualities and their expression priority.
Alternatively, persuasive arguments might show that at different moments,
maybe in relation to different issues or different objects, people ought to
privilege different methods of indicating preferences. For example, impulse
may be the best way to choose among ice cream flavors but not among political
candidates. I no longer remember which intellectual icon my mother quoted as
saying that reason is fine for unimportant decisions but for something as
important as a career or a spouse, intuition ought to prevail. (Not that she
convinced me.) Alternatively, maybe a person needs to achieve a wise
integration of methods of identifying and expressing preferences, commitments,
or values. Or maybe, even if all methods of indicating preferences are
fundamental to being a person, ordering principles could resolve (some)
conflicts. For example, since a person's wealth and the form of exchange
opportunities are dependent on the legal order, and since the choice of legal
rules that create the legal order occurs in the context where all people are
implicitly equal, maybe the political expression should have priority over the
market expression.215
Since societal structures are created by human behavior, existing structures
could be read as evidence of people's beliefs about the form of expression of
preference with which they ought to be identified. Thus, in areas where
governmental choices now prevail, maybe people consider political (or
lobbying-based) expressions as basic and market expressions as mere
epiphenomenal. This account, however, has the same problems of positivity
and circularity as did merely taking market expressions as people's "real"
preferences. It reifies the status quo. Although some of the existing order surely
reflects people's commitments, others aspects are the product of injustice and
215 See, e.g., Baker, Ideology, supra note 67; BoUinger, supra note 212.
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domination; and some aspects may reflect structures, like the market, that when
left alone operate according to their own autonomous logic in a manner
independent of human values.216
People disagree. The propriety of relying on any particular expression of
preferences is always contested just as are claims about the propriety of
differing institutional arrangements. Presumably, a rational view would be that
different expressions should prevail for different issues and in different
contexts. The choice of what forms of expression of preferences ought to rank
highest in particular contexts is clearly a matter of self-definition and
commitment. For individual self-definition, possibly the individual invests more
of her identity in particular expressions. Still, determining which expressions
shall prevail socially is inherently a matter of collective choice. All arguments
that identify democracy with self-government or self-determination suggest that
as to this fundamental question, dialogue, reflection, and democratic expression
ought to rule. In other words, granted that the audience ought to get what it
wants, whether people best or more accurately identify what media content they
want by their expenditure decisions in the market, by their political behavior, in
some combination, or by other means has no logical answer. Presumptively,
however, the prevailing answer as to which expressions of preferences to
valorize ought to result from and be open to revision by democratic processes.
2. Preferences About Preferences
The problem of determining which expressions should prevail is pushed
further by asking: Do people always prefer their (existing) preferences to
prevail? Fulfilling preferences may be an inadequate or under-specified
description of people's goal. People have preferences about their preferences. A
person can want to be a certain type of person even though she is not (yet) that
person.217 She can both want a cigarette and also want to be a person who does
not want to smoke; she can want to be a person who easily talks to strangers
but, because she is not yet that person, does not now want to talk to a stranger.
These are not merely conflicting preferences-like wanting to go both to the
movies and to the lecture tonight. Rather, this situation concerns the person's
view of the merits of even having one of her preferences.
And, of course, the same can be true of groups. A community can want to
become a certain kind of people. There exists in the collective case, however,
2 16 See JORGEN HABERMAs, 2 THE THEORY OF CoMMUNICATIvE AcnON 318-23
(1984).217 See Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL.
5,7 (1971).
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an obvious danger that the sought-after frame is really an attempt by some to
impose their orientation on others-which provides one important reason to
distinguish policies that encourage or reward change from those that coerce
conformity or that punish deviance.
People value media content for serving different purposes. Broadly, media
content serves to entertain or divert, to energize or engage, to educate or
inform, and to transform. Although the same media content may do each,
particular content is likely to serve particular functions much more than others.
And at different times, a person is likely to be primarily concerned with one or
another role. Of course, she usually would not object if the content she seeks
for one reason effectively contributes to other functions. Sometimes, however,
content chosen for one purpose will disserve a person's other goals.
Probably the best standpoint from which to evaluate how well media
content "entertains"-the first function listed above-is how well the content
satisfies present preferences. Of course, even a person's concern with
entertainment may not be quite so flat. Some people, at least some of the time,
feel they have not been satisfactorily or really entertained unless the
entertainment leaves a puzzling or potentially transformative after-taste. A
person can also value purported entertainment in peculiar ways. She could
attend the string quartet's performance not so much because she currently takes
pleasure in it, but because she expects attendance will help develop her capacity
for a richer or deeper (or merely different) pleasure than those she now
experiences, or attend in the hopes of learning to enjoy that which she thinks is
enjoyed by people like the type of person she wants to become. Moreover,
severe informational problems cause reliance on present preferences not to
unambiguously imply reliance on the market. In choosing any product, a person
might guess wrong. These informational problems are often particularly acute
in relation to media products. Knowing whether one will like reading an as-of-
yet unread book is usually harder than knowing whether one will like wearing
an as-yet unworn shirt. Still, a person's market expressions of her entertainment
preferences (ignoring the problems with the market described in earlier
sections) may be the most practical way to achieve results approximating "what
she wants."
The other listed purposes of the media-to energize, to educate, to
transform-are easily viewed in a dynamic way. A person values media content
that serves these functions in part because of changes in herself that she expects
her consumption will prompt. In other words, she values educational or
energizing or transformative content in part for creating or changing her
preferences or values. She may value First Amendment protection of
demonstrations because it results in her being confronted with expression she
would otherwise choose to avoid but with which she thinks she ought to be
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confronted. "What the person presently wants" may seem an odd standard for
evaluating material whose value lies in changing the person's preferences. Few
parents, for example, believe in leaving a child entirely unguided in her choice
of educational directions or even food choices-even the most permissive will
usually take care that materials they consider appropriate are available to the
inquiring child.
Coerced educational paternalism should apply to kids, if anyone. Respect
for people's agency argues in favor of having an individual's preferences or
choices control even in respect to media content performing these
transformative functions. The adult should be free to choose when and if she
wants to be educated or transformed and free to choose the materials or
instructors or activities that she believes will best perform these roles. She often
knows that she is not now in a position fully to know what it is that she wants to
know or to become. She can then, within the market, carefully choose agents of
change-whether activities or instructors or editors of media content-that she
believes will best serve her purposes. That is, a consumer often privileges
certain agents of change that are available in the market.
Alternatively, she might rationally privilege certain nonmarket mechanisms
for choosing some agents of change. Thus, she might, instead or in addition to
market purchases, support government subsidies for public radio or the
National Endowment for the Arts. This is key. Because people know how they
behave in markets or because they understand certain troublesome structural
tendencies of markets, they might conclude that government subsidies of
nonprofit entities, special structural rules that refashion market entities, or other
forms of government intervention will more likely result in her obtaining the
content that she desires, especially more likely as to material supportive of
desired transformations, than would total reliance on markets.
A person is necessarily faced with the question, which may be answered by
default, of whether an unregulated and unsupplemented market or, instead,
whether various nonmarket mechanisms, changes in market structures, and
market supplements, will most likely provide the content that best serves her
goals. There is no inherently right answer. But in answering this question, she
should consider not only the market's predicted ability to satisfy market-
expressed preferences. She should also consider whether the transformations
she desires for herself are most likely given reliance on market-expressed
preferences in contrast to various alternative expressions registered by
alternative mechanisms.
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3. Market-Generated Preferences
Initially, this section asked whether expressions of preferences elicited by
the market should have priority over other expressions elicited by other means
or in other contexts-and found no general reason for such a priority. A second
question considered the propriety of the market given people's concern with
what their preferences will be. An important observation related to the second
question is that people's preferences are never entirely exogenous to social
processes. However, the preferences encouraged by these social processes bear
no necessary relation to the preferences that a person wants to develop.
Therefore, a person's concern with what her preferences will be implies a need
to be able to make choices about the social processes that will, themselves,
influence her preferences.
Profit-oriented firms in competitive markets use market-based media to
encourage predictable types of preferences-preferences for the firm's
products. The media's role is central, both as carriers of ads and as products
themselves. When carrying product ads, the media are being paid to encourage
preferences for the advertised products. 218 When carrying corporate image or
editorial advertising, the media encourage a more general set of profirm or pro-
industry attitudes. Michael Schudson, despite his signature iconoclasm
illustrated by his skepticism about advertising's direct effectiveness and about
the wisdom of those in the advertising industry, describes advertising as
2 18 Professor Shiffrin argues:
Mhe promoters of the materialist message benefit from an almost classic case of market
failure. Advertisers spend some sixty billion dollars per year to disseminate their
messages. Those who would oppose the materialist message must combat forces that
have a massive economic advantage.... The inequality of inputs is structurally based.
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1281 (1983). Shifin's
characterization of this as a market failure may be debatable, but he is certainly correct that
the bias is structural and that collective rejection of this bias could be a justification to limit
"commercial speech" even though individually based speech of the same content were
allowed (and constitutionally protected). The bias is illustrated by comparing the amount spent
on "marketing" candidates and products. In 1996, all of the candidates for President and
Congress, together with their supporters (often "soft" money), spent an estimated $2 billion
on their campaigns. Meanwhile, in 1995, a single company, Proctor & Gamble, had an ad
budget of $2.78 billion, followed by Philip Morris at $2.58 billion. See R. Craig Endicott,
Leading National Advertisers, ADVERTSING AGE, Sept. 30, 1996, at S3; David E.
Rosenbaum, In Political Money Game, The Year of Big Loopholes, N.Y. Timms, Dec. 26,
1996, at 1.
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"capitalist realism." 219 That is, he emphasizes advertising's ubiquitous cultural
contributions that help create or naturalize particular sets of attitudes.
Beyond creating preferences through the content of advertising, advertisers
influence preferences, values, and knowledge in a second way. Advertisers and
audiences combine in paying for media producers' efforts. As one of the
purchasers, advertisers' preferences influence the content of even the
nonadvertising portion. And, their influence has predictable biases. They
typically prefer the following: content that is not critical of their products or
their corporate activities; content that encourages a buying mood (which often
means an uncritical mind-set); content that does not alienate any relevant group
of potential customers; and formats and content that appeal to or create
audiences that advertisers see as appropriate for their marketing goals.220
Directly through their advertising messages, but also indirectly through their
"corruption" of the journalistic or creative process of providing nonadvertising
content, advertisers encourage people to be a certain type of person-a person
who constantly wants more material goods or commercially provided services
and who, when faced with characteristic life problems, responds with purchases
as the cure-all for every dilemma.2 2 ' The shallowness and potential
dangerousness of this view of the world should be obvious. However, I will not
here try to critique this culture or set of preferences or even further defend my
claim that this is what advertisers encourage. Rather, I will turn to consider
what effect competitive media markets, even if purged of the corrupting effects
of advertisers, can be expected to have on preferences.
Independent of advertisers, profit-oriented media enterprises operating
within a market framework222 have incentives to cultivate certain types of
2 19 See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION 5-6, 209-33
(1984).220 See BAKER, ADVERTISING, supra note 11, at 44-70; JOSEPH TuRow, BREAKING UP
AMERICA: ADVERTSG AND TBE NEW MEDIA WORLD (1997).
2 2 1 Patent medicines were once "able" to cure any malady but it is not clear that modem
ads are any less all-encompassing, even if they are sometimes more subtle, in showing how
their product solves the most pressing problems confronting people with money to spend.
Turow describes the typical advertisement: "[1]t portrays a world of the intended audience, a
problem in that world, and actions that show how the product can solve the problem." See
TUROW, supra note 220, at 22.
222 The notion of an unregulated market is a misnomer-property and contract law are
themselves regulations. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 206. Legal rules inevitably
affect the cost of creating preferences. For example, tax laws increase a firm's incentive to
spend money on preference creation (on advertising) rather than on preference satisfaction (on
production) by treating advertising as entirely a current expense (currently deductible, even
though its value to the firm often lasts for several years) while investment in production
equipment must be depreciated (deducted) over a period of years. See George Mundstock,
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preferences (or persons) more than others-namely for media content that the
firm owns, controls, or has a positional advantage in producing. In economic
terms, the media firm has an incentive to devote resources to creating these
particular preferences until the marginal expenditure on the preference creation
equals the marginal gain to the firm of creating those preferences.2 3 (Of
course, as by-products or "industrial waste," media firms also sometimes spark
preferences or world views that have no explicit value to them.) This incentive
should encourage three or four tendencies, which will not necessarily push in
the same direction.
First, everything else being equal, a firm has a greater incentive to arouse
more cheaply cultivated desires or preferences. If generating an appreciation for
some type of cultural or informational item is difficult, the expenditure on
creating the desire is less likely to be worth the cost.
Second, the size of the group in which a given promotional effort can
effectively stimulate a desire will vary for different desires. The same
promotional costs (for example, the cost of coming up with the advertising
plan) may exist no matter how many "stimulated" or "influenced" purchasers
these costs are spread over. Therefore, the media firm is better off promoting
preferences for those media products with potential appeal to the larger
audience. Of course, sometimes promoting niche products can be profitable.
The point is that the expense of creating a desire for a product that will become
widely desired is more likely to be economically justified than a similar
expenditure that only creates a narrow demand. Most often this structural
feature encourages promoting lowest common denominator preferences. The
market gives the firn the most "bang for the buck" for "dumbing down" the
audience and the culture.
Possibly most important is a third tendency. An enterprise must consider its
ability to capture the potential entrepreneurial benefit resulting from any
demand it creates. Colgate's parent firm can capture much more of the desire
for Colgate toothpaste than it can of a desire for more healthy tooth brushing.
Even if the second type of ads would stimulate more gain to toothpaste
companies as a group (or to society), unless Colgate can turn the pro-tooth-
brushing ads into self-promotion (for example, by appearing to be a responsible
company) or unless it has a very high percentage of the toothpaste market, it
usually will be better off investing in creating the first preference-a preference
for Colgate toothpaste. Similarly, a copyright holder can capture more income
Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179, 1201-04 (1987);
Lawrence Summers, A Few Good Tares: Revenues Without Tears, NEw REPuBUC, Nov. 30,
1987, at 14.
223 These same incentives exist for nonmedia firms, but here the focus is on examples
from the media context.
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by encouraging a desire to watch Mean Streets than from a desire to go for a
walk on the mean streets. The Walt Disney Co. benefits more from people
enjoying Fantasyland than from their enjoyment in engaging in imaginative
fantasies (particularly if their fantasies do not require specific commodified
props). To a significant degree, the first two tendencies operate only under the
dominance of this third factor. A firm gains little from creating preferences
unless it is in a position to profit from their existence. Thus, the market
incentive is to create preferences for monopolized qualities of products rather
than generic aspects of life. And there is no incentive to generate desires (or
capacities) to engage in activities or to have preferences unrelated to saleable
products or services.
Any choice for or against reliance on an unregulated market would be
uninformed without some thought about its tendency to create certain
preferences. For example, I earlier discussed how the market, combined with
existing copyright law, creates an incentive to generate a demand for a
broadcaster's news anchorperson or her chatter rather than for uncopyrightable
news content. - 4 The same incentives provide the economic rationale for
creating the "star" system.3 The long history of serialized stories provides an
equally interesting illustration of the combination of easily aroused preferences
with monopolistically controlled elements. Movie producer's repetition of story
names and characters and broadcasters' soap operas duplicate a profitable
approach pioneered by book publishers, newspapers, and then magazines. By
creating demand for a program series or, even more dramatically, for particular
television soaps, the firm guarantees a continuing demand.
In each case, it is crucial to recognize that the market creates not only an
incentive for a firm to produce items that it owns (or controls), but also an
incentive to create preferences for these items. In the star system, for example,
the firm benefits by cultivating preferences for particular actors under contract.
Even better, it benefits from preferences for star cartoon characters, created by
employees of the media firm, since the firm does not have to renegotiate the
cartoon characters' contracts or worry about their potentially embarrassing off-
224 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
225 A second element of "brand" identity-including serial publications, story
serialization, stars, prominence of book authors or movie directors-is its capacity to reduce
the audience's informational search costs, a reduction based on the premise that the brand
continuity correlates with quality continuity. This feature gives products with the brand
identity a competitive advantage, although the advantage may not correspond to the media
products that the audience would have wanted advantaged if they did not have to worry about
search costs. This point, although related, is separate from the concern discussed in the text
about the economic incentive to create preferences for particular types of content.
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job activities or their untimely death.226 Most observers concede that to become
a star "requires a modicum of talent," 227 but still emphasize that "successful
[stars or performance] groups... are made." 228
Creation of preferences for the firms' "owned" products can have
significant cultural effects. In encouraging an emphasis on uniquely engaging
video for broadcast news, an effect that may be in decline as broadcasters
economize by using syndicated video feeds, copyright law causes broadcasters
to benefit by nurturing a desire for this ownable format rather than a desire for
depth reporting. The star system arguably teaches a form of individualism that
towers over emphases on social or structural forces in either news or dramatic
stories. It also may encourage economically wasteful amounts of individual
effort toward becoming a "star" by people who will not succeed at that but who
could have been very successful at something else. 229
A possible fourth tendency in market-based media's effect on preference or
value creation may be to foster values and perspectives that are held by those
who control the creation of media content or, more cynically, that benefit those
in power when held by audiences. 230 The increasing national and global
concentration of media ownership into the hands of five to ten megamedia
giants creates the danger that these few owners will guide development of
political (and presumably cultural) preferences along their preferred lines-what
might be called the "Berlusconi danger." 231 Fully competitive markets might
mute this danger-markets might force production along lines dictated by
economic efficiency. However, many media enterprises, especially entities like
most daily newspapers and television stations that have some degree of
monopoly power, produce extraordinary operating profits. These profits leave
226 See Madow, supra note 50, at 191-96.
227 BOGART, supra note 32, at 227.
228 Id. at 228 (quoting recording executive). Of course, the market does not push toward
this result unaided by law. Law, for example, affects the drift toward a star system by
recognizing a "right of publicity." See Madow, supra note 50, at 130.
229 See FRANK & CooK, supra note 50, at 101-23; Madow, supra note 50, at 216-17.
230 Although referring more to its general cultural content than to its political valence,
Bogart asserts that "those who produce [the commercial culture] often prefer not to consume
it themselves.... The crowning condemnation of the media system is that it is engaged in a
cunning and deliberate exploitation of public foibles by people who know better." BOGART,
supra note 32, at 231.
231 C. Alexander Stile, Media Moguls, United, N.Y. Trms, Aug. 28, 1995, at A15
(arguing that Congress' moves to deregulate media ownership will contribute to growth of
media conglomerates that will increasingly control politics). See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra
note 62. As Italy's major media magnate, Berlusconi relied heavily on both enormous wealth
and media ownership to become Prime Minister of Italy-with his media ownership itself
subsequently becoming a major issue put to vote in a national referendum.
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considerable room for media barons to indulge their own preferences. Often
both their preferences and the most profitable use of their media properties
relate to securing and exercising political power.
Policy analyses usually begin by identifying likely impacts of particular
structures. I have suggested four tendencies that are likely to influence
significantly the preferences that a market-based media fosters. If these
suggestions are right, critical policy questions become: Are these the
preferences that people want to have? How powerful is the market-based
tendency for these to be created? What alternatives are there?
The first question, what preferences do people want to have, again raises
the issue noted earlier: Which expressions of desire ought to control for these
purposes? The crucial factor here is that when the concern is how the (market)
structure encourages certain preferences, there is little opportunity, no
standpoint, within the market to reject the structure. This choice can only be
made from outside, presumably from within the political realm. Moreover, this
standpoint is suggested if, as I suspect, most people's image of both what it
means to be human and how they conceive of themselves requires that they
view the identification of the type of preferences they want to have, and the
type of person they want to be, a matter for reflection rather than impulsive or
consumerist consideration. Arguably, discursive processes are much better than
market practices for eliciting the most thoughtful expressions. More
fundamentally, the notion of democracy is founded in a commitment to both
people's equality and their agency. The first commitment suggests that these are
issues about which all should have a say, an equality not represented by market
processes. The second suggests the necessity of political choice rather than
leaving the outcome to the autonomous logic of a system that operates
according to its own logic. Thus, self-reflective, presumably dialogically
developed, democratically expressed answers, should have priority.
If asked, if making a political choice, a person may well not identify with
the type of person that the market predictably encourages, but this depends on
what she would choose to become. The market may work fine if she wants to
be ever more caught up in consumer culture. But if not, she may be disinclined
to choose the market as a primary agent of preference creation. If people do not
want to become the type of person that the market encourages, what would they
want instead? Many broad alternatives could be sketched. For instance, my
guess is that many people's self-conception is as a person who would prefer to
appreciate a broader range of cultural phenomenon at more complex levels and
with higher levels of enjoyment, a person who lives a culturally "richer" life, a
person who is constantly increasing her understanding of both herself and the
world, and a person who (either individually or as part of political
communities) makes better choices about both the social and physical world.
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Many people would like to be more reflective, more self-reliant, more
politically energized, more responsive to the needs of others, and more
interested in being informed. And many want to be inspired and spurred to
responsible social and political activity. For these transformations, the operation
of the market is likely to be inadequate. Of course, a preference to be
encouraged or taught to become such a person does not end what many people
hope to get from the media. Entertainment is extraordinarily important.
The four tendencies described above will not give market entities any
particular incentive to fulfill such a desire to become an "improved" person or
for society to become a "better" society. The question then is: What structure
would? Presumably an alternative structure must either rely more on nonmarket
based incentives or more on systematic modifications of market incentives.
Broadly, two sorts of nonmarket incentives seem most relevant: (1) people's or
collectivities' internal incentives to remain true to personal or professional
values or standards; and (2) material or status incentives granted independently
of the economic marketplace. Legal policy greatly affects the extent that these
alternative incentives exist and are behaviorally effective. As for internal
incentives, their role could be enhanced by laws that either mandated or
provided greater opportunities for varying structures of control within the media
industries. Law could make it easier or harder for journalist-owned or nonprofit
foundation-owned media entities to exist. Law could encourage or require that
journalisIs have a greater say in content decisions-recognizing that not only
government but also owners and markets should not "intru[de] into the function
of editors. "232 The law could prohibit the "repression of [editor's] freedom by
private interests"-specifically, by corporate owners which are
"nongovernmental combinations" that should not be allowed to "impede the
free flow of ideas." 233 As for material incentives that are independent of the
market, the legal order can provide subsidies to varying production activities
and status systems or can tax other market practices.
This section claims that reliance on such techniques could result in the
production and consumption of media content more in line with people's
preferences than does the unadorned market. The claim is premised on a
number of observations and preliminary assertions. It embodies observations
that alternative expression of preferences-expressions made within different
contexts or through different structures-exist and that these different
expressions may differ and partially conflict, that one important set of
preferences relate to what type of person a person wants to be and to what type
of society people want to have, that reflective or discursive (as opposed to
market) expression of these preferences ought to be privileged, and finally, that
232 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974).
233 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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the market will be inadequate to the extent that people would choose to be
different from what the market, operating on its own internal logic, would try
to make them.
V. WHERE TO?
The market cannot be expected to provide the audience what it wants. That
is my primary conclusion. This conclusion directly conflicts with the
deregulatory mood that has swept the country over the past two decades. It
directly conflicts with recent moves to reduce rather than increase the funding
for public broadcasting, for the humanities, and for the arts. It has direct
implications for postal and telecommunications policy. It weighs in on virtually
all media and communications issues that the country has taken up-and implies
that there are additional reform issues that should be raised.
I have made no attempt at empirical measurement. Nevertheless, the claim
is that the failure of the market described here is not marginal. The divergence
between what the market produces and what people want can reasonably be
expected to be massive. Improvement requires large-scale and multifaceted
government intervention. Each section pointed to a different set of problems.
Part II focused on the "public good" aspect of media content. After
someone creates media content, anyone can "consume" the content without any
lessening of its availability for consumption by others. This possibility of
"nonrivalrous use" justifies the prediction that, at least assuming media firms'
inability to price discriminate fully, the market will drastically underproduce
and inefficiently supply media content. The public good aspect also leads to
natural monopolies of particular media products. Appropriately applying
monopolistic competition analysis and again assuming inadequate price
discrimination, the prediction follows that the market success of some media
products will not be justified. Rather, their success will cause the failure or
nonproduction of other more valuable media products. In other words, market
competition can lead to inefficient results that disserve audiences.
Part MII emphasized that "what someone wants" has economic significance
only in relation to some budget constraint-only in relation to its cost as well as
the person's wealth. Even if on a given evening someone would love to see Our
Town performed live by her favorite Hollywood stars in a superbly refashioned
local theatre, she may "prefer" a free television offering or a $8 movie given
how much each alternative costs. A person's fantasies about what she abstractly
"most wants" may be important for self-exploration and provide useful insights,
but for economic or policy purposes, the inquiry usually takes place within the
context of a budget constraint that makes proper price assignments crucial.
Thus, any claim that the market gives the audience what it wants must mean
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"what it wants" given the cost of the items that it receives. That is, the claim
must assume that the audience is charged no more or no less than the cost of
providing the product.
The existence of significant externalities casts doubt on the "efficiency" or
welfare-promoting quality of a market. Of course, virtually all economic
activities produce some externalities, a fact that may provide a general reason to
be suspicious of blind reliance on markets. In many contexts, various legal
devices effectively internalize what otherwise would be major externalities; 234
those that remain may be less significant. However, the media sphere is
different. Part I argued that the production and, even more, the consumption
of media content create huge and vitally important positive and negative
externalities. For example, the quality of democracy as well as a considerable
amount of criminal violence are arguably in large part externalities of media
products. Because of the market's failure to internalize such externalities,
audiences are charged much more or much less than the real cost for many
media products. People appear to demand, and they consume, a much smaller
quantity of media products that have positive externalities than they would if
these media products were properly priced. The reverse is true for media
products with significant negative externalities.
Part IV rejected the adequacy of the market's determination of audience
preferences. First, it challenged the propriety of relying on a particular budget
constraint-the existing distribution of wealth-to identify what people want.235
A democratic society should fulfill, at least up to a certain level, people's
desires for some types of media content irrespective of their ability to pay.
Consequently, the market can be predicted to underproduce and overcharge for
media content, especially "edifying" content desired by the poor and, maybe,
by members of some "marginal" groups.
Part IV also observed that people express different preferences in different
contexts. Moreover, the very institutional structures that measure preferences
often strongly influence (if not create) these preferences. To the extent the
234 Mandated internalizations of costs generated by media products are often inconsistent
with the constitutional ideal of a free press (for example, consider imposing liability for all
libels or for creation of emotional stress or violations of privacy). Society could, however,
decide to provide compensation for some of these harms out of general tax revenues without
abridging any notion of the First Amendment. Possibly, it could even raise money for the
compensation from a general tax placed on the media since this would not suppress any
particular content and it would be a cost related to media production. See generally Frederick
Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321 (1992) (examining the
possibility of reassigning the costs of a free speech system in a way that would achieve the
dual goals of retaining a strong free speech system and lessening the disproportionate burdens
of that system on those who have historically paid for it).235 This constraint had been accepted for purposes of the analysis in Parts II and Ill.
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market operates autonomously, its creation of preferences is independent of
people's commitments and value choices. For these reasons, the propriety of
primary reliance on market elicitation of preferences is doubtful. Market
expression and creation of preferences significantly reflect the autonomous logic
of a social subsystem-the market-rather than people's discursive and
reflective practices. More dialogically elicited preferences, possibly more
politically expressed preferences, arguably have a better claim to priority. At
least if people's preferences as to which expressions should have greatest
weight and their preferences as to what type of preferences should be most
encouraged are to control, then they must be able to act outside the market to
determine the extent of this institutional framework's role.
In sum, from the perspective of providing people what they want, media
markets are subject to the following criticisms. They provide much too much
"bad" quality content-bad meaning content that has negative externalities. 236
They also may produce a wasteful abundance of content responding to
mainstream tastes. 237 Otherwise, the main problems are underproduction.
Markets predictably provide both inadequate amounts and inadequate diversity
of media content.238 Especially inadequate is their production of "quality"
content-quality meaning content that has positive externalities.239 Likewise,
civically, educationally, and maybe culturally significant content preferred by
the poor is inadequate.240 Moreover, smaller groups will often be served
inadequately, either in relation to democracy's egalitarian commitments,24 1 or
due to the consequences of monopolistic competition. 242 Finally, the market is
unlikely to reflect people's arguably more mature or more considered
conceptions of the content they want, especially of the content that relates to the
type of people they want to be.243
No single policy will provide an adequate response to the market's
inadequacies. Moreover, the extent of the inadequacies is not subject to
objective measurement for reasons that are not merely technical. Both the
balance and weight to be given various externalities are matters of normative
dispute. For example, in a latter article, I intend to show that the choice
between various media policies, as well as between various styles of journalism,
will implicitly reflect a choice between various opposing conceptions of
236 See supra Part m.
237 See Supra Part ]I (concerning ruinous competition).
238 See id.
239 See supra Part m.
240 See supra Part IV.
241 See id.
242 See supra Part II.
243 See supra Part IV.
19971
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
democracy. 244 Therefore, here I will only offer comments about the broad
directions and general principles of possible intervention.
Given the tendency to massively underproduce content that ought to be
considered "good" or "useful" or "edifying and enriching," policy discussions
ought first to consider what types of content falls into these categories. This
contentious discussion should recognize that this "good" material will differ for
different people-and the market will most dramatically fail to provide such
material in relation to the needs and preferences of the poor and members of
marginal groups. This failure is an aspect of institutionally based oppression.
One response would be not to identify categories of good content but rather
circumstances where people who are making decisions about content are most
likely to be thoughtfully attempting to choose "good" content and then to
subsidize those decisions. In any event, the government ought to mandate or
encourage structures, grant subsidies, or generate economic incentives that are
likely to encourage production and distribution of such valuable content.
Useful subsidies can take many forms. Possibilities include: direct subsidies
for non-market-controlled production of content, such as public broadcasting;
mail or tax subsidies for content produced by nonprofits and ideologically
oriented organizations; support for professional journalism education, which
could increase the supply of creators of quality content and hopefully increase
the likelihood that producers will resist mere market pressures to debase
production; subsidies given through entities like national and state endowments
for the arts and humanities to support both creation and delivery of cultural
materials; support for public libraries; and support for media literacy education
that could increase the relative demand for high quality content. Although there
is room for debate, the implication of the analysis in this Article is that each of
these should receive much greater governmental support than it has in the past.
In contrast, recent moves have been in the direction of reducing public support
for each.
Beyond subsidies, equally appropriate are policies directed at encouraging
the allocation of decisionmaking control over content creation to people with
commitments to quality rather than merely to the bottom line (for example, the
content creators themselves or decentralized control by people involved in the
media enterprise). This goal, for example, supports a drastic revitalization of
antitrust enforcement in the media area, with the policy being guided by First
Amendment concerns that go beyond traditional market analyses.245 It also
supports the following: the long standing FCC policy of favoring license grants
244 C. Habermas, supra note 205.
245 Cf. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitnt, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051,
1051 (1979) (calling for the courts to consider not only the economic approach to antimst, but
a political values approach as well).
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to applicants whose principals live in the community or, even better, whose
principals were themselves involved in management; tax policies that favor
family ownership rather than, as was long the case, that favor sale to
conglomerate interests; labor laws that favor a stronger editorial voice for
workers; and business organization laws that favor media ownership by
workers or nonprofit organizations.
The above suggestions are merely a beginning. The three key claims are:
First, massive subsidies of a wide variety of sorts are justified. Second, rules
relating to the distribution of decisionmaking power are appropriate objects of
attention, not with the goal of making media entities more responsive to the
market (which is the typical goal of much policy discussion) but with the goal
of making them more responsive to the goal of creating "quality" content.
Third, in discussions about particular proposals, attention to market
considerations should not divert the focus from more important normative or
evaluative choices. As suggested in Part IV, these collective-definitional choices
about how to supplement and how to sculpt the market ought to be the center of
media policy.
These policy guides have focused on responses to the market's failure to
provide enough quality content. The issue of too much "bad" content also cries
out for attention. In fact, probably the most common political reaction to the
mass media is to identify and then attempt to suppress or restrict popularly
conceived "bad" content. In contrast, the civil hbertarian premise warns that
suppression is seldom the wisest or most effective way to handle a social
problem. This premise about the imprudence of suppression applies even more
forcefully to laws that would prohibit activities, like gaining access to freely
produced media content, that people plausibly view as aspects of their basic
freedom.
Virtually inevitable uncertainties warrant great caution concerning any form
of suppression. First, often people will disagree about whether to characterize
some media effects as good or bad. The ideals of liberty and democracy imply
opportunities for collective promotion of majoritarian conclusions, but
suppression of minority views contradicts these ideals. A second uncertainty
concerns the inevitably speculative quality of trying to predict the quantity of
various "bad" effects that can properly be attributed to the media. Even given
certainty that media portrayals of violence lead to some antisocial violence, it is
still important to know, how often? And what is the content's value to those
who are not led to violence (or even to those who do commit the violence)?
These inquires are important because a portrayal's bad effects should be
weighed in a balance that also considers any good that it does.
Once this point is noted, an array of additional questions opens up. For
some of the audience, do these portrayals lead to a revulsion against violence
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and, behaviorally, to reduced violence by some people? For other people, do
the portrayals lead to increased readiness to resist unjust oppression-do they,
in part, promote a liberating psychology? Of course, also relevant would be
whether they promote wise or self-destructive resistance to oppression. Will bad
consequences that are now attributable to particular bad content become, if that
content is suppressed, attributable to other, nonsuppressed content-will
suppression be effective at reducing evils? Even if the net effect of some content
is bad, how often will content with net social benefits also be suppressed
because mistaken for that without social benefits? Or how often will this content
be discouraged out of fear that it will be so identified? Whose evaluation of
these costs and benefits ought to prevail? Given the complexity and variability
of responses to any specific content, is the "real" problem not the content but
the failure of society to adequately educate people to be good media "readers"
of violent content? In contrast to education and transformation, would
suppression be a disempowering and ultimately less effective response to the
problem of media-stimulated violence?2 Or is a more serious problem-the
"real" problem-the set of commercial incentives given to media creators and
producers who, if given the opportunity, would have often chosen to produce
richer, more complex, and potentially more beneficial content. If this is the
problem, is suppression misdirected as compared to polices directed at changes
in the structure of incentives or changes in the structure of who gets to make
content decisions?
These questions are not meant to be paralyzing. People continually do
make decisions reflecting their beliefs about net consequences of materials as
well as their views about the quality of media content. They are likely,
especially if empirically informed, to do so relatively intelligently. But it is
disquieting that the more popular policy route, the easier approach for the
political entrepreneur, is to focus on (purportedly) objectionable material and to
respond with calls for suppression. Positive alternatives often involve greater
programmatic complexity. Promoting them requires greater, and more difficult,
explanatory effort. Implementation often requires expenditure of resources that
overtly come from taxpayers. These features can generate opposition from
those with wealth or property and provide opportunities to nitpick proposals and
to obscure real issues. Is this in part what happened in 1993 and 1994 with the
246 Some research indicates that viewers of violent sexual videos, as compared to
nonviewers, have more aggressive attitudes toward women and unsympathetic attitdes
toward rape victims, but viewers of the same videos followed by appropriate debriefing have
greater sensitivity toward issues of violence toward women than they had before seeing the
videos. See Daniel Linz & Edward Donnerstein, The Effects of Cowzter-Information on the
Acceptance of Rape Myths, in PoRNoaRAIHw: REsEARCH ADVANCES & PoucY
CONSIDMAIONS 259, 263-67, 284 (Dolf Zillman & Jennings Bryant eds., 1989).
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health care debate? And surely it occurred repeatedly in response to proposals
to require greater expenditures on quality television for kids. The paucity of
good children's television is obvious. But rather than attempt to create more
good material for which there is an apparent consumer demand, the more vocal
political response is to be repressive. First, the response was to ban indecency.
More recently, it has been to use societal resources to manufacture V-chips and
to apply "ratings" to help people engage in private censorship, despite a lack of
good evidence that they will use the censorship technology when made
available. 247 In addition, the FCC has now taken steps to implement the 1990
Children's Television Act by requiring stations to provide children three hours
a week of educational programming.248
In sum, practical considerations suggest avoiding suppression as the
regulatory route. Suppression contradicts important noneconomic values, is
often likely to produce worse externalities than those it suppresses, and can
reduce important positive externalities. Advocacy and implementation of
suppression often divert attention from more serious problems and divert
creative energy from finding more complex, usually structural, but more
meaningful solutions. Moreover, this diversion may have a class-based bias.
The more intelligent responses will often involve changes in property rights and
structural rules while suppression will seldom significantly limit opportunities
desired by the wealthy. Clearly, however, one way to reduce the influence of
"junk" is to increase the incentives and opportunities to create quality content
and to make this quality content more available-to lower its cost to the
audience.
Paternalism lies not in governmental intervention but in refusing to treat
intervention as a matter of democratic choice. Unquestioning nonintervention is
paternalistic in either of two ways. Cynically, it limits people's choice to act
politically, with this limitation designed to benefit systematically those people or
entities that profit from nonintervention.249 More sadly, unquestioning
nonintervention may represent a paternalistic refusal to believe in people's
capacity for democratic decisionmaking to make their media more to their
liking and more conducive to their aspirations.
247 See Frank Rich, The Idiot Chip, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1996, at A23. But cf. Clyde
H. Farnsworth, CGzp to Block TV Gore Popular in Canada Test, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 28, 1996,
at A2 (discussing the V-chip's popularity in Canada).
248 See Lawrie Mifflin, U.. Mandates Educational TVfor Chidren, N.Y. T]MES, Aug.
9, 1996, at A16.
249 To be more precise, since the government always intervenes at least to the extent of
creating and enforcing a legal framework of property rights, this purported nonintervention
benefits those who profit most from conventional or status quo conceptions of
nonintervention.
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